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ABSTRACT
This thesis stresses the centrality today of synthetical sociological theories, 
such as those of Habermas, Giddens and Alexander, but criticises them for 
neglecting the problem of collective subjectivity. The failure to consider this 
topic stems from deep problems in the history of sociology. Emerging from 
the social thinking of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment, 
sociology has been keen on perceiving social life in the mould of a 
polarisation between active individuals and passive societies or, more 
generally, social systems or structures. Although the dialectics between subject 
and object plus the notion of interaction have allowed for bridges between 
those two poles, a crucial idea has not been receiving enough attention. Marx 
- with the concept of social class - and Parsons - with the concept of collective 
actor - produced two important departures from the presuppositional universe 
of the Enlightenment. But their elaboration does not suffice and, more 
regrettably however, those synthetical theories have not acknowledged and 
worked on the problems and concepts Marx and Parsons highlighted. The 
concept of collective subjectivity is, therefore, introduced to resume their 
insights and connect them to the issues and formulations put forward in 
synthetical theories. A critique of the philosophy of the subject, aiming at its 
decentring, is moreover pursued, for Marx and Parsons still embraced some 
of its main tenets. The concept of collective causality holds centre stage for 
the definition of collective subjectivity. Alongside collective causality, 
interaction, dialectics, levels of (de)centring, the syllogism of the general, the 
particular and the individual, plus multidimensionality, furnish the categorial 
axis for the development of the thesis. Concerned with general theoretical 
questions, this study makes, however, reference to "middle range" theories, 
in order to develop, ground its propositions and suggest ways in which its 
concepts may be useful in more empirically oriented research.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the nineteenth century beginnings of sociological theory, there has 
been much attention paid to individuals as actors and to societies, systems and 
structures. This stems from a commitment to some underlying tenets of the 
Enlightenment, even though it is not necessarily acknowledged, and from the 
almost unavoidable dependence of sociology upon the universe of ideas that 
furnish the ideological core of modern bourgeois society. Some alternative 
perspectives have been suggested to these two poles of sociological theory. 
Marx’s and Parsons’ conceptualisations stand out amongst them. Nevertheless, 
the very important and interesting syntheses which have been developing in the 
last decades do not take much notice of these alternatives and hold fast to 
individual actors, on the one hand, and to systems or structures, as passive 
entities, on the other, as the two main elements in their explanatory schemes.
The objective of this thesis is to address precisely this shortcoming. The 
concept of collective subjectivity lies, therefore, at its core. It is accompanied 
by a specific notion of causality, namely collective causality, which will allow 
for the understanding of social systems as something else than merely passive, 
inert entities. It is far from my intention to underrate the role of individual, 
reflexive actors in social life. On the contrary, the concept of collective 
subjectivity will be presented herein as an attempt at proposing a view of 
social systems qua systems of action, which, however, possess their own 
distinctive properties, amongst which collective causality should be placed. 
This hinges on their level of centring, for the definition of which the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces that are at work within and on social systems 
are crucial.
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This study is cast simultaneously as a critique of ideology, whereby the 
history of sociological theory will be read from a particular angle, and as a 
positive approach to theory building. It adopts a deconstructive strategy, 
although not a post-modern one, insofar as it aims at producing theoretical 
insights of greater degree of adequacy. Hence, it owes more to Marxism than 
to post-structuralism in this regard. It moves in a very general theoretical level, 
although I shall throughout refer to more empirical issues. Whilst a 
contribution at this theoretical level, I intend to contribute to the ongoing 
development of a critical theory able to explain and possibly influence social 
change in the contemporary world. This is an aspiration which it shares with 
several strands of that synthetical movement.
This thesis is inspired in its mode of presentation by Marx’s method of 
exposition in Capital. Its development is, therefore, theoretically organised 
around the exposition of categories and the order of exposition constitutes part 
of the argument. We begin from the most superficial layers of representation 
of social reality in modem ideology - individual and society, or its equivalents, 
systems and structures - and move further, deeper into the fabric of social life. 
This is achieved in part through the analysis of Marx’s and Parsons’ concepts 
of collective subjectivity, but acquires more radical expression in part three, 
when my own conceptualisation is introduced. In part three the method of 
exposition is further elaborated, since we start with the basic "cell" of social 
life - interaction - and gain a more comprehensive view, via the discussion of 
social systems’ properties, including their collective causality. Thus, starting 
with abstract notions of individual and society, I proceed to develop concepts
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which allow for the establishment of a concrete universal which, at a very 
general theoretical level, provide for a more comprehensive understanding of 
social life. Collective subjectivities hold centre stage in this conceptualisation, 
incorporating and surpassing these abstract notions.
I shall therefore present in part one the main problems on which the thesis 
will critically focus. In chapter one, I shall discuss the character of the 
contemporary movement towards heterogeneous syntheses and expound the 
central sociological definitions of action and order as well as the key notions 
of causality in the discipline. The partial alternatives to that initial polarisation 
will then be analysed and the historical origins of such ideas will be 
investigated and the contraposition between "methodological individualists" and 
so-called "holists" will be considered. Chapters two and three will provide 
occasion for an examination of the two main syntheses in contemporary 
sociology, those of Giddens and Habermas. I shall endeavour to bring out their 
enormous contribution to our thinking, but also stress how much they hark 
back to those two traditional poles, irrespective of how much they profit from 
insights that represent advances with respect to a clear-cut separation between 
individual and society.
Part two will fasten upon the two main concepts of collective subjectivity 
thus far broached in sociological theory. Marx’s concept of social class and 
Parsons’ concept of collective actor will be the focus and their paramount 
importance will be emphasised. On the other hand, their shortcomings will also 
be pointed out and criticised.
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Part three will consider the concept of collective subjectivity in connection 
with the themes of action and interaction, on the one hand, and of structure 
and system, on the other. The main issues raised by contemporary theorists, in 
particular those oriented towards synthesis, will then be brought to bear on the 
unfolding of the argument. Chapter six will deal with some basic notions and 
introduce - via interaction - concepts I shall expand on in the following 
chapters. Chapter seven will substantiate the concepts of collective subjectivity 
and collective causality, and, thereby, the central claim of the thesis. Chapter 
eight will focus on multidimensionality, hierarchy and their relation to 
collective subjectivity. Finally, in the conclusion, three goals will be pursued. 
First I shall undertake to establish clearly and effectively the means to link the 
theory hitherto carved out to empirical investigations. Next it will be applied 
in a more detailed manner to a specific empirical question. Finally a reiteration 
of concepts will close the thesis.
The concepts of collective subjectivity, collective causality and levels of 
centring have a great role to play in sociology, both in terms of general theory 
and empirical research. In the first case because its very absence in 
contemporary theories is in fact a step back in relation to what was achieved 
by Marx and Parsons. Insofar as theorists are oblivious to the problem, they 
cannot, however, deal with it in theoretical terms nor profit from these 
empirical researches that somehow focus on collectivities. They in fact can 
deal with them only in ad hoc ways, as we shall see in Giddens* and even 
Habermas’ cases. But the absence of these concepts in more empirically 
oriented research is equally problematic. For sociologists who grapple with
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more empirically based problems cannot avoid dealing with collective 
subjectivities either, as these constitute a central phenomenon in social life. 
For, while these sociologists deal with this problem, they constantly overlook 
the subtle ways in which collective subjectivities exert impact upon social life, 
even when they acknowledge their presence in the course of their research. A 
more precise and explicit conceptualisation of the problem can provide new 
insights, clues and questions for empirical investigation. The almost 
iconographic case of the relation between Protestantism and modernity - with 
its exclusive concentration on "material" and "formal" causalities, whereby the 
Protestant sects and their collective causality receive very little attention - will 
furnish occasion for a specific illustration of this last contention.
* * *
Numerous persons have contributed, in one way or another, to the 
development of this thesis. Nevertheless, I want to acknowledge those who 
have been especially important for its completion in intellectual terms. My 
supervisor, Dr. Alan Swingewood has throughout been very helpful. Prof. 
Nicos Mouzelis has carefully read and commented on large sections of this 
study. Jean-Karine Chalaby, Creso Franco, Terry Mulhal, Claudia Rezende, 
Myriam Santos and Monica Herz, contributed insights, with discussions of 
different aspects of the social sciences, to the unfolding of the ideas presented 
herein. Philip Thomas carried out a final revision of the English. To some 
extent at least, I am afraid they are responsible for the final outcome of my
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thesis. Most probably unintendedly and with me as the intended core of this 
network, they comprise a collective subjectivity which has been crucial to the 
production of this piece of work. If they cannot be blamed for its 
shortcomings, they are in part responsible for the final overall result Happily 
enough, I could count on them.
This thesis was made possible by the generous financial support of the 
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq) of the Brazilian Ministry for Science 
and Technology.
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PARTI
SYNTHESIS AND CAUSALITY
CHAPTER I
ACTIVE AND CONDITIONING CAUSALITY IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
^FRAGMENTATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
The last fifteen or twenty years have witnessed a very peculiar 
development within sociological theory. Referring to the whole of the social 
sciences, Quentin Skinner coined the expression "the return of grand theory".1 
Whatever the applicability of this formula to the sociology and history of 
science, to anthropology and other social disciplines, it seems more appropriate 
to speak of a particular development of sociological theory rather than of a 
reawakening of dormant theoretical forces. Of course, we should not ignore the 
positivist hostility to general theorisings and its still pervasive influence in 
sociology. If this has been a dominant tendency, it has never been, however, 
able to brush aside truly theoretical flights, which recently gathered 
momentum. Inasmuch as one bears in mind that several and sometimes very 
divergent schools of sociology have kept their relatively independent evolution, 
it may be safely stated that the most ambitious theoretical attempts in the last 
two decades have consistently aimed at building synthetical approaches. The 
names of Jurgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens are probably the best known 
within this approach, which also includes the linkage of what, in the United 
States, has often been treated as the macro/ micro dimensions, of neo- 
Parsonianism and of other developments in Europe.
After years of predominance of what some authors have called the 
"orthodox consensus", especially in Anglo-American academic life, sociology
Quentin Skinner, "Introduction" to Idem, ed., The Return of Grand Theory 
in the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
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had to face what at the time Gouldner referred to as its "impending crisis".2 
In opposition to functionalism, above all against its Parsonian version, a good 
number of alternatives vigorously sprang up in the sixties. Apart from 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and, in a theoretically less ambitious sense, 
Goffman’s dramaturgy, most of the ideas that achieved more visibility during 
this period had been developing concomitantly with functionalism. Exchange 
theory, symbolic interactionism and, particularly, phenomenology already had 
long histories. All the same, they received a new impulse with the breakdown 
of the massive influence of that current.3
With some exaggeration, and adopting a terminology widespread in 
American sociology, Jeffrey Alexander explained these theories both as an 
answer to problems in the flawed Parsonian theoretical synthesis, and as an 
inevitable and permanent disagreement on theoretical grounds, inherent within 
the social sciences, which leads to diversified theoretical enterprises. Against 
Parsons’ dominant concern with normative regulation and the impact of social 
structures upon individuals through socialisation, these alternative theories 
highlighted the component of action in social life, with strong emphasis on its 
micro dimension. On the other hand, structuralism, conflict theory and several
2Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis o f Western Sociology, London, 
Heinemann, 1971 (1970), particularly chap. 10.
3Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Cambridge, Polity, 1989 
(1984), p. xv. See also Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and 
Political Theory, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1976. The extent to which one can 
properly speak about an "orthodox consensus" during this period is, of course, 
debatable, unless one wishes, as Bernstein does, to oppose to it basically a 
hermeneutic view, which was, in fact, at least already partially incorporated by 
some of those authors.
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strands of historical sociology worked out general explanations of social life, 
of macro and collectivist character.4 Simultaneously, a revival in Marxist 
theory took place. However generally attached to the so-called "macro’1 themes, 
it was quite usual to see its participants share the same field of debate of 
academic sociology, as the discussions of the young and the late Marx, 
structuralist Marxism, phenomenological Marxism and the like demonstrate. 
In the meantime the Frankfurt School found a renewed and wider audience.5
Whereas the main thrust of these not by chance strongly polemical schools 
was to stretch the frontiers of their own particular forms of grasping the social 
world, what Alexander precisely named "the new theoretical movement" has 
shown a different choice of goals.6 The several trends that superseded the 
influence of functionalism, he says, transformed the general debate and 
permeated the empirical works of middle range. Their strength stemmed from 
their one-sidedness, a welcome corrective to the tightness and the all- 
embracing character of Parsonian sociology. These one-sided strategies 
eventually led these schools towards a deadlock, which they had no tools to 
overcome. The ultimate result of this complex development was the 
formulation of a work programme of a very diverse nature. Heirs to different
4Jeffrey C. Alexander, "The New Theoretical Movement" in Neil J. 
Smelser, ed., Handbook o f Sociology, Newbury Park/ Beverly Hills, Sage, 
1988, pp. 84ff.
5A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, London, Macmillan, 1988 
(1979), p. 235; Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1973, p. xv.
6J. C. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 89-93.
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traditions and at first without direct communication, some sociologists have 
followed a similar route. This route is the one I have mentioned above, leading 
to heterogeneous theoretical constructions, which, in spite of that, possess a 
basic common feature: the attempt at synthesis. This movement has also 
contributed to a greater internationalisation of sociological theory, which 
speaks nowadays, for the first time, a truly global language, although national 
traditions still retain peculiarities which are likely to persist in the foreseeable 
future.
These synthetical developments constitute the most powerful and 
progressive "research programmes"7 in contemporary sociological theory. This 
does not mean that more radical and sectional efforts, such as those of Turner - 
in the "micro" dimension - or Fararo - from a structuralist stance - make no 
sense.8 They must be judged on their own merits, providing that we bear in 
mind their partiality. The same is true as for Marxism or Weberianism, insofar 
as they remain open to new and contradictory developments outside their 
domains. By and large, these synthetical programmes include more empirically 
oriented research and inductive practice, besides theoretical work, although the 
weight of this orientation varies in each strand of research as does the means 
whereby theory and empirical issues are articulated within them.
7Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Research 
Programmes", in I. Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the 
Growth o f Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979 (1970).
Jonathan Turner, A Theory o f Social Interaction, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1988; Thomas Fararo, The Meaning o f General Theoretical 
Sociology, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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It is worthwhile noticing that this "new theoretical movement" exhibits a 
property it shares with the other social systems discussed in this study. It 
constitutes a collective causality, which has its origins in the foregoing 
production of the social sciences and will have impact upon the research now 
in progress. This movement must be seen as a collective subjectivity, although 
institutionally and theoretically not centred or homogeneous at all.
Perhaps somewhat surprising is the fact that such spontaneous collective 
movement came of age precisely at the moment when general regimes of 
speech have been severely questioned9, in the awakening of a world-view in 
the centre of which the fragmentation of social identity points to the 
irreducibility of difference. Dialectics has been in the defensive and so has its 
core notion of totality.10 How is it, thus, that such a powerful dialectical 
movement has been at work, bringing about an impulse towards totalisation? 
We can suggest that this is a moment of dialectical overcoming of that intense 
plurality that followed the emergence of new paradigms in social analysis. This 
dialectical sublation is not exactly a Hegelian one, though; it should be 
conceived of as a particular process in the course of which our knowledge - 
as Gaston Bachelard underscored - is reorganised.11 One does not need, 
however, to discard completely the idea of contradiction in social life and
9Jean-Frangois Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne, Rapport sur le Savoir, 
Paris, Minuit, 1979.
10M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, Berkeley/ Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1984, "Epilogue".
"Gaston Bachelard, La Philosophie du Non, Paris, Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1975 (1940), pp. 4ff.
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theory if contradictions are concretely understood. We must, nevertheless, bear 
in mind that the evolving of this dialogical social science does not lead to an 
absolutely unified totality, but to one wherein difference and heterogeneity are 
preserved12 in the form of a plurality of syntheses. Nonetheless, the notion of 
collective subjectivity is almost thoroughly absent in this theoretical movement.
The hypothesis I want to present in the following pages of this chapter - 
and, with recourse to Giddens* and Habermas’ work, in the ensuing ones - is 
that, notwithstanding the very important efforts and achievements of the last 
twenty years, contemporary sociological theory has been polarised by the 
opposition between individual and society, regardless of whether these are 
conceptualised in a dichotomous or in a more dialectical manner. Classically, 
these have been seen as the poles of action and structure or system. This 
division has a very long history in Western thought and is almost explicit in 
some of the most relevant theories recently accomplished. The major 
consequence of this polarisation is, first, the disappearance of a central element 
of mediation between these two poles, if not directly in substantive terms, 
certainly in theoretical ones, with further repercutions in the whole spectrum 
of sociological thinking.
The notion of causality rests upon the same problematical ground. I want 
to conceive of it herein according to the notion of efficient cause, which harks 
back to Aristotle’s insights, implying the triggering off of movement. 
Nonetheless, I do not accept the external character, in principle, of the
12As suggested in the general dialectical approach of Remo Bodei, 
"Strategic di Individuazione", Aut-Aut, v. 32, 1985 (93:109), pp. 108-9.
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element that operates as explananda for that which is the explanandwn: the 
"action" of one entity over itself is not necessarily tautological. This is true in 
general, as for the Aristotelian notion of "material" and "formal" causes (herein 
broadly regarded as the social conditions whereby social systems are 
reproduced), but also because teleological causes can be transformed into 
efficient ones if taken as intentional action. A Humean conception of causality, 
which is always conceived as external, is thereby refused. Whether the 
substantive causation of a concrete phenomenon has external or internal 
character is, therefore, a contingent question.13 I shall constantly refer to the 
topic of causality throughout this study, in terms of its analytical importance, 
but shall also propose an alternative to the polarised manner in which it has 
been framed, with the opposition between active individual subjects and 
passive social totalities. It is a basic contention of this study that the traditional 
notions of causality - which has also been conceived of in sociological theory 
in a dichotomous way, either as actional-active or as static-conditioning - 
need to be rethought and rephrased.
In order to state my problem clearly, I shall go through four stages. First, 
the main characteristics of these two poles will be outlined in greater detail. 
My second task will consist of an inquiry into the origins of this perspective. 
We can, then, move on and analyse three general themes. These are positions 
meant to overcome that polarisation, at least in its starkest form. The
13For Aristotle’s conceptions, see Jerald Hage and Barbara F. Meeker, 
Social Causality, Boston, Uniwin, 1988, chap. 1. For a critique of the Humean 
perspective, see Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility o f Naturalism, London, 
Harvester, 1989 (1979), especially p. 42.
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dialectical relation between individual and society plus the concept of 
interaction will receive attention, as will a view that introduces collective 
actors thought of after the model of the individual actor. I hope to show how 
and why these theoretical positions are still limited because they have not 
entirely broken with some very basic theoretical elements that emerged with 
the Enlightenment. Finally, the never ending contraposition between 
individualists and the so-called holists will be taken on, not so much as a goal 
per se, but as a means to push further the clarification of the idea of collective 
subjectivity.
II)ACTION AND STRUCTURE IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
Talcott Parsons gave precise form, in his The Structure o f Social Action14, 
to two questions that became central In the development ol sociological theory. 
Action is one of these key issues, order its counterpart. It is important to 
stress that individual and system, or structure, are the notions whose shadows 
hover above these categories. To be sure, we cannot identify system and 
structure with society. Nevertheless, time and again that is what we come 
across in the literature. Furthermore, the other equivalents to system and 
structure are more often than not envisaged according to the idea of society. 
This means that they are basically reified - notwithstanding the complex 
dialectics several authors attach to them - and are treated as causally static. If
14Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, New York, The Free 
Press, 1966 (1937), chaps. 2-3.
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we take into account that these other systems or structures were theoretically 
moulded precisely according to the Enlightenment’s conception of society, as 
I intend to demonstrate, the links between these forms of understanding 
systems and structures become clear.
Recasting Parsons’ conceptions, Alexander produced a broad statement on 
what he regards as the two main "presuppositional" questions to be tackled by 
sociological theory, which would be, once more, the problem of action and 
the problem of order. He stresses that action is always, at the same time, 
interaction, but it is clear that this is conceived of as a mere outcome of 
individuals’ intervention in the world. According to him, both Marx and 
Parsons developed a similar conception about these issues, having Weber and 
Durkheim as companions in this synthetical approach. Defining those closely 
connected problems, he observes that "...instead of taking the individual as the 
unit of analysis, the question of the nature of action must take into account the 
fact of the social interrelationship of a plurality of actors".15 But that is not 
enough, since Alexander intends to establish a hierarchy between these two 
problems, whereby none is allowed to eclipse the other. Therefore, the problem 
of order receives priority in the cybernetic hierarchy of control. Individualism 
should be discarded as a "viable option" since it would turn the problem of 
order into a "residual category".16
15J. C. Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, v. 1, London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1982, pp. 68-70.
16Idem, Ibid., p. 123.
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This discussion is as interesting for what it explicitly reveals as for what 
it fails even to be aware of. In relation to the problem of action, in a manner 
only partially akin to Parsons, as we will have occasion to see in a later 
chapter, Percy Cohen stressed the concepts of action and actor that are also 
openly embraced by Alexander:
The theory of action consists of a number of 
assumptions...which prescribe a mode of analysis for explaining 
the action or conduct...of typical individuals in typical 
situations. These typical individuals are referred to as actors or 
social actors.17
One could barely be more definite on a statement, which is very close to 
Alexander’s position. As will be seen in the next section, this conception of 
action comes to us from the Enlightenment’s tradition, having Descartes, 
Hobbes and Kant as its paradigmatic expressions. The brief quotation from 
Cohen’s meditation restates the problem sociologically. As for the theme of 
social order, it is to Parsons himself that we should look for a precise 
definition. But in his case as well, it is to predecessors that the interrogation 
leads, since he started from a consideration of how Hobbes and Locke, in the 
individualistic utilitarian tradition, solved the puzzle. It was in this way that 
Parsons established the axis of one of his initial quests: how is order achieved
17Percy Cohen, Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann, 1968, p. 69.
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in society?18 What he presented was the very definition of society as a 
passive object, made up by its active subjects, individual actors, although 
Parsons put forward afterwards quite a more complex notion of actor, this is 
the one that is usually retained from his work, in connection with and in 
opposition to the idea of society (or social system, in a broader sense), which 
implied its definition in terms of its actionless essence.
Alexander, in turn, does not actually tell us that the problem of order 
refers to society as such. But he does not address the issue either, and treats 
action and order as two poles in very much the same way I have set out to 
criticise. In a more recent work he offers a very precise definition of our 
problem. He draws the opposition between the autonomy, at least potential, of 
actors, and the external, heteronomous limits comprised by the environment 
wherein agents move. He observes that "...action is organized by structural 
constraints that are, in some sense, external to any particular actor".19 Very 
clearly, alongside the causality of action, we have a second one, a merely 
conditioning causality, brought about, we could say, by the influence society 
exercises on individual actors.
We are, thus, faced with a sharp distinction and opposition between what 
I have called active and conditioning causality: the first defines the unfolding 
of individuals’ intervention in the social realm, whereby they are able to "make 
a difference"; the second is the expression of society’s influence on this action,
18T. Parsons, op.cit., pp. 90ff.
19J. C. Alexander, "Social Analysis: Presuppositions, Ideologies, Empirical 
Debates", in Action and its Environments, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1988, p. 12.
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influence which can be conceptualised in more or less deterministic terms 
according to each sociologist. Moreover, nothing is placed between individuals 
and society. This is true as for the three writers on whom we are focusing. 
There is, in this sense, no mediation between the two poles in their definition 
of those very general problems, although in their work as a whole we can find 
more subtle perceptions and, especially in Parsons* case, departures in another 
direction. The notion of a collective causality, not as passive influence, but as 
a conceptual comprehension closer to the idea of action, is utterly missing too. 
One could imagine that this is a perspective that is present in these authors 
alone, but what I intend to show is that they share with a great many 
contemporary sociologists a symptomatic lack of awareness of the theme of 
collective subjectivity. This notion has very often been treated as a "residual 
category"20: it has constituted for some a category that does not fit into their 
theoretical framework, consisting, however, in a device that must be present 
in order to account for unavoidable empirical questions.
If we examine the debate about the integration of the so-called "micro" 
and "macro" traditions in sociology, we often encounter these positions 
restated.
Peter Blau, who has made contributions to both macro and micro 
approaches, expresses the radical break between these dimensions in the 
sociological tradition, which he sees as irreconcilable, at least for the moment:
20See, for this concept, T. Parsons, op.cit., pp. 16ff.
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Microsociology analyzes the underlying social processes that 
engender relations between persons. The focus is on social 
interaction and communication...Macrosociology analyses the 
structure of different positions in a population and their 
constraints on social relations.21
Action, in his view, pertains to individuals. He firmly rejects the term 
actor to conceptualise collectivities, lending extreme importance to social 
facts, with the meaning this expression assumed in the first phase of 
Durkheim’s development. Blau excludes moral elements from "social facts", 
returning, therefore, to a, say, pre-Kantian position.
Randall Collins is another example of the reproduction of that polarisation, 
with a strong inclination towards methodological individualism and the study 
of micro situations, in spite of his commitment to "macro-sociology" and the 
linkage between macro and micro. He defends the idea of "micro-translation" 
so as to establish more solid foundations to macro concepts.22 Nevertheless, 
it is quite arguable whether there is any real translation in his proposal. 
Elsewhere he indicates that individuals are the ultimate object of sociological 
analysis:
21 Peter Blau, "Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives", in J. C. Alexander et 
al., The Micro-Macro Link, Berkeley/ Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1987, p. 71.
22Randall Collins, "Micro-Translation as a Theory Building Strategy", in 
Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Aaron Cicourel, eds., Advances in Social Theory 
and Methodology, Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.
27
"Structures" are a way of talking about the patterns of what 
they do in groups. If we pay attention to what goes around us 
all the time, it is not hard to remember that "organizations", 
"classes" or "societies" never do anything. Any causal 
explanation must ultimately come down to the actions of real 
individuals.23
Once again we are confronted with the dichotomy I have been criticising. 
Collins - not by accident having absorbed much of Weber’s style of thinking, 
since his early writings24 - embraces ideas dear to the German sociologist: he 
is actually very close to, if not entirely immersed in, a nominalist frame of 
mind. It is necessary not to disregard, however, that another strand of 
reasoning can be demarcated in Collins’ work. That comes about when he 
develops the concept of "interaction ritual chains", which introduces, at least 
partially, a different element in his thinking. He has more recently advanced 
the idea of a meso level of theorising in between those other two and a 
recommendation of translation of micro concepts into macro ones, 
complementing the former converse strategy.25
23Idem, Conflict Sociology, New York, Academic Press, 1975, p. 12.
24Idem, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology", in Reinhard 
Bendix, ed., State and Society, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1968, p. 51.
^Idem, "On the Micro-Foundations of Macro-Sociology", American 
Journal o f Sociology, v. 86, 1981 (984:1014); and "Interaction Ritual Chain, 
Power and Property: The Micro-Macro Problem as an Empirically Based 
Problem", in J. C. Alexander et al.t op. cit.
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We shall have opportunity to investigate other approaches to sociological 
theory, when similar shortcomings will be brought to the fore. Before that I 
shall explore the origins of this polarisation, from the Enlightenment world­
view on, with reference also to the work of Weber and Durkheim. They 
reproduced this polarisation and introduced it into the heart of sociological 
theory.
III)SEARCHING FOR THE ORIGINS
We can actually spot the pristine characterisation of the individual in the 
very beginnings of Christian representations, with its formalisation in the hands 
of Augustine. But it was only "out" of this world, in a direct and mystic 
contact with God, that a human being could achieve individualisation at this 
stage.26 Ever since then the problem of free will has held centre stage. During 
the European Middle Ages, in a reciprocal influence with the individualisation 
that the development of markets was bringing about27, the idea of the 
individual took deeper roots in social thinking, although not all formulations 
assumed it as such a paramount category. Basically, two strands were of major 
importance during this period. On the one hand, Dun the Scott and Wilhelm 
Occam drew the main features of a nominalistic epistemology and of an 
individualistic social theory, even in terms of political power and ecclesiastical
26Louis Dumont, Essais sur V Individualism. Une Perspective 
Anthropologique sur VIdeologie Moderne, Paris, Seuil, 1983.
27Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, London, Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1964 (1857/8).
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function; Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the roles 
of the state - a political body which would mediate between the individual and 
the community - and the church - a mystical body which would mediate with 
God.28
The Renaissance, for the first time, made the individual the axiological 
centre of society, introducing a distinction between (individual) morals and 
(social) ethics.29 A number of concurrent and subsequent movements brought 
the domain of the individual to earth, which attained expression in the varied 
forms of subjectivism introduced by Descartes, Pascal, the Reformation and by 
others.30 It was with the Enlightenment, though, that the bourgeois individual 
completely took over the definition of social life.
This process began with the development, under the Absolutist State, of 
an economic sphere independent of the political realm, having as a counterpart 
the familiar niche of the "middle class". Therein, under the patriarchical 
command of the male bourgeois, these newly individualised beings could fulfil 
their humanity and enlighten themselves. Piecemeal, this generated a literary 
public sphere, in which the debate of free opinions developed. A second step 
implied the enhancing and differentiation of the literary sphere into a political 
public sphere. This meant that power should be snatched away from the
28Richard Morse, El Espejo de Prospero, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1982, chap.
1.
29Agnes Heller, Renaissance Man, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978 
(1967).
30See Benjamin Nelson, "Conscience and the Making of Early Modem 
Cultures. The Protestant Ethic beyond Max Weber", Social Research, 1969, v. 
36 (5:21).
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Monarch and that the foundations of a system of representation should be laid 
down. In those enlarged spheres, the debate of rational individuals could 
develop, their interests be represented and experience a universal sublation.31 
The revolutionary upheavals that heralded the modem era in Europe and the 
United States had different expressions and intensity according to the distinct 
regions in which they occurred. All the same, the middle class identity became 
everywhere a bifurcated one: private and economic, with expression in its 
bourgeois face, plus public and political, with expression in the concept of 
citoyen.32
In the first case, utilitarian individuals had to pursue their interests and 
self-satisfaction within a reified economic world, dominated by the fetishism 
of the commodity, which seemed beyond their control and was utterly 
external.33 How to explain, then, the permanence of a political and social 
order was the main question Parsons pointed to as the central dilemma of 
utilitarian thought, as we saw above. Hobbes introduced a second element in 
his picture of society, the Leviathan, to which members of society should give 
up their sovereignty so as to achieve order and prevent the "war of everyone 
against everyone". But it was Locke who really decided the future of utilitarian 
individualism when he proposed the fanciful notion of a spontaneous harmony
31Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: 
an Inquiry into a Category o f Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989 
(1962).
32K. Marx, Zur Juden Frage (1844), in K. Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Werke, B. 1, Berlin, Dietz, 1956, pp. 354-5 and 363ff.
33K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, MEGA II-5, Berlin, Dietz, 1987 (1867), p.
102.
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of interests which, rather than depending on the threat of violence by the state, 
would bring men together in the political cooperation of the social contract so 
that they could enjoy the fruition of the products of nature.34 For Hobbes and 
Locke, despite their differences, political society comes about through the 
deeds of active individuals and constitutes a passive thing, a quality it shares 
with the external facticity of the market. The same may be said of the broader 
concept of society, as a network of institutions and processes, which had a 
strong original formulation in the writings of Montesquieu, Millar and 
Ferguson.35
It should be noted that often in these formulations the notion of "emergent 
properties" of social phenomena was present.36 The most pervasive and 
central persuasion of this period certainly was, however, an atomistic view of 
human nature and society. This perspective had strong parallels with the 
contemporary classical mechanics of Isaac Newton and its notion of "simple 
location", according to which one particle could be pinpointed in space without 
reference to anything else.37 Hobbes, once more, was the first to draw the 
consequences of this world-view, turning what was already prefigured in
WT. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp. 90ff. He did not notice, 
though, that at least in the material dimension this order appeared to the 
individual actor as external and given.
35See Alan Swinge wood, A Short History of Sociological Thought, London, 
Macmillan, 1988 (1984), pp. 17ff.
36Steven Seidman, Liberalism and the Origins o f European Social Theory, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp. 23-34.
37Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1933 (1926), pp. 6Iff.
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Descartes’ individual monad of knowledge into an individual (knowledgeable) 
actor.38 If individuals have ever since been grasped in interaction, they were 
conceived of as pre-constituted actors that subsequently come across each other 
in society and interacted. Ernest Cassirer expresses this perspective with great 
clarity:
The eighteenth century doctrine of the state and society only 
rarely accepted without reservations the content of Hobbes’s 
teaching, but the form in which Hobbes embodied this content 
exerted a powerful and lasting influence...In this field too the 
analytic and synthetic method is victorious. Sociology is 
modelled on physics and analytic psychology [...] Thus at first 
Hobbes proceeds by analytically isolating the elements of his 
problem...The problem of political theory consists in explaining 
how a connection can arise from this absolute isolation - a 
connection that not only joins individuals loosely together but 
which eventually welds them into a single whole.39
Drawing upon the idea of human reason, our reflexive capacity, and the 
imperative necessity and possibility of individual freedom, the Enlightenment 
bequeathed also an ever lasting concept of human nature to modem sociology.
38T. Parsons, "Social Interaction" (1968), in Social Systems and the 
Evolution of Action Theory, New York, Free Press, 1977, pp. 155-6 and 164-5.
39Emest Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1951 (1931), pp. 20 and 255-6.
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Kant, who detected in the individualistic strand of Rousseau’s philosophy an 
emphasis on "man’s capacity for moral self-direction", translated this 
reflexibility and freedom into the concept of autonomy, our independence 
from God, society or nature, based on unconditional and imperative categories. 
This was coupled with an abstract and reified concept of totality, evenly shared 
by the human community.40 Another version of the drives that propel human 
action was developed by cruder strands of utilitarian and proto-positivist 
thinkers (whose views were chastised by Kant as a mistaken apology of the 
heteronomic aspects of human behaviour). For them, our organic impulses 
constituted the leitmotif of action 41 In both cases, nonetheless, action was 
defined in individual terms, against a backdrop of conditioning imperatives, 
interests and natural forces, which were seen as influential but not reflexive.
Moreover, in the Scottish Enlightenment, with Smith and Ferguson, but 
also in England, for instance with Locke, an idea that has recently been 
granted great favour was already put forward. The unintended consequences 
of intentional action were regarded not only as means whereby the social 
fabric is webbed, but as the secret that explains the developmental logic of 
human society.42
40Geoffrey Hawthorn, Enlightenment & Despair, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987 (1976), p. 34; Lucien Goldmann, Etude sur la Pensie 
Dialetique et son Histoire: la Communaute Humaine chez Kant, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1948.
41See T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp. 60ff.
42See A. Swingewood, op. cit., pp. 25-8.
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But even within the Enlightenment, the narrow scope of this standpoint 
was felt. Rousseau is important in this regard, in his non-individualistic strand, 
with his concept of "collective will", which was to have a strong influence on 
the normative problematic advanced by Kant.43 But with Leibniz and his 
notion of the individual as a monad, complete - as a unity, not as the mere 
sum of its parts - and isolated, the seed of a new formulation was laid, not in 
itself, but via its appropriation by the Romantics. The reaction to the French 
Revolution - with Burke, de Bonald and de Maistre - rejected the concept of 
the individualised rational actor presupposed by both the Gerondins and the 
Jacobins, underscoring the irrational and traditional aspects of social life, 
alongside their stress on the organic nature of society and the importance of 
the bonds that link individuals within it.44 Led by the genius of Herder, the 
Germans, with their romantic historicism, took up Leibniz’s concept of the 
individual and turned it into a category that could be applied not only to 
human individuals, but also to historically individualised societies, which had 
their own personality45
This is probably the first modem formulation (with the exception of the 
Kantian assimilation of freedom to the universal categorical imperative) to 
state society as enabling individuals to be what they are as well as constraining 
them within certain limits. There was no individuality outside the meaningful
43E. Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1963.
^A. Swingewood, op. cit., pp. 33-5.
45E. Cassirer, The Philosophy o f the Enlightenment, pp. 29ff.
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tissue of culture and human and natural relations that constituted the deepest 
traits of social life; there was no order either without the hierarchy and 
relations on which society depended.46 Despite this contraposition of an 
organic and hierarchical totality to that individualistic framework, there appears 
to be, and this is the main point, scarce contradiction between the two 
opposing views. Also in the Romantics’ portrayal, society was depicted as a 
passive totality, extremely influential in the coming into being and remaining 
of its individual members, but, as such, motionless. This was so also because 
they dealt with isolated totalities, which had little in common with other 
societies. Action was confined to their individual members and in this sense 
its definition was strikingly similar to that of the Enlightenment, even though 
society was given the upper hand in the Romantics* formulation. If we bear in 
mind that conservative thinking was born out of a dialogue, however fierce, 
with its predecessor, and left behind what should be properly called a 
"traditionalist" approach to society, it is not too hard to understand the 
coincidence of these points of view.47
The circumstances in which departures from this perspective apparently 
obtained really entailed a restatement of the kinship between those two 
intellectual movements. If society could be taken as an actor, it was after the 
individual’s model that it was visualised, since its concept as a totality came 
precisely out of that idea. Already in Herder, but afterwards possibly coupled
46Karl Mannheim, Conservatism, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986 
(1925). See also S. Seidman, op.cit., pp. 44ff.
47K. Mannheim, op. cit.y pp. 72-6.
36
with Vico’s conception of history as a product of human praxis, this is an idea 
that achieved widespread currency in German philosophical idealism, from 
Kant to Hegel, above all with respect to the broader history of humankind.48 
It introduced what Martin Jay has called a "longitudinal" concept of totality. 
Its sociological impact was, however, reduced; the role played by what that 
author has named a "latitudinal" concept of totality was, in fact, more crucial. 
Hegel was also central for its definition, although a cardinal aspect of his 
contribution has been consistently overlooked - one which will be examined 
when we tackle Marx’s theory of collective subjectivity. The concept of 
"longitudinal" totality referred to the unfolding of history and the concept of 
"latitudinal" totality covered the whole of relations encompassed by a certain 
social order. Moreover, an expressivist model of the self had been instituted 
in the years of the German "Sturm und Drum", according to which a socially 
grounded subject was seen as striving to come to its full development. It was 
eventually regarded as valid for both individuals and society 49
The nineteenth century was witness to a companionship between the 
sociological science that then arose and another branch of the natural sciences 
- biology (although Herder had already been aware of its importance to social 
thinking, provided its framework was reinterpreted). In both sciences, thus, the 
notion of organism became progressively central, with a translation of the 
Enlightenment’s notion of progress into evolutionary lines. In sociology,
48See M. Jay, op. cit., chap. 1, and R. Bodei, op. cit., p. 94.
49Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 
3-50.
Comte and Spencer (the latter still committed, however, to utilitarian 
individualism) became exponents of this development, which partially 
challenged the very foundations of Hobbes’ paradigm and its atomistic 
thrust.50 The interplay of influences between the two sciences should not 
occupy us, suffice it to say that it just grew henceforth. For this, the figure of 
the physiologist Lawrence J. Henderson was decisive in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.51 The basic features of the polarisation between individual 
and society were not, as one could expect, questioned by this new reference.
One should bear in mind that the idea of society, central for all these 
undertakings, assumed different connotations in each formulation. For Herder, 
for instance, it meant basically an expressive totality of non-political character 
- concretely, tribes and nations, in their multiplicity and incommensurability.52 
It is true as well that Marxism, from its early beginnings, broke free from rigid 
national boundaries, stressing the international character of the capitalist 
economy and of contemporary class struggles, despite the lack of actual
50For an overview, see John C. Greene, "Biology and Social Theory in the 
Nineteenth Century: Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer", in Science, 
Ideology, and World View, Berkeley/ Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1981.
51 See Garland E. Allen, Life Sciences in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1978, chap. 4, and Bernard Barber, "Introduction" 
to Lawrence J. Henderson, On the Social System, London, The Chicago 
University Press, 1970. One wonders also why the development of the theory 
of relativity and of quantum theory, which dealt a serious blow to the 
Newtonian-Hobbesian paradigm, by means of their relational crux, did not 
have greater impact upon sociological thinking.
52Isaiah Berlin, "Herder and the Enlightenment", in Vico and Herder, 
London, Hogarth, 1976.
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analysis of the international feasibility of socialism.53 Nonetheless, the legacy 
of both Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment to twentieth century 
sociology implied the definition of society in the tight limits of the modem 
nation-state, whether its main concern was with the political dimension, as in 
Hobbes and Locke, or with culture more generally, as in Herder. The result of 
this misuse of a category debatable in such clear-cut way even as for the 
historical coordinates it stemmed from was to distort the understanding of 
social formations, such as Ancient China and India, in a mould that could 
hardly be appropriate54, let alone the passivity embodied in the category of 
society per se.
How did the "founding fathers" of sociology deal with this heritage? 
Postponing Marx’s very central alternative to a later stage, let us briefly 
examine Weber’s and Durkheim’s answers.
Max Weber has been characterised as a paradigmatic case of 
methodological individualism, since he emphasised the necessity of 
"understanding" social life through the meaning individuals attach to their 
action - although he repeatedly warned that this must be accomplished in the 
relationship between actors and introduced types of social action as units of 
analysis.55 One could positively raise objections with respect to the
53Vendula Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism and International 
Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 27ff.
^Wolfram Eberhard, "Problems of Historical Sociology", in R. Bendix, op. 
cit., and Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, v. I, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986, chap. I.
55Max Weber, "Ueber einige Kategorie des verstehenden Soziologie" 
(1913) and "Soziologische Grundbegriffe" (1921), in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur
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consistency with which Weber applied his principles, both methodologically 
and substantively. In the first case, because he put so much emphasis on 
collective movements in the making of history, his general methodological 
position may look dubious. He would probably claim, however, the possibility 
and necessity of the reduction of those movements to the meaning they possess 
for their participants. If sociology cannot ignore collective ideal constructions, 
such as the idea of the state, it should refuse any notion of "active (hartdelnde) 
collective personality".56 Moreover, social action is often oriented towards the 
representations of a given form of domination, a legitimate order.57 Hence, 
notwithstanding those considerations, he was firmly committed to a conception 
of the social in which we find active individuals and conditioning structures, 
especially in terms of frozen meaning.
The trajectory of Emile Durkheim’s attempts to come to terms with these 
issues was more complex. He started with a tough position, emphasising and 
criticising Spencer’s utilitarian individualism,58 and defined social facts as 
external, constraining and irreducible to the individual mind. Sociology, 
therefore, was irreducible to, and should be separated from, psychology. Social
Wissenschaftslehre (ed. by Johannes Winckelmann), Tubingen, J. C. B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck), 1951, pp. 429, 528 and 536; and pp. 553ff - respectively.
56Idem, "Soziologie Grundbegriffe", in op. cit., p. 539.
57Idem, Ibid., p. 539. Because of his acute historical flair he did not, 
however, identify these passive entities directly with the modem nation-state 
and the society contained within its boundaries.
58Emile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social, Paris, Felix Alcan, 
1893, pp. 219ff.
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facts ought to be seen as things.59 He gradually softened his position, 
approaching in the end of his oeuvre a view that stressed society (in its 
religious expressions) as a moral reality, interpenetrated with the individuals’ 
mind. He fell short, however, of realising the importance of this insight for the 
understanding of social orders as interactive systems. Durkheim certainly did 
not deny the active character of progressively individualised individuals and 
the reality of modem moral individualism; but, up to his later work, he was 
keen on stressing the action of society upon itself60, despite the fact that its 
passivity in external terms was not questioned. Thereby he intimated a concept 
of totality which hovers above, and is something more than, the interaction of 
social elements - in his case, individuals.61 In a sense, nonetheless, some 
progress was achieved, since social facts were regarded in this last phase as 
emerging from social relations rather than as rough external determinations.
This is the set core of presuppositions that contemporary sociological 
theory received from the Enlightenment, the Romantics and some of its first 
exponents (to whom I shall return in chapter seven). Sociology derived its 
concepts and generalisations from this heritage. In addition, Ferdinand de
59Idem, R&gles de la Methode Sociologique, Paris, Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1977 (1895), chaps. 1-2.
“ Idem, Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1968 (1912), pp. 23-4, 603-8 and 617-21.
61Idem, Ibid., p. 27. Which, however, receives different shapes historically, 
from the small primitive group to the international system of the contemporary 
world. And, in normative terms (as de Tocqueville before him), Durkheim did 
notice the importance of intermediate bodies for social life. See the "Preface 
a la Seconde Edition" (1902) of De la Division du Travail Social, wherein he 
discusses the "corporations" as mediators between the individuals and the state.
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Saussure introduced a separation between langue and parole, producing an 
approach which, whatever its validity in linguistics at that time, once it was 
absorbed by the social sciences in general and sociology in particular basically 
recast the main thrust of the notion of society as a passive entity, except for 
its influence on its members. He borrowed from Durkheim the idea of external 
and constraining social facts, which were regarded now as a structure 
(although he used more often the word system to refer to them).62 Some other 
alternatives were, nevertheless opened, different from this set core, but which 
share some problems with it. Let us now investigate their potential and 
limitations.
IV)SURPASSING THE POLARISATION: THREE SETS OF CONCEPTS
I want now to turn my attention to particularly important developments, 
which begin to dissolve that polarisation, bringing closer those two terms that 
were formerly completely separate and/or maintained a one-way relationship 
with one another. Dialectics, interaction and an idea of collectivities as actors 
are the main alternatives which have been crafted, although to a limited extent, 
to go beyond the polarity between individuals and society in sociological 
theory. Let us see how this assumes expression in twentieth century writers.
Pierre Bourdieu, under the confessed influence of Marx’s "Theses on 
Feuerbach", worked out an interesting dialectical approach to come to grips
62Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Generate, Paris, Payot, 
1962 (1915), pp. 25ff and 104.
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with the polarisation between individual and structures. The last category 
appears in his "theory of practice" in place of the more common concept of 
system in the Anglo-Saxon tradition,. This happens because his polemic is 
directed mainly against structuralist accounts of social life, which were 
exceedingly important in France during the sixties and the seventies. On the 
other hand, he sharply criticises Sartrean phenomenology and neo-utilitarian 
currents. This means that he aims at a critique of both "objectivist" and 
"subjectivist" approaches: the former would steadily substitute the theoretical 
model built to understand reality for the reality it investigates; but he refuses 
the latter’s view as well, for it embraces too broad an idea of individual 
autonomy and rationality.63
Bourdieu intends to establish a dialectical relation between structure and 
action, a challenge he chooses to meet by introducing the key concept of 
habitus. This consists in a "system of durable and transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures", which 
constitute principles of a generative and organising character, imprinting their 
influence on "practices and perceptions". The habitus is, furthermore, 
responsible for the coming about of social regularities. It forms a "system of 
cognitive and motivating structures", granting the actors with anticipations 
about the possibilities of unfolding directions of events, its background 
furnished by past occurrences. Those anticipations, originated in past 
experiences, are characterised by Bourdieu as "practical hypotheses".
63Pierre Bourdieu, Le Sens Pratique, Paris, Les Edition de Minuit, 1980, 
chaps. 1-2. See also his Esquisse d’une Theorie de la Pratique, Geneve, Droz, 
1972.
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Nonetheless, in certain limits the habitus assures a ''conditioned and 
conditioning freedom" to the actor, it is, therefore, an "art of inventing", 
accounting for some bounded creativity.64
It is not necessary to go into detail about his oeuvre and the concepts 
anchored on these general theoretical reflections. It is enough to highlight the 
definition of an ongoing process of mutual transformation between actors and 
social structures that is the basic outcome of his reworking of some Marxian 
dialectical conceptions and, in a highly critical manner and inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s stress on the practical aspect of language-games, of some ideas 
disseminated by Parsons (above all the concept of need-dispositions). 
Moreover, it is interesting to draw attention to the fact that, if he recognises 
the validity of collective action, Bourdieu tends to fall back upon 
individualistic notions of subjectivity: alongside concepts such as "culture", 
"structures" and "modes of production", he aims at disposing of the concept 
of "social classes" as real actors. According to him, sliding from the noun (le 
substantif) to the substance, the attribution of action to these reified 
abstractions entails an unwarranted "personification of collectivities".65 There 
is some reasonable concern in his refusal to treat collectivities as persons; this 
should not mean, however, that they have no subjectivity and are not "subjects 
responsible for historical actions". I shall leave the question there for the
^Idem, Le Sens Pratique, pp. 87ff.
65Idem, Ibid., pp. 63-4. See also his "The Social Space and the Genesis of 
Groups", Theory and Society, v. 14, 1985 (723:794).
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moment, just stressing that it will become the main focus in the development 
of this study.
Similarly, we find David Lockwood’s distinction between "system” and 
"social" integration66, which, in spite of being considered by him as "wholly 
artificial", is retained in the course of his assessment. The latter fastens upon 
"the orderly or conflictual relationships between the actors", the former upon 
"the orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts", of a social system. 
We should bear clearly in mind that when he speaks about "actors" he is, in 
fact, referring to collective agents. His argument has not had much influence 
in theoretical developments until recently, but in terms of a very different 
reading - which does not pay enough heed to "collective actors". These 
constitute a central part of his reasoning, again under the acknowledged 
influence of Marx.
Providing that we do not forget the importance of Lockwood’s sensitive 
remarks, we must once more recognise some real limitations to them. He 
presents an excessively loose, but at the same time reductionist, concept of 
collective actor and collective subjectivity. The former engulfs the latter, 
although we do not encounter a discussion of its meaning. Intertwined with 
this, there is still a more general problem. This is the opposition between 
system and social integration, "parts" and "actors", which is shaped having our 
already well known categories as a backdrop - conditioning and active 
causality: as for actors, action and volition underpin the analysis, whereas, in
^David Lockwood, "Social Integration and System Integration", in George 
Z. Zollschan and W. Hirst, eds., Explorations in Social Change, London, 
Routledge, 1964.
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regard to parts, inert structures are to be grappled with. Lockwood has arrived 
at an earlier insight of a "theory of structuration" (which includes collective 
actors), stopping short, however, of overcoming that polarisation, which he 
ends up reproducing in a more specific theoretical level.
Knorr-Cetina presses home an important set of considerations regarding the 
linkage of micro and macro-sociological approaches, now connected to the 
notion of interaction. We must acknowledge that some key traditional ideas 
hitherto stressed do not lose their sway, but it is true too that a new question 
is introduced. Drawing attention to the "upsurge" of theories and 
methodologies concerned with "micro-processes of social life", such as 
symbolic interactionism, cognitive sociology, ethnomethodology, ethogenics, 
etc., she speaks about a powerful challenge to macro-sociology. A twofold 
onslaught was launched: the move from an idea of normative order to a 
cognitive one and the rejection of both individualism and collectivism. The 
main target of those first onslaughts was basically, for historical reasons, 
Parsonian theory. Nevertheless, the fact that only "individuals are responsible, 
purposive human actors" does not inhibit her from refusing also the reduction 
of sociology to an individualistic methodology:
Micro sociologies...do not turn to individuals, but to 
interactions in social situations as the relevant methodological 
units.67
67K. D. Knorr-Cetina, "Introduction: the Micro-Sociological Challenge of 
Macro-Sociology: towards a Reconstruction of Social Theory and 
Methodology", in K. D. Knorr-Cetina and A. Cicourel, eds., op.cit., p. 8.
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Her background is clear, stretching over to Simmel, Mead, Blumer, 
Goffman, Garfinkel and others. If she gives continuity to a legacy that attaches 
great importance to the concept of interaction, she reproduces, as they do, the 
same ideas that we found in the beginnings of the Enlightenment: the usual 
configuration of the notion of interaction does not suffice to put the debate in 
new terms, for it still implies actors as individuals and interactions as passive 
systems or structures. Moreover, as I tried to bring out with the historical 
sketch of the origins of this theoretical polarisation, from the very beginning 
individuals have been observed in interaction, even though they used to be 
seen as prior to it. What, then, is the particular contribution of the concept of 
interaction, so much stressed recently, and what are its limitations, if it is kept 
within the determinations of the polarisation, dialeticised or not, on which we 
have been focusing?
Norbert Willey’s definition of levels helps make these points clear. He 
underscores the differences between the diverse layers that constitute social 
life. First, he opposes the individual to the social, which is further split into the 
interactive and the "supra-interactive" levels. Finally, he divides the latter in 
two other ones, the social structure and the cultural levels. It is necessary to 
notice that these levels are connected by a "continual flow" from one to the 
other. According to him, however, it is exactly the level of interaction which 
has not received its due amount of analysis. Therefore, it comes to be "...one 
of the thorniest problems in social theory, largely because so many theorists 
have omitted or misconceived this level". Thus far, he remains on a very 
general plane. He introduces in the discussion, then, another interesting
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suggestion, irrespective of how inappropriate its inclusion in his line of 
reasoning is, since it belongs in a more empirical domain. He says that 
organisations should be thought of as "...intervening between interaction and 
the larger social structure".68 Willey advances the notion of a more varied 
compass of social formations, with their own characteristics and connections, 
bringing together some divergent strands of sociological theory. His 
systematisation is an extremely arguable one and his understanding of the role 
played in some contemporary theorists by the concept of interaction is less 
than accurate. However, it allows us to trace two questions.
Apparently, at least, the notion of interaction breaks through the 
polarisation of individuals and society (social structure and culture, it seems, 
in Willey’s terminology). It would offer the idea of mediation a concrete 
place. That is certainly true, but only in part. What needs to be asked is 
whether this implies that interaction is conceived of as possessing the quality 
of agency. In both Willey’s work and in general in recent attempts at bridging 
the gap between "micro" and "macro", this is not the case.
That should not be suiprising, since this is how the concept of interaction 
has received shape. This is a salient feature of Harold Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology and of Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy. The central tenet of 
the former’s propositions is that the activities through which everyday life is 
produced are identical with the procedures their producers use to make them 
accountable. It means that these are "reflexive" activities, "observable-and-
68Norbert Willey, "The Micro-Macro Problem in Social Theory", 
Sociological Theory, v. 6, 1988 (254:261), pp. 258-9, especially.
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reportable" practices for the individual "members" of the interaction.69 As 
Goffman’s most famous book title indicates, what he was interested in was the 
"presentation of self* in its interactive conduct in several settings in daily life. 
His selves are also knowledgeable actors, capable of manipulating social 
norms according to their individual interests as well as the stages wherein their 
lives are spent.70 Both treated action as individual action, without much 
concern with what happens beyond the static world of interactions, which 
constitute micro-societies and share the passive characteristics of the larger 
societies wherein they are carried on. Goffman and Garfinkel dwelt upon the 
study of institutions such as hospitals and the like, leaving aside the impact of
69Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Cambridge, Polity, 1984 
(1967), p. 1.
70Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Edinburgh, 
University of Edinburgh, 1956. See also J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith, 
American Sociology and Pragmatism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1980, p. 26 - wherein they defend the idea that George Mead, himself a "social 
realist", has not actually exerted much influence on the subsequent 
development of the Chicago school, predominantly nominalist (or, as I would 
rather say, individualist), contrary to what is usually assumed. This particular 
point would not matter so much for my discussion if the notion of interaction 
did receive passive clutches in any case, as supposed by Lewis and Smith. As 
we shall see, this is not, however, the standpoint espoused by Mead. 
Historically, it is to Georg Simmel that the other source of the notion of 
interaction should be debited, in its innovations and limitations, although Marx 
had already worked out a more powerful version of this theoretical leap 
forward, despite not having received the corresponding attention by 
professional sociologists, an issue to be tackled later on. In Simmers case, in 
any event, the concept of "sociation", with its primary formal appearance in 
the dyadic relation between two actors, introduced the notion of interaction 
with its active individual and passive systemic or societal causality. See Georg 
Simmel, "How is Society Possible?" (1908) in On Individuality and Social 
Forms (ed. by Donald L. Levine), Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1971. 
The same shortcomings are found in Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological work. 
They are clear, for example, in his "Common-Sense and Scientific 
Interpretation of Experience and Thought Objects", in Collected Papers, v. I, 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
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their subjectivity, but upon their own members, what is, moreover, even 
questionable in the case of ethnomethodology (since Garfinkel is strongly 
inclined towards a sort of sociological solipsism).
This has been the main thrust of micro-sociology and also the means 
whereby the linkage between the so-called micro and macro traditions have 
been sought. Lest it pass unnoticed, it is important to remember that 
Alexander’s and Parsons’ definition of action emphasised on its interactive 
aspect, which of course points to a direct relation with the problem of order. 
All the same, this depiction of these two sets of questions did not deliver much 
from the standpoint of the concept of interaction as an independent conceptual 
level. We must, therefore, be aware of the peculiarity and novelty of a notion 
of interaction in the course of which actors constitute themselves. This will be 
focused on in connection to Marx’s, Mead’s and Habermas’ contributions, and 
more specifically in chapter six. It is curious that in these developments so 
much of their original source of inspiration was lost. I mention once more to 
Parsons’ work, against whom some of those undertakings were planned. Only 
in an extremely partial way did they address some very central issues in that 
author, inasmuch as he represents one of the most important advances 
regarding the problem of collective subjectivity in the field of sociology, as 
will be seen in chapter five.
We can finally analyse an interesting treatment of the notion of collective 
actor and the problem of causality linked to it.
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Rom Harre takes up the problem we are dealing with in an interesting and 
somewhat less usual direction.71 He intends to draw a clear distinction 
between two kinds of collectivities. The first comprises "taxonomic groups". 
Their reality would be fictitious, for this would be merely a conceptual 
categorisation, with existence only in the mind of the observer, derived from 
the attribution of "similar beliefs, dispositions or aspirations" to a group. In 
contrast, there is another kind of collectivity, the structured one, which would 
involve roles and role-holders. Harre wants to imply, with the idea of structure, 
the twin notion of emergent properties (which he introduces via allusions to 
the natural sciences). These collectivities can sometimes appear as "supra- 
individuals". They should be continuous in time, occupying a precise and 
continuous space - although he recognises the non-universality of this 
characteristic - and, what is distinctively important for our discussion, they 
would have causal powers or efficacy - again regardless of the lack of 
refinement of this concept, as he believes. With this he wants to discard most 
of the concepts of "macro-sociology", including the concept of social class. 
They would be merely expressive and rhetorical devices, hardly allowing for 
empirical definitions and demonstrations. In fact, it seems that those taxonomic 
groups would be no more than small scale "institutions and the like", which 
must be arrived at inductively. Possible bridges bringing macro and micro 
together seem to be written off.
71Rom Harre, "Philosophical Aspects of the Macro-Micro Problem", in K. 
D. Cetina and A. Cicourel, eds., op. cit.
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We find, thus, a line of argument that aims at tackling collective action, 
and, more than that, collective action qua a systems’ action. Nevertheless, the 
prototype according to which H arris collective actor is built consists, 
unfortunately, of that of the individual, and in its most traditional form. It 
possesses what I have called active causality. Furthermore, this would even 
distinguish collective actors from amorphous entities, aggregates of individuals 
with common features ascribed by the social scientist alone. In the case of 
those active collectivities, Harre assumes, by means of the idea of emergent 
properties, a realist position; as for the other case, deprived in his view of this 
quality, he sustains a nominalist perspective. The notion of conditioning 
causality, as I have defined it, is visible in his article when he suggests the 
influence of collectivities on their individual members.
This author treads an unusual path, making use of logical premises to state 
his ideas. Notwithstanding his intelligent coupling of structure and causality, 
I shall reject his identification of collectivities with individuals as well as his 
arbitrary separation of collective actors and collectivistic fictions. This means 
precisely to refuse a clear-cut line between the ideas of active and 
conditioning causality. The main aim of this study will exactly consist of 
devising of some ideas to think the problem anew. The notion of social 
systems as collectivities with varying levels of subjectivity will be central to 
my argument. In order to advance towards this goal, however, I will have to 
criticise most of the theories of collective subjectivity already developed in 
sociological theory. They tend to accept the same standpoint we have just seen 
Harre support. So as to assimilate their otherwise fruitful propositions, we will
need to sort out this equivocal model from the insights that are intertwined 
with it.
V)INDIVIDUALISM AND HOLISM: IDEOLOGY AND THE LAYERS OF 
SOCIAL REALITY
It is time to comment on what is probably the most exclusive of all the 
polarisations in the social sciences, the one that opposes methodological 
individualists and the so-called holists. I do not intend to discuss it at length, 
for it seems to me, as it should be evident to the reader at this stage, that this 
is, in fact, an imprecise watershed. Of course, "methodological individualists" 
are usually outspoken about their perspective. This does not, however, warrant 
the assumption that the writers they are in pains to criticise are "holists", a 
classification that most of them would not acquiesce to and which sounds to 
me, at any rate, as fallacious.72 Durkheim, for instance, has often been 
considered as a case of "holism"; but, as I have commented, he was 
progressively more concerned with the interplay between individual and 
society, despite the greatest emphasis he was inclined to place on the latter,
72Furthermore, one should be careful with a direct identification of the 
epistemological opposition between nominalism and realism, on the one hand, 
and individualism and holism, on the other. This is what is done by Werner 
Stark, The Fundamental Forms o f Social Thought, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962, pp. 2-3, and J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith, op. cit.y 
pp. 23-4. These are logically independent positions, not to be conflated, 
regardless of how often they have been historically associated. One might, 
thus, logically (though not exactly with good inspiration) indicate beings in the 
social realm whose depiction under the same concept would be just a short­
hand definition without assuming the reduction of these beings to their 
individual members, as would be required in individualistic accounts.
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and from the start acknowledged the importance of modem moral 
individualism.
It would be hard to find examples to fit the "holistic” model. On the other 
hand, it goes without saying that individualists do reproduce the action 
framework I have brought out: they usually are its main advocates. Moreover, 
they often leave the social environment of action unexamined or try to explain 
it away with recourse to the comfortable device of unintended consequences 
of intentional behaviour.73 The core of their argument, as we see in Jon 
Elster’s individualistic Marxism, implies a reduction of the whole social world 
to the actions of its individual atoms (notwithstanding the recognised 
impossibility of substantiating this postulate).74 There are, of course, authors 
who are inclined to situate themselves within a holistic framework, as Mead 
or, more recently and explicitly, Nicos Mouzelis75 do, since they refuse the 
idea of society as the mere sum of its parts, striving to grasp it in its 
wholeness. But this classification does not do justice to their theoretical 
developments, since they are concerned precisely with the interplay between 
actors and the interactional setting or society, as we shall see in subsequent 
analyses.
73See Barry Hindess, Choice, Rationality, and Social Theory, London, 
Uni win, 1988, pp. 106ff.
74Jon Elster, Making Sense o f Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985, pp. 8 and 359ff.
75George H. Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, 1962 (1927/30), p. 7; Nicos Mouzelis, Post-Marxist Alternatives, 
London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 38.
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I do not wish to deny that certain writers adopt visions of society which 
put stress on the whole, sometimes playing it off against particular groups and 
individuals. Hegel, to a considerable extent, may be included amongst such 
writers, although he is far from joining in pantheistic ambitions or presenting 
an undifferentiated view of totality.76 Mead is not completely innocent in this 
regard either. Their work, even so, is characterised by much more complex 
perceptions of reality, bringing out the multiple instances of social life and 
history, individual longings and action, plus the struggle between groups, 
notwithstanding Hegel’s ultimate reduction of this manifold reality to the 
manifestation of the Absolute Spirit.77
And it is true that so-called Western Marxists have on occasion embraced 
aspects of that sort of reductionism and relied upon a philosophy of history 
which, already for Marx, secured the optimal and necessary outcome of the 
overcoming of capitalism and the ensuing communist society. Yet once more 
I do not think that their characterisation as holists is appropriate, especially 
when writers such as Sartre, so deeply committed to individualism, are 
included under this gloss.78 In the course of the very polemic between Popper 
and Adorno we can spot the latter recurrently stressing totality and
76See C. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 8Iff.
77See Georg Lukacs, Uber die Besondeheit als Kategorie der Asthetik, in 
Werke, B. 10, Berlin/ Neuwide, Luchterhand, 1969, p. 574.
78Martin Jay’s otherwise interesting book, Marxism and Totality (passim), 
falls pray to this standard categorisation. As for the French philosopher, the 
mere recall of his "progressive" and "regressive" method suffices to eschew 
any idea of holism, even in his late oeuvre, let alone the early one. See Jean- 
Paul Sartre, "Question de Methode", in Critique de la Raison Diale deque, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1960.
individuality as two moments of the reproduction of society.79 Others, 
however, such as Louis Althusser, are closer to Hegel. If we examine his 
formulation about the relation between agency and structure, we will in fact 
find the total dominance of the latter: it is the structural ideological appareils 
of the state which, in their functioning to reproduce social relations, shout, as 
policemen, to concrete individuals - "hey, you there" - and turn them into 
subjects.80 For all that, it is not an undifferentiated totality what comes out 
of his writings; in a manner akin to Parsons - a totalist or even a "totalitarian" 
writer? - he has offered, despite the remaining of an unspecified economic 
determination in the last instance, a formulation which, splitting society in 
different and decentred levels, depicts social totalities as heterogeneous and 
fractured. Moreover, the notion of practices provides a means of preventing 
both an anthropomorphic reading of society and its reification81 - although its 
conceptual potential, I would claim, is made effective only in connection with 
the notion of collective subjectivity.
Having said that, I do think that it is important to radicalise the 
differentiation of the concept of totality: not only to address questions posited 
by contemporary identity formations, but also in order to carve out a concept 
of more general application as to social systems, which seem never to have
79For that quarrel see Theodor W. Adorno, ed., The Positivist Dispute in 
German Sociology, London, Heinemann, 1977 (1969).
80Louis Althusser, "Ideologic et Appareils Ideologiques d’Etat", in 
Positions, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1976, p. 113.
81Idem, Pour Marx, Paris, Maspero, 1965, pp. 85ff, 206 and 163-98. For 
a discussion on structuralism and totality, see Jean Piaget, Structuralism, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971 (1968), pp. 97ff.
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been so compact and coherent at any stage of human history, although it looks 
as if with capitalism that fragmentation of totality has achieved further 
dimensions. Giddens’ and Habermas* syntheses, as well as a host of other 
contemporary theories, are fraught with suggestions in this direction and I shall 
draw upon them so as to attain that radicalisation. A mediating concept, that 
of particularity, will be introduced later on in order to help the 
conceptualisation of collective subjectivities. As for claims to absolute 
knowledge or directly falsifiable statements, I shall confine myself for the 
moment to observing that, in the aftermath of discussions enacted under the 
influence of Wittgenstein and Kuhn, on one the hand, and hermeneutics, on the 
other, neither Hegel nor Popper fare very well. A train of reasoning that 
touches upon certain issues related to this topic will be suggested in the 
introduction to the concluding part of this study.
Moreover, the content of the explanation for everything in social life 
receives in the hands of "methodological individualists" a formulation which, 
at least programmatically, demands a reduction to which I have called active 
causality, on what Elster himself is very straightforward. In his case, active 
causality is dressed as intentional causality, although he accepts two subsidiary 
notions of causality, the subintentional - internal to the actor - and the 
supraintentional - external to the actor - as an outcome of social 
contradictions.82 Nevertheless, as their proclamation is too broad to support,
82J. Elster, op. cit., pp. 27ff, and Logic and Society, Chichester, John Wiley 
& Sons, 1978, especially p. 158. Weber attributed the meaning of action to 
motives, which hold the basis for the explanation, playing with the German 
word Grund (at the same time "reason" and "ground"). Cf. M. Weber, 
"Soziologische Grundbegriffe", in op. cit., p. 536. Other forms of
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methodological individualists frequently back off from their radical postulation 
and accept explanations that introduce elements that are not reducible to 
individual action and causality.83 Thereby we witness a capitulation to the 
notion of a social, merely conditioning causality.
It is not that individualistic views of social reality are utterly mistaken. 
Even more compelling, to an extent, are the views of those who concentrate 
on totalities as passive social entities. They grasp some important features of 
social life, but methodological individualists above all remain at a superficial 
level, without obtaining access to deeper layers of social relations. As we have 
seen, individual and society have been two strongholds of bourgeois ideology. 
Sheer individualism belongs with other elements of this ideological core, 
complemented by more totalist approaches, which, in fact, tend to accept the 
former’s vision of action in its exclusively individualistic form. They have 
their moment of truth; we must not allow, however, that the overwhelming 
obfuscation of these ideological appearances make us blind to other aspects of 
reality.
The situation is analogous to that uncovered by Karl Marx in his study of 
the capitalist mode of production. Is the first category grappled with by Capital 
a mere gloss, to be discarded after a more penetrating analysis? By no means. 
Together with the assumptions tied to the idea of the universal exchange of
individualistic explanation, such as crude behaviourist ones, would certainly 
play a similar role, despite the specific content of the efficient cause in each 
case.
83See Steven Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered", in 
Essays in Social Theory, London, Macmillan, 1977.
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equivalents in the market, the commodity is perhaps the central element of 
bourgeois economic ideologies. In spite of that, it constitutes a moment of the 
categorial exposition developed by Marx and, within its limits, possesses a 
dimension of truth, becoming ideological only inasmuch as we do not move 
further, through and past its practical and theoretical ideological function, onto 
other concepts - above all that of surplus-value. It is, hence, necessary to 
unveil the aspects of social relations hidden inside the universe of daily 
perceptions and ideological presuppositions inherent to the ongoing process of 
capitalist production, without, however, brushing aside the veracity contained 
in those more superficial layers.84
I do not want to eschew as a whole the ideas of the "methodological 
individualists", whose contribution to certain aspects of a theory of collective 
subjectivity will be taken up in chapters seven and eight. Rather, through the 
contradictions of one of their exponents, I shall introduce a crucial problem, 
concerning the relation between a social systems’ properties and causality.
‘“See K. Marx, Das Kapital, passim (especially B. I), and the 1857 
"Introduction" to the Grundrisse der Politischen Okonomie, Berlin, Dietz, 
1953. Bhaskar’s conceptions are very interesting as he points to the "stratified" 
character of reality. Whereas he utilises the term structure to address these 
stratified dimensions of reality, to which science gains access step by step, I 
prefer the word layer. I do so in order to avoid confusion with the concept of 
structure, which, basic for the social sciences, shall be examined later on. For 
his general conceptions, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory o f Science, Leeds, 
Leeds Books, 1975, especially chap. 1. He has, moreover, neared the idea 
herein presented, of individualism and "holism" as partial approaches to social 
life, although he is unaware of the problematic of collective subjectivity. See 
Idem, The Possibility o f Naturalism, pp. 19-20 and 30ff.
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VI)STRUCTURE, MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL PROPERTIES
As mentioned above, Karl Popper is a supporter of the idea that the whole 
of social life should be explained with respect to individual action, a position 
he defends in his better known writings on the social sciences.85 
Subsequently, however, he smuggled a different approach to this question into 
his discussions on epistemology. This happened when he proposed the 
distinction between "worlds" or "universes". The first of them alludes to 
"physical objects" or "states"; the second to "states of consciousness" or 
"mental states", or "behavioural dispositions to act"; against "belief 
philosophers" (such as Descartes, Locke or Kant), who are interested in our 
subjective beliefs and the bases of their origins, he delineated a third sphere, 
that of "objective contents of thought", close to a Platonic theory of ideas or, 
more faintly, to Hegel’s objective spirit.86 The contents of this "third world" 
comprise theoretical systems, problems and problem situations, critical 
arguments - and the material amassed in journals, books and libraries. Popper 
is adamant that we must not relegate these contents to the second world, for 
the third has a "more or less" "independent existence".
Somewhere else in the same book he expanded the third world and 
included in it all the products of human opinion and knowledge - the "most
85Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, v. 1 and 2, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966 (1945); and The Poverty o f Historic ism, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, especially pp. 17-9 and 76-83.
86Idem, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1972, pp. 106-7.
60
important field" of historical studies, constituting the "central problem of 
humanities", i.e. religion, philosophy and science, going still further to embrace 
language in its complete dimension.87 Strangely enough, without any allusion 
to the transcendental principle of methodological individualism, Popper 
referred back to a passage in an older publication, where we glimpse at the 
pristine formulation of this now developed thesis and, by the same token, are 
caught by the suspicion that material structures are, in his own view, 
themselves not reducible to individual action either.88 What we are offered 
is a theory of objective structures that have emergent properties, a product 
of the "human animal", just like a spider’s web.89 Their "production", their 
creation, as the outcome of individual action, would not really matter, although 
more generally he recognised the dialectics between the second and the third 
world (as well as their imprint on the first):
The third world is largely autonomous, even though we 
constantly act upon it and are acted upon by it: it is 
autonomous in spite of the fact that it is our product and that it 
has a strong feed back effect upon us; that is to say, upon us 
qua inmates of the second and even of the first world.90
87Idem, Ibid., pp. 159, 185 and 300.
88Idem, Ibid., p. 107, and for the original proposition, Idem, The Open 
Society and its Enemies, v. 2, p. 108.
89Idem, Objective Knowledge, pp. 112-4 and 297ff.
^Idem, Ibid., p. 112.
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Not only the imprecision of his terminology - "more or less" and "human 
animal" are simply the outstandingly elusive expressions to be found in these 
passages; also an implicit recognition of the implausibility of methodological 
individualism is brought out by these reflections. Yet what is more important 
to our case is that Popper refuses to acknowledge the fact that social 
interaction is a central element in the history of science, with the constitution 
of scientific communities (although, curiously enough, his criteria of truth is 
based on intersubjectivity91). He remains prisoner of the polarisation this 
chapter identified and, furthermore, does give in to the "holistic" adversaries 
of his own making, for he acknowledges social phenomena that must be 
understood in their own reality. His ultimate point of view is still an 
individualistic one, for, behind the idea of "emergency", lurks the supposition 
that those phenomena come about as a result of individual "mental states";92 
notwithstanding, the product of these states is visualised in its wholeness. 
Popper could not accept, on the other hand, an approximation of his third 
world to an active process, wherein social interactions within a community 
define a collective subjectivity whose "ideal" as well as "material" products 
undergo a permanent transformation in terms that do not allow for their 
reification in an "objective" independent universe. That is the reason why he 
is so unsure of Hegel’s standpoint in relation to his theory, indicating their
91Idem, The Logic o f Scientific Discovery, London, Hutchinson & Co., 
1959 (1934), p. 47.
92Idem, Objective Knowledge, p. 297.
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similarities, but refusing, more discretely, what he regards as a conflation of 
the second and the third world by that philosopher.93
He has, however, already lost sight of his methodological contention, one 
of the central banners that made him a well known spokesman against 
Hegelians, totalitarians and holists in general. We are presented, therefore, in 
the end, merely with something that in most of the formulations thus far 
examined was already apparent: the denial of causality to collective 
subjectivities.
Hitherto we have concentrated basically on four categories: individual and 
society plus the dialectics between them and the notion of interaction; we have 
also scrutinised a concept of collective actor that falls short of suggesting a 
real breakthrough with respect to that narrow frame of conditioning and active 
causalities that permeate those four categories; and I have hinted at the 
alternative category of collective subjectivity and its correlative notion of 
collective causality, which we have seen throughout being denied as 
commanding the status of a property of social systems. Popper’s 
inconsistencies have furnished the ultimate basis to criticise this ideological 
universe and made clear a crucial aspect of social reality that lies hidden 
underneath its powerful spell. We are prepared now to tackle the two in my 
opinion most important versions of theoretical synthesis in contemporary 
sociology, which miss as well a concept of collective subjectivity, the revision
93This occurs despite his remark on our interaction with the third world: 
Idem, Ibid., p. 112; and, for his account of Hegel’s position, p. 154, note 2.
63
and reconstruction of which will engage us in the second and third parts of this 
study.
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CHAPTER II
INDIVIDUALS, STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS
IN GIDDENS’ STRUCTURATION THEORY
I)THE SYNTHETICAL CHARACTER OF THE THEORY OF 
STRUCTURATION
One of the central attempts in contemporary sociology in the direction of 
a synthesis of the manifold trends that mushroomed in the sixties and 
thereafter is Anthony Giddens’ "theory of structuration". His work today shows 
great complexity, including substantive research in important areas and very 
general theoretical formulations. Concomitantly, he has been an assiduous 
visitor to the history of the social sciences, especially that of sociology. From 
the beginning one of his main concerns has been with what he regards as the 
need to surpass the themes, problems and concepts bequeathed to 
contemporary thinking by the social scientists of the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries, although the incorporation of their contribution has also 
been a goal. This striving towards renewal was already manifest in his study 
of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and has been henceforth repeatedly reiterated.1 
After a consistent discussion on the origins of capitalism and its subsequent 
development, as well as that of "state socialism", he changed the focus of his 
interests, turning to a highly general level of theorising - thereby becoming one
1 A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. vii and 276; and, more recently, "A 
Reply to my Critics" in David Held and John B. Thompson, eds., Social 
Theory o f Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Criticsy Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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of major the exponents of a redirection of English sociology during the last 
twenty years.2
Cohen commented on the fact that Giddens shares with Marx and Parsons 
a manner of building concepts that constitutes what the latter named "analytical 
realism". The concept of "duality of structure" is in this regard crucial for this 
theoretical synthesis, being moreover thought out as a bridge that allows its 
general propositions to connect with empirical research. Cohen even claims an 
ontological character for this body of concepts - whereby we have an 
indication of their level of generality, but also of some problems to be tackled 
later on; particularly because Giddens’ work would be an "ontology of 
potentials", referring to social actors considered qua individuals.3 In part as 
a consequence of this perspective, a gap opens up between Giddens’ own 
theory and his more empirically oriented research, although it should be added 
that an overelaboration of his conceptualisations and the effort to sometimes 
cover too many issues are also responsible for these problems.
2Perry Anderson, "A Culture in Contraflow-I", New Left Review, n. 180, 
1990 (41:78), p. 52. In that work on class structures the first sparks of the 
theory of structuration can be seen, although without major implications. What 
led to the development of the theory was the shift in a "methodological 
direction", as we are told in A. Giddens, "Structuration Theory and 
Sociological Analysis", in Jon Clark, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil, eds., 
Anthony Giddens. Consensus and Controversy, Basingstoke, The Falmer Press, 
1990, p. 298. For the original question, see Idem, The Class Structure of 
Advanced Societies, London, Huntchinson & Co., 1973.
3Ira J. Cohen, Structuration Theory. Anthony Giddens and the Constitution 
of Society, London, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 11, 17-8 and 233ff; and 
"Structuration Theory and Social Praxis", in A. Giddens and J. H. Turner, eds., 
Social Theory Today, Cambridge, Polity, 1987. For the theoretical/ empirical 
role of the "duality of structure", see especially A. Giddens, The Constitution 
of Society, pp. 339-40.
Pushing forward his project of theoretical synthesis, Giddens has been keen 
to debate with disparate trends in the social sciences. Since his 1971 book, the 
dialogue broached with the founding fathers of sociology has been time and 
again resumed, together with the appraisal of other subjects and writers, such 
as Habermas. If these discussions spread over varied domains, they have their 
axis in a critical revision of what he sees as two opposed fields in social 
theory: on the one hand, the "interpretive sociologies", of Schutz and 
Garfinkel, plus hememeutics, with Gadamer, on the other, Parsons’ and 
Merton’s functionalism, as well as structuralism, with Saussure and Levi- 
Strauss, plus its post-structuralist successor, represented by Foucault and 
Derrida. In an intermediary position we must place his valorisation of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas and Goffman’s sociology. Giddens’s stake 
is clear: he wants to bring together the contributions of these currents, 
inasmuch as a great many of their insights are deemed essential. He intends, 
however, to overcome what he understands as subjectivism in the first and as 
objectivism in the second, both approaches being, therefore, one-sided.
To be sure, many of the contemporary representatives of these schools 
reject this characterisation of their enterprise. In any case, more important for 
our discussion is how Giddens accomplishes his own synthesis and the 
concepts that are instrumental for this purpose. It is exacdy for the powerful 
and erudite manner in which his contribution is cast that it is the more 
astonishing to notice that he resolutely partakes in the traditional model of 
social life brought out in the foregoing chapter. It is true that dialectics - 
between individuals, on the one hand, and structures and social systems, on the
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other - and the notion of interaction are central in his theoretical framework. 
Active and conditioning causalities, however, still hold centre stage, 
demonstrating their perennial grasp of the social sciences* conceptual universe.
II)ACTION, SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE
A whole series of neologisms and metaphors were forged by Giddens to 
develop his project. The concept of "duality of structure" features as the 
cornerstone of his theory. At first sight its definition does not imply much 
novelty. In some measure, this is an impression that is confirmed after a more 
detailed examination, since that concept reproduces some basic features of 
older formulations. This must not cloud the fact that it allows for a 
rapprochement of strands of thought which, having developed in more recent 
years, paid little respect to any already laid down undisputed solution - even
if the solution was worthwhile bearing in mind, as Giddens realises. As he
expresses his point of view:
By the duality of structure I mean that social structures are 
both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are 
the very medium of this constitution.4
4A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, London, Hutchinson & 
Co., 1988 (1976), p. 121.
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The Marx of the "Theses on Feuerbach" is indubitably the direct 
inspiration of this statement.5 It is also evident that contemporary authors 
would hardly deny the interplay between the two elements implied in that 
passage. Giddens draws his own conclusions from these premises, though. Let 
us investigate the concepts and propositions that derive from this basic 
formulation.
In the process of establishing his personal standpoint on the role and 
characteristics of subjectivity in social life, Giddens dwells upon the ideas that 
stem from the schools mentioned above, developing an array of analytical 
distinctions. He embraces the contributions of phenomenology and 
ethnomethodology, of the Wittgensteinian philosophies of language and of the 
Anglo-Saxon philosophies of action. The hermeneutic currents are present with 
their emphasis on the notion of Verstehen - introduced in the theory of 
structuration not only as a methodological device, but also as a paramount 
ingredient of the constitution of social life in its widest range. Echos of Schutz 
and Marx are audible, alongside an underlying, notwithstanding hidden polemic 
against Parsons, when he advances his concept of action:
I shall define action or agency as the stream of actual or 
contemplated causal interventions in the ongoing process of 
events-in-the-world. The notion of agency connects directly 
with the concept of Praxis, and when speaking of regularized
5Idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 53.
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types of acts I shall talk of human practices, as an ongoing 
series of "practical activities".6
With this distinction, our author underscores the role of reflexivity in 
social action. Thereby he distinguishes "action" and "agency" from "acts", 
which are the "elements" or "segments" of action, identified as such by the 
actor only through a "reflexive process of attention". We should not forget that 
the thrust of this conception of social action lies in the idea that, in their daily 
life (actually the reference for the carving out of these categories), actors 
successfully carry out a permanent "monitoring" of their activity. As furnishing 
the rationale for this monitoring, Giddens points out "intentions" or "purposes" 
that have as consequence acts with which the actor intends to "make a 
difference" in the world. "Project" constitutes a definition of "purpose" in 
relation to long term developments. "Reasons", in turn, may be defined as 
"grounded principles of action", a central feature of agents’ monitoring of their 
intervention in social interactions. Interests are no more than "outcomes" or 
"events" that facilitate the fulfilment of agents’ "wants". All these concepts 
basically refer to processes of which the actor is aware. The notion of 
motivation, however, implies drives which - as we have known since Freud - 
may not be accessible at the level of consciousness to the actors themselves.
The importance of these categories derives especially from the general 
conclusion they deliver: the production and reproduction of social life are
6Idem, New Rules o f Sociological Method, p. 75. The references to the 
theme of subjectivity are all to be found in chaps. 2-3 of this publication.
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brought about by the activities of human beings in terms of "purposes” and 
"projects". These are processes that are to be understood as the outcome of the 
conscious action of individual actors - notwithstanding the fact that the 
notion of consciousness, as will be seen shortly, is rather nuanced according 
to Giddens, and that, besides, actors command always limited knowledge of 
the conditions and consequences of their action. Giddens is entirely committed 
to a conception of social life in which the "constitution of society" depends on 
the ability of individuals and, therefore, he characterises the making of social 
life as a "skilled achievement". Once more the hypotheses of phenomenology 
and ethnomethodology come to the fore. By means of "mutual knowledge", the 
"competent" members of a society apply interpretive schemes through which 
interactions receive shape.7 Introducing a notion whose consequences will be 
explored below, Giddens observes, in addition, that all reproduction is at the 
same time production, drawing from this the conclusion that the "seed of 
change is there in every act".
The notion of consciousness is oudined in Giddens’ work in a very 
original form: he seeks out a "stratified model" to make it compatible with the 
contradictory approaches of psychology and psychoanalysis. Alongside a 
"discursive consciousness", whereby actors are able to express verbally the 
grounds of their conduct, he posits a "practical consciousness", which makes 
possible their movement in day-to-day life, monitoring their action by means 
of acts and in situations (phenomenologically) taken for granted. The more
7One could certainly demand a more detailed account of the relation 
between this knowledgeability and the concept of ideology as posited in Idem, 
Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 167ff.
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traditional concept of "unconscious" closes the enumeration of the layers of his 
model. As we have seen above, motivations are regarded by Giddens as often 
unconscious. But what is more interesting and polemical in his account of this 
theoretical issue, at which he arrives with his notion of "practical 
consciousness", is the statement that a large part of the actions carried out by 
individuals in social life are rooted in nothing else but routine. Thence one 
ought not to suppose underlying motivational processes which would impel 
actors in every action. The challenge to Parsons conception of "need- 
dispositions" is evident in this discussion.8
The concept of power brings us to the conclusion of our investigation of 
Giddens’ view of action. He actually understands that they are inevitably, 
"logically" linked. The idea of action cannot dispense with the twin notion of 
"means", in the sense of the production of outcomes. "Power" would, thus, be 
the "transformative capacity of human action", the capacity of the agent to 
mobilise resources to constitute those means. Nonetheless, it is this idea of 
"transformative capacity" that Giddens retains to refer to the general concept 
of power, reserving the latter expression for a more restricted and traditional 
use, thereby returning to Weber (and Hobbes), the notion of power in a strict 
sense is connected to that of domination, the capacity to secure outcomes that 
are dependent upon the "action of others". In passing, it should be noted that 
his ultimate definition of "power" is inappropriately "realistic", since the idea
8This problematic is developed at length in Idem, The Constitution of 
Society, pp. 43ff. Based on an existential horizon acquired since childhood, the 
concept of "ontological security" sustains this anti-normative platform. I 
regard, however, with scepticism his attempt to substitute his own concepts for 
those of I, it and I-ideal that are cardinal to Freud’s psychoanalytical theory.
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of domination entails an unsurpassable inequality between individual actors 
(and collective subjectivities). There is no logical connection between this idea 
and the concept of power as influence or control, in a broader mould, even 
though, of course, relations of power may assume the form of subordination 
(by force or not) of subjects by subjects - as they often do. Societies seem to 
be inherently hierarchical; the form and content of this hierarchical disposition 
is, however, to be historically grasped.9
At this stage, it is clear enough that Giddens opts for a totally traditional 
concept of social action. He does not have much in common with behaviourists 
and writers that are wont to reduce individual action to a derived effect of 
social structures. The opposite is true. His is a very classical conception of 
active causality, though, in what it has that is theoretically interesting, but also 
in its shortcomings, inherited from the Enlightenment and its subsequent 
followers. It will be evident below how much he owes to a Kantian or 
Romantic conception of totality as well. He explicitly states that causality does 
not presuppose laws of "invariant connection", but rather: "a)the necessary 
connection between cause and effect, and b)the idea of causal efficacy". He 
rejects an opposition between freedom and necessity, asserting the notion of 
"agent causality" - the causality obtained by the actor’s reflexive conduct - as
^ o  be sure, the extent to which structures should be regarded as enabling 
or constraining, according to what we shall see shortly, demands the 
consideration of differentials of power positioning. See N. Mouzelis, Back to 
Sociological Theory. Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap, London, Macmillan, 
1991, chap. 2.
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a principle of explanation, proposing that we completely shun 
"determinism".10
This standpoint could be directly related to what Anderson interprets as a 
commitment to "libertarian socialism" or to his version of "utopian realism"11, 
which requires an awareness of the questions that need to be addressed by a 
critical and agile social science in the context of contemporary society.12 
Therein the issues of individual autonomisation and self-fulfilment must be 
given due attention. We must ask, however, whether this is the best solution 
to fill in the theoretical voids of a contemporary critical approach to society, 
regardless of how many interesting insights his sensibility is likely to bring to 
a renewed critical theory, especially in terms of the problematic of 
individuality and its "disembededness" in "late modernity".
It would be a mistake to classify Giddens neatly as an individualist, as the 
ensuing analysis of this chapter will make clear. "Methodological 
individualists" are usually prone to reduce the whole of social life to individual 
action. Giddens is far from assuming this narrow positioning, but he is
10A. Giddens, New Rules o f Sociological Method, pp. 84-5.
nP. Anderson, op. cit., p. 54. For his definition of "utopian realism", see 
A. Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity, Cambridge, Polity/ Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 154ff.
12For the impact of the North-American culture upon his perception of the 
limitations of the "agenda of the European left" (and for biographical 
information in general), see Christopher G. A. Bryant and David Jary, 
"Introduction: Coming to Terms with Anthony Giddens", in Idem, eds., 
Giddens' Theory o f Structuration: a Critical Appreciation, London, Routledge, 
1991. His more recent publications dive into this problematic: A. Giddens, The 
Consequences o f Modernity, Modernity and Self-Identity, Cambridge, Polity, 
1991, and The Transformation o f Intimacy, Cambridge, Polity, 1992.
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definitely a neighbour of some of their tenets.13 The problem is that he opts 
for a compromise with an individualistic perspective when he confines the idea 
of activity to individuals and locks collectivities into passivity, perhaps 
influenced by his commitment to individual autonomy and freedom. Curiously 
enough, probably evincing a widespread consonance of opinions as for the 
definition of action in contemporary social sciences, this action branch of 
Giddens’ duality of structure has not been the target of too many quarrels, 
even though Habermas has accused him of holding an anthropomorphic 
conception of society, which would be excessively open to transformation 
under the Praxis of individuals.14 Nowhere, however, does the alternative 
depicted go beyond a different way of putting those well known active and 
conditioning sorts of causality.
When conceptualising the other dimension of the "duality of structure" 
Giddens makes a U-turn in order to bring into his synthesis the contributions 
of structuralism and functionalism, making sharp and free use of Marx once
,3As can be seen in A. Giddens,"Commentary on the Debate", Theory and 
Society, v. 11, 1982 (527:539) - when, in an intervention in the polemic 
between Cohen, Roemer, Offe, Elster and others, he reveals much more 
sympathy for those individualist writers, despite his rejection of both 
functionalism and methodological individualism. In any case, his immersion 
in an individualistic perspective as for the classically posed "problem of order" 
was, as one might expect, considered excessive by J. C. Alexander, "The New 
Theoretical Movement", in N. J. Smelser, ed., Handbook o f Sociology, p. 90.
14J. Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", in David Held and John B. 
Thompson, eds., Habermas. Critical Debates, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 
268. Giddens was also criticised for an oscillation between an attempt at 
superseding the dichotomy subject/ object and the perception of daily conduct 
as "activity" or "doing", whereby the pole of the subject would regain 
preeminence. See Fred D. Dallmayr, "The Theory of Structuration: a Critique", 
in A. Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, London, Macmillan, 
1982, p. 22.
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more. Even before launching the New Rules of Sociological Method, his first 
extensive exposition of the structuration theses, Giddens had already underlined 
his dissatisfaction with the "subjectivism" and "relativism" that had taken over 
a large territory within the social sciences in the aftermath of the crisis of 
functionalism. Despite its limitations, that current had brought forward the 
crucial problems of "social organization", the importance of which he 
emphasises.15
It may well be maintained as a caveat that Giddens’ principal influence 
comes from linguistics, with a number of grave problems occurring as a 
consequence.16 If it is more than feasible to state the negative character of 
some aspects of these concerns, it would be wrong to overlook the insights 
produced by them and the thrashing out of some of their more problematic 
shortcomings by the author himself. Furthermore, however incompletely, other 
tendencies concur to give a definite place to the concepts derived from 
linguistics in his comprehensive theorisation.
Giddens’ first step in this connection was to fasten upon the differences 
of meaning the term structure receives in those two traditions. In structural- 
functionalism, he argues, the concept of structure appears on a par with that 
of function: whereas the first is above all descriptive, the second is responsible
15A. Giddens, "Functionalism: apres la Lutte", in Studies in Social and 
Political Theory, London, Hutchinson, 1977, p. 96. His general account of 
structuralism and post-structuralism appears in his Central Problems in Social 
Theory, chap. I.
16Margaret S. Archer, "Moiphogenesis versus Structuration: on Combining 
Structure and Action", British Journal o f Sociology, v. 33, 1982 (455:483), p. 
472.
77
for the main explicative operations. In turn, for structuralism, the notion of 
structure is intertwined with the idea of "rules of transformation", with the 
difference between function and structure substituted by "code" and "message". 
Functionalists treated structures as patterns of interaction, stretching over time 
- although Giddens proposes there was a supposed fluctuation of usage 
between "structure" and "system"; Saussure, on the other hand, used to employ 
the term "system" rather than "structure", a tendency reversed in the work of 
other structuralists. Giddens is, in however, eager to set their meaning clearly 
apart:
"...’structure’ refers to ’structural property’, or more exactly, to 
’structuring property’, structuring properties providing the 
’biding’ of time and space in social systems. I argue that these 
properties can be understood as rules and resources, recursively 
implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structures exist 
paradigmatically, as an absent set of differences, temporally 
’present’ only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments 
of social systems".17
According to this definition, a social system is a "structured totality", 
existent in space and in time. Structures, on the other hand, exist only 
abstractly and are characterised by the absence of subject. In fact, attributing 
a "realist" character to structures and depicting social systems as merely the
17A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 64.
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patterning of social relations between individual actors, he intends to invert the 
usual configuration of these concepts. Thereby, it should be stressed, system 
becomes a concept that conveys something of a skeleton-like quality and has, 
turned into a nominalistic entity, its properties denied. I shall take stock of his 
concept of structure in a critical way shortly and shall refuse, later on, this 
watering down of the concept of system in the course of a discussion geared 
towards an alternative definition.
Giddens’ scheme was enriched by the introduction of two complementary 
distinctions, which do not change those basic traits, nonetheless. The first 
brings out the plural character of structures, whilst the second draws the lines 
between "structural principles" (modes of articulation and differentiation of the 
institutions whereof a society is constituted), the already focused "structures", 
and the "elements or axes of structuration" (which lead to the examination of 
the structural properties of the institutional practices that lie at their bases). 
There is a hierarchy between them in terms of abstraction, in the order they 
were above listed. This differentiation and hierarchisation have a 
methodological, but not a substantive basis. It must be added that, out of time 
and space, structures are regarded by Giddens as enjoying a virtual existence 
only, in "memory tracks" and organisational complexes - wherein the storage 
capacity of social systems, progressively enhanced by writing and other forms 
of notation, is of paramount relevance. Furthermore, the notions of "rules" and 
"resources" serve an outstanding purpose: they are intended to open the 
concept of structure to the actors’ action. If a structure works as a constraint, 
it is at the same time enabling, creating the possibilities for the freedom of the
actor (as in Kantianism or Romanticism). Structures are, in addition, open to 
permanent transformation.18
Notwithstanding the great effort condensed in these formulations, they not 
only leave some questions unanswered but, as would be inevitable, show 
weaknesses that raise polemical responses. It may be asserted, for instance, as 
Thompson does, that Giddens does not possess a concept of structure that 
could do justice to the specific features of "social structures".19 Despite its 
only partial truthfulness, this consists in a worthwhile consideration, since it 
shows the narrow and unsatisfactory content of Giddens’ concept of structure 
and of those related to it - "rules", which has not received a clear definition, 
and "resources". Particularly important is to ask about both the limitations of 
his conceptualisations and what happens to the notion of structure if we sail 
beyond the domain of language.
The most obvious thing arises directly from the influence structuralism 
exerted on this construction. An overreliance upon linguistics is clearly 
burdensome. At this stage, we must inquire into the status of the "resources" 
pointed to by Giddens - those he characterises as "allocative", i.e. material 
aspects of the environment, means of material production and reproduction,
18Idem, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, London, 
Macmillan, 1981, pp. 35 and 54-5; The Constitution o f Society, pp. 16-24.
19J. B. Thompson,"The Theory of Structuration" and - for an answer - A. 
Giddens, "A Reply to my Critics", in D. Held and J. B. Thompson, eds., Social 
Theories o f Modern Society: Anthony Giddens and his Critiques, pp. 62-70 and 
pp. 256-7, respectively. Although this critic brings up several central problems, 
Giddens’ dissection of the concept of coercion (prominent in Thompson’s 
critique) - pushed through in The Constitution o f Society (pp. 172ff) - in its 
Durkheimian dimensions of contraint and coercion, clears a great deal of the 
most common confusions surrounding this problematic.
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and finished goods, as well as those he names "authoritative", comprising the 
organisation of time and space, the organisation of "life-chances", the 
production and reproduction of the human body. These resources would be 
elements of social totalities, not the possession of individuals, constituting a 
"structured system of domination" (with, once more, a far-fetched "realism" 
seeping through).20
Giddens seems to realise that an individualistic response to this set of 
social properties will not do. How could one treat material elements - including 
the human body - as paradigmatic structures, which have existence out of 
space and time? His conceptual universe is, therefore, under considerable 
strain. Even if we introduce the idea of "instantiation" of these structures by 
individual action in the constitutive moments of interactive processes - what 
would apparently, though not really, make sense in the case of beliefs and 
knowledge, for example when their "presentification" obtains - the 
conceptualisation remains inconsistent, unless we cling to an extreme and 
untenable individualistic perspective. I shall carry out below a discussion 
which suggests that Giddens tends to insert the "structures" into the actors’ 
consciousness, in its practical, non-discursive layer. If this would be 
appropriate to deal with "paradigmatic" entities (such as language), other 
aspects of social life that might be grasped by means of the concept of 
structure - as economic and political systems - do not allow for a simple 
"instantiation" in interactive processes.
20A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 73-7; The 
Constitution of Society, p. 39 (note 2).
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In a more basic level, nevertheless, we must tackle the coherent character 
of these structures as presupposed by Giddens. Contrary to his view, it should 
be said that social structures do not belong in the tidy space of grammatics.21 
In this sense, Giddens cannot help sharing the company of those "objectivists" 
(whom he strives to overcome) attacked by Bourdieu, a writer who directs his 
salvos against the typical division between langue and parole so dear to 
structuralists. The reification brought about by these constructions is produced 
either through functionalist operations or by substituting a presumed "reality 
of the model" for the more modest and correct "model of reality"22, a mistake 
Giddens has committed in theoretical terms.
Moreover, in criticising Levi-Strauss and assuming a reified concept of 
structure23, Giddens is pressed into an extremely rigid view: he seems to 
think that the different structures of which he speaks are, in fact, evenly 
distributed amongst all the individuals that make up a social system. In the 
end, it seems that these individuals could hardly be individualised, since they 
would share exactly the same son of perspectives, values, and capacities. This 
concept of structure turns out to be, thus, a highly deterministic one. In order
21M. S. Archer, op. cit., p. 460. She does not realise, however, that 
languages as such are not as coherent as linguists and grammarians often 
imagine they are.
22P. Bourdieu, Le Sens Pratique, pp. 55-67.
23A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 62-3. His concept 
of structure is, to an extent, more rigid than Levi-Strauss’s, who refers only to 
the systematic features of reality - upon which our model should be built, and 
correspond directly to - and recognises accidental, non-systematic aspects of 
social relations. See Claude Levi-Strauss, "La Notion de Structure en 
Ethnologie", Anthropologie Strueturale, Paris, Plon, 1974 (1958).
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to move away from its evenness and determinism and craft an alternative 
concept of structure as open to change and individualisation, another approach 
is necessary. Otherwise we are dangerously close to an idea of "collective 
mind" that exists and changes synchronically in all individuals, and which 
could scarcely be said to be enabling. It should be added, in any case, that, 
although without much specification, this conceptualisation allows him to avoid 
a characterisation of internalised norms as commanding individual behaviour - 
an issue I shall return to in chapter six. Moreover, if he is correct in pointing 
out the individualistic limitations of Schutz’s phenomenology, this should not 
lead to the opposite shortcoming, namely the theoretical disappearance of 
individuals in the face of structures. Actually, it is still to be shown that we 
can have more than just a "fragmentary and imperfect knowledge of the 
other"24, as Schutz intuited.
We saw at the beginning of our analysis of Giddens* work that he 
incorporates one of the main advances of the social sciences in attempting to 
break through a stiff polarisation between individual and society, resorting to 
Marx’s dialectics between subject and object. The other spearhead of this 
development, the notion of interaction, is also present in his theory. In fact, he 
asserts that the proper locus for the study of social reproduction lies within the 
confines of the "immediate process of the constitution of interaction", whence 
"everyday life" should be considered a "phenomenon of the totality".25 The 
duality of structure would afford procedures which make interactive processes
24A. Giddens, New Rules o f Sociological Method, pp. 17-8 and 24 ff.
^Idem, Ibid., p. 122.
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understandable. The problem is that it is never clear whether Giddens devises 
an ontological or a methodological status for this duality. We will have 
occasion to ask about the depth of the notion of interaction in this theory, 
which, despite his wishes and undertakings, remains questionable.
He upholds, on the other hand, a methodological "bracketing" that would 
pave the way for the study of the two poles of that duality (no longer, he 
claims, a dualism), each with its own characteristics.26 His methodological 
distinction points to two operations: an "institutional analysis", to penetrate the 
passive universe of the structures, and an "analysis of the strategic conduct". 
A new category is introduced to bridge those two procedures, the "modalities 
of structuration". They receive the label of "central dimensions of the duality 
of structure in the constitution of interaction". In the ambit of the strategic 
analysis, structures take on the configuration of knowledge and resources of 
which the actors make use in the course of interactions; at the level of 
institutional analysis, rules and resources should be treated as institutional 
features of interactive systems. The modalities constitute, thus, the element of 
mediation between the poles of the duality of the structure. It is difficult, 
nonetheless, really either to feel or to understand the role of these "modalities", 
the meaning and utility of which Giddens has still to demonstrate in his more 
empirically oriented research. In spite of that, several of the suggestions and 
insights that follow from these cardinal propositions are very interesting and 
creative, especially because they bring together in a synthetical way many
26Idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 80 and 92.
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different strands of contemporary social theory, the details of which fall 
outside the scope of our discussion.27
Margaret Archer has charged Giddens with the lack of recognition of the 
real discontinuities between action and system, concomitantly to the mistake 
of transposing the dualism from the methodological to the theoretical sphere. 
She evoked for that the notion of emergent properties, whereby she 
endeavoured to stress and answer the questions derived from that ontological 
discontinuity.28 I shall return to this notion, in order to revise it, when 
examining Parsons’ theory. For the moment it must be merely noted that 
Giddens radically disavows the validity of such a conceptualisation, criticising 
Durkheim’s mineralogical analogies. He correctly affirms that, if it is not 
possible to speak about individuals except in interaction, the notion of 
"emergent properties" is meaningless.29 The terrain is, however, slippery and 
his difficulties are made manifest when he comes up with the awkward 
statement according to which individuals "decide" to take decisions in the 
context of what he refuses to accept as "collective actors". The inconsistencies 
are flagrant: in one passage the notion of interaction underpins the rejection of 
the "emergent properties"; in the other, he postulates the autonomy of 
individuals vis-d-vis interactions. An a priori and far-fetched individualistic 
position hinders any proper consideration of this crucial question.
27See especially the figures in Idem, New Rules o f Sociological Method, 
p. 122, and in Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 80-2 - as well as the 
extensive discussion articulated in the latter.
28M. S. Archer, op. cit., p. 467.
29A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 171.
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Departing from a phenomenological stance, Bemd KieBling has accused 
Giddens of the opposite sin - "objectivism". The concept of "practical 
consciousness", far from underlying human reflexivity, would dispose of our 
communicative capacities, since it reintroduces the structures in the 
consciousness of the actor.30 Once more the duality of structure is under 
strain and, although KieBling’s perspective puts excessive emphasis on an 
unbounded human reflexive faculty (without real consideration of Giddens* 
discussion on the decentring of the subject and of his stratified model of 
consciousness), he succeeds in exposing the uncertain character of the latter’s 
concept of structure. This issue will be taken up again in chapter six of this 
study. It is necessary to observe now, however, that if the distinction between 
system and structure is fundamental, the meaning of the latter should hark back 
to the functionalists’ usage, rather than to the structuralists’ version, in the last 
instance the one adopted by Giddens. It should be regarded as descriptive and, 
therefore, as analogous to Bourdieu’s idea of model, with no claims about a 
coherent and non-contradictory structural reality being laid down. This does 
not mean to say that Giddens’ suggestion of a methodological "bracketing" has 
no relevance, although it will need to be reassessed when we turn to the 
discussion of collective subjectivity.
Giddens intends to establish his own depiction of the relations between 
"social integration" and "systemic integration". For him, the smallest social 
systems are "dyadic". The concept of integration refers to the degree of
30Bemd KieBling, Kritik des Giddensschen Sozialtheorie, Frankfurt, 
Peterlang, 1988, particularly pp. 197-8.
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interdependence of action or its "systernness", regular processes of interchange 
or reciprocity of practices between actors and collectivities. These two forms 
of integration are, however, distinct: whereas social integration comes about 
at the level of "face to face" interaction, systemic integration obtains in 
relations of "absence", which tend to coincide with relations between social 
systems and collectivities. Their mechanisms are different, inasmuch as social 
integration always happens via reflexively monitored conduct, what just 
incompletely occurs in the systemic case. Institutions play a crucial role in 
system integration, consisting in patterned modes of behaviour.31 But Giddens 
makes a point of drawing attention to two elements, whereupon we will dwell 
below, advancing the idea that "the expansion of attempts at reflexive self- 
regulation at the level of system integration is evidently one of the principal 
features of the contemporary world". The two "most pervasive types of social 
mobilization in modem times" - the "’legal-rational’ social organization" and 
the "secular social movement" - are closely connected to this expansion of 
rationality.32
Giddens wants to discard the notion of function, denying any positive 
consequences as to its use in the social sciences. Only under one aspect does 
he regard it as relevant: namely if functional statements can be transformed in
31A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 73ff. He prefers 
these concepts to the micro/ macro distinction, stressing also the historical 
variation of social and system integration in Idem, The Constitution o f Society, 
pp. 139ff.
32Idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 79.
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contra-factual propositions.33 He believes that functionalists showed wisdom 
when they underscored how much non-intentional outcomes of action are 
important in social life; they erred, though, when trying to translate these 
outcomes into reasons or necessities of society. He goes on, then, to reject any 
teleological account of social systems’ developments.34 His alternative for 
explanatory purposes in the dimension of systemic integration comprises three 
ideas, somewhat cryptically expounded. These are "homeostatic loops", self- 
regulation through feed-back and reflexive self-monitoring.35
This set of proposals is closely connected to the idea of "unintended 
consequences of action", which he discovers again in Marx. Reflection, let us 
recall, monitors human conduct. It is not capable, however, of surpassing the 
fact that human actors are immersed in conditions the knowledge of which is 
ever limited, as well as it is not powerful enough to foresee the emergence of 
certain results that were not intended when the action was at first projected - 
independently of the intended consequences coming about or not. Now, if this 
is an active mechanism in terms of social integration, as to systemic 
integration, it has far-reaching importance indeed.36
33Idem, Ibid., p. 113.
^Idem, Ibid., pp. 78-9. This book is, incidentally, proposed as a "non­
functionalist manifesto" (p. 7).
35Idem, Ibid., pp. 115ff.
36See, for instance, Idem, Ibid., pp. 56 and 66, and New Rules of 
Sociological Method, p. 77.
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Giddens’ assessment of the notions of social and system integration, 
despite a certain awareness of the problem of scale in social life, seems to 
constitute a drawback, especially if compared to Lockwood’s former 
propositions, which we reviewed in the foregoing chapter (l.IV). Despite his 
separation between "parts" and "actors" being utterly inadequate, Lockwood 
was at least concerned with collective actors, which are hinted at in Giddens’ 
formulation only in an absolutely unspecified manner. Functionalist notions are 
useful, according to Giddens, only as contra-factual statements, This is an 
important contention, notwithstanding the question of the individualistic limits 
which are concretely supposed by his notion of unintended consequences of 
action, even though this does not need to be the case. Social systems have no 
functions, unless they are intended as such, but undergo processes that entail 
their reproduction and change. Although functionalists bore this often in mind, 
they were prone to turn this analytical tool into a substantive dimension of 
social life. Giddens is correct in eschewing this mistake from his theory.
If we otherwise introduce the importance of collective subjectivity, his 
concept of unintended consequences of action must be included in a broader 
picture so that it can help address the contingent character of collective 
centring and causality - as we shall see later on. In Giddens’ construction, 
active causality is reserved for individuals, but structures - as constraining and 
enabling - are endowed at least with conditioning causality, by means of their 
"rules" and "resources". This is even completely lacking in his treatment of 
social systems, whose internal processes - as described by those three 
mechanisms - are reduced to the interplay between individuals and structures.
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For the moment, I will contend myself with the non-acceptance of social 
systems as "patterned relations". Together with their specific properties, 
accurately underscored by Giddens and of which structures give us an 
approximate model, they possess a particular type of causality - a collective 
one.
III)COLLECTIVE ACTORS, INDIVIDUALISM AND HISTORY
One of Giddens’ critics found good reasons to attack his notion of 
actor, for it would be reductive, focusing only on individuals.37 The problem 
is not that Giddens completely ignores the question; he grapples with it in 
substantive terms. The quotation makes this clear:
"I shall distinguish two main types of collectivity according to 
the form of the relations that enter into their reproduction. I 
shall call these associations and organizations, and I shall 
separate them from social movements".38
Those first collectivities, associations, would monitor their reproduction 
without looking forward to controlling or changing the conditions in which it
37B. Hindess, Choice, Rationality and Social Theory, pp. 100-1, and 
Political Choice & Social Structure, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989, pp. 6 and 
89. We are recurrently warned of this problem also by N. Mouzelis, Back to 
Sociological Theory, chap. 2.
38A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 199.
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occurs; the opposite is true for organisations, which are collectivities no longer 
managed in "traditional" ways, that is they strive to control their own 
reproduction. On the other hand, "social movements" - not limited to specific 
locales and not establishing either, unlike the former categories, crystallised 
internal "roles" - reflexively constitute collective endeavours in search of new 
forms of life. Organisations came into being with the emergence of agrarian 
states, but flourished in the modem age, in which social movements consist in 
the main bearers of a new sort of history, characteristic of, to use Levi- 
Strauss’s phrase, "hot societies". Historicity assumes centre stage as the 
project of the transformation of the present.39
With this incursion, Giddens only marginally tackles the question of 
collective subjectivity. It must be considered that this discussion is carried out 
under the title of "Making History" and that it is not by accident that only his 
fourth book came to reflect upon these entities. In a body of work projected, 
if we accept his closest interpreter, Cohen, to develop an "ontological" 
approach to the social sciences, the precise position of these collectivities 
reveals very much their status in the general theoretical framework. In fact, 
they barely constitute even "residual categories". He stresses that collectivities 
are not actors, since they have no "corporeal existence",40 a remark similar
39Idem, Ibid., pp. 200-3, and "Out of the Orrery: E. P. Thompson on 
Consciousness and History", as well as, especially, "Time and Social 
Organizations", in Social Theory and Modern Sociology, Cambridge, Polity, 
1987. He has more recently sketched a classification intended to clarify the 
concept of social system, without addressing the underlying theoretical 
problem. Idem, "Structuration Theory and Sociological Analysis", pp. 302-3.
40Idem, The Constitution o f Society, pp. 220-1.
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to, and as misguided as, Harre’s. In any case, it gives away Giddens* 
appreciation of these collectivities in the mould of individual actors. To be 
sure, collectivities have no body comparable to that of human beings. This 
does not warrant the denial of their material - "corporal” or "organic” - 
constitution, and the fact that they depend directly on the "natural" world for 
their very existence, crucial question on which I shall expand in chapter eight.
At the same time, as has already been mentioned, adopting - in an offhand 
way - a radical form of atomistic nominalism, he defends the thesis that the 
participants in these collectivities "decide" (individually) to take decisions. 
Against this idea, we see authors raise even the limited conditions of decision 
that are open to prisoners in concentration camps. We do not need to go that 
far. Individual autonomy is a phenomenon that can be observed in the most 
painful and coercive situations. This is not tantamount to saying that actors can 
relinquish participation in certain social systems. We just need to imagine the 
case of the members of a family, part of which, by definition, those individuals 
will always be. In other cases, such as those of a worker or a prisoner, the 
capacity of withdrawal is only limited, in any event, by moral or material 
constraints. Moreover, the level of systematicity of interactive relations in 
collectivities corresponds to properties that cannot be reduced to their 
individual expression, irrespective of whether individuals can quit a specific 
social system or not. To begin with, the collective causality of social systems, 
which can be broken down into the active causality of their members only 
analytically, has its proper sphere of impact. It is necessary to underscore the 
limits of the "analytical realism" which Giddens purportedly shares with
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Parsons and Marx as well as the insufficiency of his discussions on the 
concepts of "emergent properties" in Durkheim, when answering Archer. If 
they are not, definitely, "emergent", as properties of social systems they belong 
in a specific layer of reality. Or else, how to understand the properties of 
structures and social systems? They are accepted just because they are passive 
or totally inert? The kinship of this approach with that of Popper, analysed in 
the end of last chapter (l.VI), stands out, as much as its inconsistency, derived 
from an unexamined acceptance of the heritage of the Enlightenment.
This theoretical knot is partially responsible for a certain lack of fit 
between the theory of structuration and Giddens’ own empirically oriented 
research, but for his discussions of individuality in modernity, wherein, of 
course, the problem is less serious. The more he grapples with explicitly 
collective phenomena, the less he utilises the concepts of the theory of 
structuration. More generally, time and again he makes the theoretical 
framework match the empirical realm by means of ad hoc conceptualisations. 
For example when he mentions a "sense of opposition of interest" between 
collectivities, having defined, as we have seen, the concept of interest in the 
context of individual action alone.41 Or when he mentions the dimension of 
power (relations of autonomy and dependency), previously defined in terms of 
individual ontological capacity, with respect to collectivities.42 Throughout his 
reflection on the emergence of the state, of organisations and social 
movements, this problem is prominent. The idea of "double hermeneutics",
41Idem, A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, p. 232.
42Idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 225.
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which is aimed at addressing the reabsorption of the social sciences in daily 
life, and vice versa,43 is to be regarded in similar terms: should we think of 
it as a relation between individual lay actors and individual social scientists 
only, and it would be difficult to do justice to its implications in the whole of 
contemporary social life. Therefore, in spite of all its wealth, there are 
difficulties with Giddens* theory when applied to empirical situations, not least 
in the writings of its creator.
Social movements have become a topic of paramount importance in his 
writings, since they express Giddens’ deep concern with social change in the 
modem world. It is hard to understand so much reliance upon their 
transformative character, if it is not expected that they would bring about 
social consequences that individuals in isolation would not be able to, in any 
of the four institutional axes Giddens identifies in the late modem world.44 
Take, moreover, the two dimensions he distinguishes under the headings of 
"life politics" and "emancipatory politics". The latter is defined as the politics 
of "life chances", oriented towards the liberation of individuals from different 
types of constraints, seeking the principle of autonomy; the former, revolving 
around questions of "life style" and "choices", hence around morals to a great 
extent, is central to the construction of personal identities45 Should we not 
perceive the dimension of life politics - as well as that of emancipatory
43For this concept, see especially Idem, New Rules o f Sociological Method, 
p. 79.
44Idem, The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge, Polity, 1985, pp. 219ff; 
and The Consequences o f Modernity, chap. V.
45Idem, Modernity and Self-Identity, pp. 210-5.
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movements - as developed by the constitution of collective subjectivities? 
Social movements, sometimes loosely centred and with no general plan or 
direction, collectively accomplish the creation of new styles of life. In this case 
also an individualistic approach seems to be insufficient.
The historical evolution of social formations is not a direct concern of my 
research, but the themes we have been focusing on lead us up inevitably to the 
fringes of this problematic. Discussing Giddens* theory one cannot help 
making a brief reference to his understanding of the theories of evolution, 
which he in fact disavows, proposing their "deconstruction". I shall not develop 
a complete analysis of his theses and shall be satisfied with pointing out the 
place of collective action and collective actors in his account
First of all, he intends to discard what he calls "unfolding models" of
change. Although this does not mean abandoning the notion of development
or taking the instance that all social change finds its way through external
influences, these are actually issues he wants to raise. Even because the ideas
of inside/ outside are tied to the entangling of society and state. He constantly
alludes to collective subjectivity or collective actors, or at least to things linked
to these notions. He speaks of invasions, migrations, trade routes, wars and
explorations, observing that all these "episodes" by definition "...involve
movements of groups or populations from and to somewhere". Time-space
"paths", therefore, are traced by "collectivities rather than individuals". And he
goes further to state that "collectivities nominally internal to states" are
*
sometimes "perhaps more strongly integrated into transnational networks" - the
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most expressive contemporary example of these being "gigantic transnational
•  I* 46corporations .
The problems that are revealed in these passages are not new. Whilst 
Giddens stresses the role of collectivities, even rendering their action more 
important than that of individuals, if pressed he would probably deny an 
acknowledgment of these entities as collective subjectivities. It is when he 
introduces the concepts whereby one could construct "generalizations" in 
explaining social change that the absence of those categories is negatively 
highlighted. According to him, there are no "general mechanisms" of social 
change, much less any unilineal sequence of development; he advances, 
however, five concepts that would help us grasp the evolving of human 
history. These are: structural principles, episodic characterisations (delineation 
of comparable modes of institutional change), intersocietal systems 
(specification of the relations between societal totalities), time-space edges 
(indication of connections between societies of differing structural type) and 
world time (examination of conjunctures in the light of reflexively monitored 
history).47
If he had hinted at the importance of collective subjectivity in a 
substantive manner formerly, theoretically they hold no importance in regard 
to history and the theory of evolution. Whereas one can guess that collective 
subjectivity - or at least action (and actors) - is included in the above 
mentioned "episodic characterisations", one is almost puzzled but the exclusive
46Idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 223-5.
47 The Constitution o f Society, p. 224.
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reference to "human actors" (supposedly, of course, individuals, should one 
stick to his more general theses).48 No commentary on collectivities is 
advanced. Moreover, he thinks that Marx gave too much importance to class 
relations and class struggles, a point his Marxist critics do not really try to 
refute 49 This is, in my opinion, a reasonable assertion in relation to most of 
human history. In spite of that, this was, as we shall see at an appropriate 
stage, not only a substantive core of Marx’s thinking, but it played the role 
of logical and ontological mediation of individuals, on the one hand, and 
national societies plus the international system, on the other. Giddens does not 
bother to offer a substitute to those notions and role.
It is, thus, a little ironic that Giddens’ critique of Habermas* "Parsonian- 
style Weber" chooses to emphasise the "multifarious practices and struggles 
of concretely located actors", the "conflict and clash of sectional interests" and 
on the "territoriality and violence of political formations or states".50 A 
critique of an excessive concern with integration and normativity (which would 
actually furnish the rationale to Parsons’ "emergent properties") is certainly
48Idem, Ibid., p. 251.
49 Idem, Ibid., p. 256. See, for a Marxist critique, Erik O. Wright, "Models 
of Historical Trajectory: an Assessment of Giddens’s Critique of Marxism", in 
D. Held and J. B. Thompson, eds., Social Theories o f Modernity: Anthony 
Giddens and his Critiques. The discussion of substantive aspects of human 
history and of the theories of evolution is the gist of Giddens’ A Contemporary 
Critique o f Historical Materialism. In this book he even speaks about 
"activities" of labour unions and parties, and the "role" they played in the 
transformation of capitalism (p. 226). I have already addressed above the 
general question of social movements as agencies of change.
50A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. xxvi-xxvii; and "Labour and 
Interaction", in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, eds., Habermas. Critical Debates, 
p. 159.
97
necessary, but has, nonetheless, been taken too far by Giddens, as I shall make 
clear later on. Weber, notwithstanding his individualistic methodological bias, 
dealt brilliantly with collective movements. This would be Giddens concern, 
just as in Weber’s case, only in an unreflected way. This realisation drives us 
beyond the boundaries of the theory of structuration. For, as I have tried to 
show above, despite the rich orchestration of Giddens’ theory and the synthesis 
of many diverse currents, there remains an absence in his work, which needs 
to be filled in with respect to collective subjectivities.
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CHAPTER THREE
LIFE-WORLD AND SYSTEM IN HABERMAS’
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
I)SYNTHESIS AND DIALECTICS
Jurgen Habermas has been, for some decades, one the most prolific and 
consistent writers in the fields of social theory and philosophy. His critical 
theory has been very much concerned with the reconstruction of the legacy of 
German philosophy, first basically in a Marxist framework, but increasingly 
under the influence of Kant. Differently from Giddens, his attempt at 
theoretical synthesis has been closely connected to more empirically oriented 
issues, in what he perceives as a Hegelian perspective in methodological 
terms.1 The theory of evolution, which he once deemed the basic element of 
a theory of society2 and which at last received a peculiar shape in his hands, 
supplies foundations to his process of argumentation, since "...in the course of 
social evolution the object as such changes".3 He rejects, therefore, a more 
autonomously formulated general theory, although in practice several sections 
of his work are solely dedicated to analytical reasoning and abstract 
conceptualisations. This, in fact, brings some problems to his theory, insofar 
as historically specific questions mingle in an unwarranted manner with truly 
general considerations.
For Habermas, the multiplicity of paradigms in sociological theory is an 
illusion, probably the artificial rhetorical product of scientific discourse: the
]J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1989 (1981), B. I, p. 7.
2Idem, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 7.
3Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, p. 447.
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only two real paradigms are those of "action" and "system". The dialectical 
notion of totality had brought them together, but this version of synthesis is 
regarded by Habermas as untenable. He aims, therefore, at recombining, in a 
non-trivial or eclectic manner, those two paradigms, which have become the 
"disjecta membra" of the Hegelian concept of totality that Marx and Lukdcs 
would have taken over without reconstruction.4
In order to achieve that, Habermas strongly stresses the necessity of 
forsaking the paradigm of the "philosophy of consciousness". This expression 
refers to the configuration which the subject received under the sway of the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In particular, he 
draws attention to the isolation, self-referentiality, clear-cut demarcation and 
control of an instrumentally oriented ego.5 But other issues are present in his 
characterisation. At the same time as embedding the subject in its interactive 
settings, he tries to eschew the analysis of consciousness, in its Hegelian or 
Husserlian versions, and substitute it by procedures directly derived from 
linguistic philosophy and, to an extent, behavioural psychology. Instead of an 
intuitive knowledge arrived at by reflection and introspection, and instead of 
an inquiry into intentions by means of a transcendental analysis of meaning, 
he opts, thus, for investigations which imply "intersubjective proof'. This 
would be accomplished either through the reconstruction of the logic, rules and
4Idem, "Political Experience and the Renewal of Marxist Theory" (1979) 
and "The Dialectics of Rationalization" (1981), in Autonomy and Solidarity 
(ed. by Peter Dews), London, Verso, 1992, pp. 91, 105 and 113; Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, p. 459.
5Idem, Der philosophische Diskur der Moderne, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1988 (1985), p. 27.
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symbols of language, or through observation of actual behaviour and its 
structures of signification. These are strategies which Mead in part blended.6 
He thinks that a philosophy that is based on the assumptions of the 
transcendental philosophy of the subject cannot escape Hegel’s dialectics and 
its shortcomings.7
A further step leads Habermas to denounce the idea of collective subject, 
which he regards as illegitimate, as an outcome of that perspective. Marx 
would have speculatively regarded society as a singular subject. For both Marx 
and Hegel, he argues, that moral totality has become fragmented. To discuss 
this fragmentation they utilised the model of the disruption of common 
morality by crime. For Marx, socialism would reconstitute that pristine unity, 
overcoming the division of society into classes.8 In contrast, the theory of 
communicative action does not contemplate the process of rationalisation as 
the unfolding of a "macro-subject" that undergoes a moral evolution towards 
higher unity - instead, the accent is shifted to intersubjectivity.9
Habermas is quite aware that Marx did not imagine a simple transposition 
of attributes of individuals - such as consciousness, interest and action - to the
6Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" (1967), in Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1982, pp. 240-1; Theorie 
des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 11-4.
7Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", p. 93.
8Idem, Erkenntnis und Inter esse, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991 
(1968), pp. 73-5 and 77ff.
9Idem, Die philosophische Diskur der Moderne, pp. 396-403.
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collective level, which is intersubjectively constituted.10 He also once alluded 
to the dialectics of the general and the particular when he stated that the 
identity of individuals is formed within groups which relate to other groups. 
Furthermore, they would obey general practical rules and the communication 
between them might be distorted, although this could be surmounted through 
a process of enlightenment.11 He observed subsequently that he conceives of 
totalities as forms which overlap and intertwine, even though - contrary to 
Marx’s view - they do not constitute a "supertotality", since the "general" 
would now be more "fragile".12 This obtains regardless of the fact that, but 
also insofar as, he criticises the inconsistency of the notion of collective 
subject in Hegel, Marx and Lukdcs, and also the supposed idealism of the idea 
of the "concrete universal".13 Such collective subjects would merely 
"hypostatise" intersubjective relations.14 This does not make things easier for 
a precise understanding of his incidental declaration that society is a
10Idem, "Einleitung zur Neusausgabe" (1971) to Theorie und Praxis, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988, p. 20.
nIdem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", p. 298; "Einleitung zur 
Neuausgabe", p. 35. See also his "Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie? Eine Auseineidersetzung mit Niklas Luhmann", in J. 
Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985 (1971), p. 217.
12Idem, Der Philosophische Diskur der Modern, pp. 396-7.
13Idem, "Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie? Eine 
Auseineidersetzung mit Niklas Luhmann", pp. 179-80. In the same text (note 
16, p. 217), he ties, however, moral issues in with the dialectics between the 
individual, the particular and the general.
14Idem, "A Reply", in Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds., Communicative 
Action. Essays on Jurgen Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, 
Cambridge, Polity, 1991 (1986), p. 250.
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"systemically integrated action network (Handlungszusammenhange) of socially 
integrated groups".15
Habermas has not tackled the reformulation of Hegel*s logic because he 
has never felt it was necessary.16 In any case, Jay has precisely underlined 
that, although in his first writings Habermas adhered to an essentially Marxist 
view of totality, he came afterwards to strive to recast this concept in distinct 
terms.17 Alongside Giddens’ and a handful of other theories, Habermas holds 
centre stage in the contemporary movement towards theoretical syntheses. 
However, his overall rejection of dialectics18, in particular with respect to the 
constitution of collective subjectivities, creates insurmountable problems. This 
seems not to happen by accident, nonetheless, insofar as his work has been 
revealing more explicitly his commitment to the Enlightenment and its 
theoretical and moral tenets, moving away from Marx’s insights. An 
attachment to the poles of the individual and the social system is therefore 
likely to follow.
15Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, p. 301.
16Idem, "Vorwort zur Neuausgabe" (1982) to Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaft, p. 9.
17M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp. 469-73. For Habermas’ early thoughts 
on this subject, see his contributions - "The Analytical Theory of Science and 
Dialectics" and "A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism", to T. W. Adorno, 
ed., op. cit.
18Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of Dialectic, 
New York, Verso, 1990, pp. 7, 237 and 240.
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This refusal of dialectics has led him towards several dichotomies (rather 
than distinctions, as McCarthy would have it19): in terms of his conception 
of action and system or structure, the most important for us are those which 
oppose communicative to instrumental and strategic action, on the one hand, 
and life-world to systems on the other. As we shall see, there is in fact a 
blurred underlying distinction of causality in relation to each of these 
dichotomies, whose coiTelations with the two extremes of each pair he has not 
actually worked out very clearly. The sharp separation between history as 
narrative and the theory of evolution reproduces these dichotomies.
Many authors have criticised Habermas for his lack of understanding of 
the role of collectivities in history, usually from a standpoint that results, 
however directly or indirectly, from Marxism. Some contend that the 
attribution of a central role to groups and collective actors would by no means 
imply the reification of a "macro-subject".20 It is not that Habermas pays no 
heed to collectivities in history: he often addresses the point; in particular, he 
recurrently speaks about "social groups", rather than classes. The problem is
19Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory o f Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge, 
Polity, 1984 (1974), p. 23.
20A. Honneth, Kritik der Macht, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, pp. 
313-4; H. Joas, "The Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and Positivism", in 
A. Honneth and H. Joas, eds., op. c/r., p. 114; P. Anderson, In the Tracks o f 
Historical Materialism, New York/ London, Verso, 1983, p. 67. Whilst 
Mouzelis is correct in pointing to the absence of collective actors in Habermas, 
he seems to be prone, however, to a form of reification. See N. Mouzelis, 
"Appendix I" to Back to Sociological Theory. I have already mentioned 
Giddens’ somewhat unwarranted remarks on the topic in chap. 2.III.
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that their status remains unclarified throughout.21 Others, closer to Habermas, 
discard for instance classes as collective subjects and wish to focus on social 
movements, but think that the theory of communicative action misses the 
strategic aspect of collective action.22 In any case, concentration on system 
analysis provokes the receding of the practical-political activity of social agents 
to the background.23
Habermas’ statement on the existence of only two paradigms in sociology 
- those of "action" and "system" - is not precise. He has confused the real and 
manifest multiplicity of research programmes with two problems which 
sociological theories have necessarily to grapple with, especially inasmuch as 
they remain - as he himself does - committed to the traditional polarisation of 
bourgeois thought. That characterisation of two paradigms is indeed effectual 
to state his case on how a new synthesis should be achieved. On the other 
hand, he has had in practice to synthesise diverse strands of thought, an 
endeavour in which the enormous reach of his readings comes to the fore. 
From the classics of Marxism and of sociology, through German traditions, 
such as transcendental philosophy plus hermeneutics, and behavioural analysis, 
to contemporary legacies, such as micro-sociologies and Parsonian-Luhmannian 
functionalism, Wittigensteinian language-games and linguistic philosophy, as 
well as genetic structuralism, Habermas has faced up to challenges ensuing
21 A. Heller, "Habermas and Marxism", in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, 
eds., Habermas. Critical Debates, p. 30.
22Klaus Eder, The New Politics o f Class, London, Sage, 1993, pp. 52 and
61.
23T. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 379.
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from different comers in order to reshape the critical theory he inherited from 
the Frankfurt School.24
In Knowledge and Interest, Habermas attempted to ground critical theory 
by means of an examination of the interests that underpin science. He 
underscored, in particular, the interest in emancipation that calls forth a critical 
approach. The other two approaches consisted in the empirical-analytical 
(nomological) sciences, oriented towards control, and the hermeneutic sciences, 
interested in the enlargement of the (self-)understanding of human groups.25 
This book dwelled upon epistemological issuesl Concomitantly, he resumed his 
original efforts to carve out a theory of society, which culminated in his The 
Theory o f Communicative Action.
II)ACTION, LIFE-WORLD AND SYSTEM
His first serious move in that direction consisted of an analysis of the 
philosophy of the young Hegel. In his Jena period Hegel had depicted the 
different aspects of the dialectics of subjectivity: "representation", labour and 
struggle. Rather than a Spirit manifesting itself in language, labour and moral
^He has in fact proposed a classification of theories according to their
"holistic" or "atomistic" (<elementaristischen) point of view, on the one hand, 
and their basic action concepts, on the other. See J. Habermas, "Vorlesungen 
zu einen sprachtheoretischen Grundlegung der Soziologie" (1970/1), in 
Vorstudien und Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1984, pp. 23ff. He was otherwise predisposed 
to associate the dissolution of Marx’s concept of totality with the proliferation 
of autonomous disciplines. See Idem, "Zwischen Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft: Marxismus als Kritik" (1963), in Theorie und Praxis, p. 238.
^Idem, Erkenntnis und Interest, passim.
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relations in the absolute movement of reflection, it was the dialectics of 
linguistic symbolism, labour and interaction that defined the concept of Spirit. 
For Hegel, at this stage, being was the means whereby identity was 
interactively moulded, not the ultimate foundation of self-consciousness. But 
he changed his standpoint, embracing the idea of a movement of morality in 
dialectical evolution, in the course which the Absolute Spirit constitutes itself. 
Habermas maintains that, without cognizance of Hegel’s Jena phase, Marx 
resumed the thematic of labour and interaction in The German Ideology, 
reducing, however, the latter to the former.26 Habermas strongly criticised 
Marx in this respect and introduced a distinction that became crucial for his 
theoretical development: he differentiated between "instrumental action" and 
"communicative action". The first is "monological", the second 
"intersubjective". To an extent it recouched a distinction already present in 
Knowledge and Interest, nonetheless, the idea of interaction received pride of 
place in the study of Hegel.
One year later his formulation acquired a much more explicit gist. He 
interpreted labour as pure instrumental action, in contrast to communicative 
action, which mediates interactions structured via symbols and norms. The 
"institutional framework" of society was furnished by the "life-world" and the 
moral normativity therein produced. The "subsystems" of instrumental and 
strategic action (respectively related to the economy and to the state 
administration) were seen as independent of the life-world in certain measure,
“ J. Habermas, "Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenses 
’Philosophic des Geistes’" (1967), in Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1968.
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but their normativity would derive from that institutional kernel. The dynamic 
of capitalism, he contended, tends to subordinate the life-world to the 
requirements of those subsystems.27 We have, in a nutshell, the theses that 
Habermas has subsequently fully developed. We should add to this that the 
notion of communicative action transposes the idea he discussed in his first 
book, that of a public sphere in which rational argumentation is carried out, to 
a more general theoretical level; the same is true as for the systems’ logic 
which, appearing in that first version in connection with mass participation and 
the fall of the bourgeois public sphere, assumed the general form of 
subsystems of purposive-rational action that menace the life-world.28 Let us 
explore the unfolding of these ideas and the problems ingrained therein.
According to Habermas, action oriented towards "understanding" is the 
basic form of social action. All other forms - struggle, competition, in 
particular strategic action - are derived from this primary one, wherein we treat 
a subject as somebody capable of reflexibility, not as an object.29 An 
intersubjectively shared life-world is essential to the reproduction of the life 
of the species. Therefore, "communicative praxis" holds centre stage for him - 
although action should not be reduced to speech nor interaction to 
conversation, and the rare realisation of its idealised theoretical form
27Idem, "Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologic", in Ibid., pp. 62-70.
28Idem, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: an Inquiry 
into a Category o f Bourgeois Society, passim.
29Idem, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen 
Kompetentz", in J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, op. cit., pp. 118-9; "Was heiBt 
Universalpragmatik?" (1976), in Vorstudien und Erganzung zur Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns, p. 353.
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notwithstanding either.30 Social life, however, is not wholly covered by this 
concept alone. Alongside communicative action, he introduces other, 
exclusively "teleological" types: instrumental action and strategic action. In 
both of them the actor pursues a goal, choosing appropriate means, and acts 
according to maxims, choosing and deciding between alternatives. Whereas 
instrumental action refers to the interchange of individuals with nature, 
strategic action belongs in a social dimension, together with communicative 
action (which possesses a teleological aspect). However, the latter implies an 
inclination towards "understanding" and "agreement", in contrast to 
strategically oriented conduct, which handles other agents as manipulable 
objects in correspondence to one’s purposes, rather than as subjects.
However, "pathologies" may come about in the interactive process, 
producing "systematically distorted communication". Overtly communicative, 
action may thus include strategic action, implying an unconsciously assumed 
instrumental attitude. Alternatively, strategic action might be disguised as 
communicative action in order to achieve calculated manipulation.
Habermas argues that understanding (Verstandigung) consists in the very 
telos of human language and that agreement (Einverstandnis) depends on 
argumentative processes open to "validity claims". These address: objective 
truthfulness (collectively agreed upon), insofar as teleological action can be 
judged according to its efficiency and embodies strategic and technical 
knowledge; correctness of normative understanding and behaviour in normative 
action, which embodies moral-practical knowledge; and veracity of personal
30Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 31-7 and 143.
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expression, in what he calls "dramaturgic action", in the course of which actors 
compose a "public" for one another. Linguistic "constative" acts incorporate 
knowledge and can be criticised according to their thruthfullness as well.31
"Locutionary" acts, expressing things and facts, "illocutionary" acts, 
whereby the speaker expresses (states, promises, etc.) something, and 
"perlocutionary" acts, with which s/he attains an effect on the listener, are the 
basic elements of speech that permeate action (although understanding is not 
necessarily linguistically mediated). Thereby Habermas wants to displace the 
so-called "philosophy of consciousness", for he could analyse interaction by 
means of an investigation of the structure of language. Therefore, even though 
he needs to allude to the intentions of actors, he could abdicate from the 
examination of psychological behavioural dispositions, solely concentrating on 
the intuitive knowledge of actors as for their attitudes in terms of the general 
structure of processes of understanding.32
Writers such as Giddens and Hans Joas have stressed that this typology, 
instead of being seen as a concrete depiction of types of action, should be 
regarded as an analytical scheme - which Joas sees as incomplete, and which 
for Giddens is an inaccurate synthesis Marx’s and Weber’s very heterogeneous 
insights. In turn, Alexander believes that Habermas’ distinctions are loaded 
with "heavy conflationary baggage". Moreover, they and others have repeatedly 
censured Habermas for the distortion and impoverishment of Marx’s concept
31I brought together two typologies and their derivations, which Habermas
develops in Idem, Ibid., pp. 126ff, 148ff, 38Iff and 445-6.
32Idem, Ibid., pp. 372 and 385ff; see also "Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?"
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of labour, which is exiled into the realm of instrumental action, and for 
disconnecting communication from other phenomena such as power relations 
as well as tending to reduce interaction to action, and action to speech acts.33 
Habermas is, however, unyielding: whilst he acknowledges the lack of clarity 
of some of his statements - and cryptically observes that "all understanding is 
simultaneously non-comprehension" - he has reaffirmed all his own basic 
ideas, adding that he is not interested in devising a somewhat dubious general 
anthropological categorisation of action.34
However, particularly strange seems to be his return to actors’ intentions 
so that he would be able to clearly establish the concrete type of action they 
plan to carry out - whether communicative or strategic. It is difficult to 
visualise how this could be done by linguistic means alone. For this and other
33A. Giddens, "Labour and Interaction", in D. H. and J. B. Thompson, eds., 
Habermas. Critical Debates, pp. 150 and 156-7; also "Reason without 
Revolution? Habermas Theory o f Communicative Action" (1982), in Social 
Theory and Modern Sociology; H. Joas, op. cit., pp. 99-101; J. C. Alexander, 
"Habermas and Critical Theory: beyond the Marxian Dilemma?", in H. Joas 
and A. Honneth, eds., op. cit., p. 63 (the same being valid for illocution and 
perlocution, p. 68); A. Honneth, op. cit., pp. 265 and 317-31. See also P. 
Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, pp. 60ff, and J. B. 
Thompson, "Universal Pragmatics", in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, eds., 
Habermas. Critical Debates. The force of that latter criticism was weakened 
with the publication of his major book, for Habermas more clearly 
distinguished action from speech acts therein.
WJ. Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, 
eds., Habermas. Critical Debates, pp. 244-69; "A Reply", in A. Honneth and 
H. Joas, eds., op. cit., pp. 233-49. That notwithstanding, he has elsewhere 
recognised labour as an "exemplary case" of social action, presupposing the 
cooperation of actors so as to coordinate their instrumental action, even though 
this is only one variety of interaction. See, for instance, Idem, "Erlauterung 
zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns" (1982), in Vorstudien und 
Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, p. 571.
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reasons which I shall introduce shortly, his recommendation to completely 
relinquish the "philosophy of consciousness" turns out to be rather partial in 
practice and, in fact, unnecessary. In contrast, even when focusing on actors’ 
intentions, the analytical character of those types and their concrete presence 
in interactive processes should be borne in mind, the attitude chosen by the 
actor notwithstanding. As we shall see later on, instrumental exchanges with 
nature - though not necessarily under the form of productive labour - are a 
requisite part of interactions, just as communicative and strategic aspects are 
present in all kinds of action and interaction, as will soon be clear below.
As can already be guessed, the concept of life-world is for Habermas
closely related to processes of understanding: therein communicative subjects
come to agreements. The life-world, more or less vaguely constituted, counts
on background, non-problematic presuppositions, which demarcate a
"community of communication" vis-d-vis other collectivities. It builds on the
work of former generations and, providing a reservoir of given and tacit
«
matters, protects against the risks of dissent that haunt each concrete process 
of understanding, although its rationalisation makes this guardianship ever 
more reflexive. Language and culture are constitutive elements of the life- 
world, within the horizon of which communicative agents move and out of 
which they cannot step.35
Under Mead’s influence, Schutz had already described the life-world 
intersubjectively; his analyses still remained, nonetheless, in the surroundings 
of Husserl’s phenomenology and thus devoted to the experiences of actors.
35Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 107-8 and 188ff.
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According to Habermas, it is necessary to eschew this approach and adopt a 
linguistic alternative, whereby a hermeneutic, "formal-pragmatic" 
reconstruction of a life-world which is accessible to its own members can be 
undertaken. It is not the content of specific life-worlds that interests Habermas; 
he is concerned with the general structure that (in "quasi-transcendental" terms) 
is common to all of them. Sociologically, though, the phenomenological 
everyday concept of life-world is deemed essential: it allows for the analysis 
of interaction in time and space. Narrative processes are fundamental for this 
analysis. Culture (as a stock of knowledge), personality (as the competence of 
speech and action that enables the affirmation of an identity) and society (as 
a legitimate order) are the structural components of the life-world, correlated 
respectively to cultural reproduction, socialisation (meaning the acquisition of 
those competencies) and social integration. Moreover, Habermas draws 
attention to the dependency of the web of quotidian communicative action - 
within which culture, society and personality are reproduced - upon processes 
of material reproduction of the life-world. This reproduction is achieved 
through the interchange with nature carried out by instrumentally oriented 
individuals. Thereby Habermas intends to surpass a culturalist concept of life- 
world, although it could be argued that those linguistic and sociological 
strategies are not clearly connected in the course of his exposition.36
36Idem, Ibid., pp. 179-82, 197-8, 206-12 and 223-4. For more on that 
"reconstructive science", see his "Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?" and 
"Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences" (1983), in Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge, Polity, 1990. For that 
critique, see Herbert Schnadelbach, "The Transformation of Critical Theory", 
in A. Honneth and H. Joas, op. cit., p. 17. Habermas extensively reviewed the 
literature on socialisation, maintaining the importance of childhood for the
114
Time and again, contrary to an idealistic version of hermeneutics, 
Habermas has underscored that not only "language", but also "labour" and 
"domination" - through force (Gewalt) and power (Macht), the latter 
comprising institutional domains of society - arc pervasive aspects of social 
life; stratification, moreover, is something that came about early in the 
evolution of the species. Generally speaking, society and life-world must not 
be conflated.37 Society appears as a multidimensional reality, which demands 
several approaches in order that it be comprehensively grasped. Social 
relations, therefore, cannot be exhaustively surveyed by linguistic means. 
Many other dimensions must be focused on so as to reach a general 
understanding of social life. We must add to this that the links between the 
formal-pragmatic reconstruction of the life-world and its sociological version - 
which at least originally implied an analysis of the processes of typification 
and construction of taken-for-grantedness in each actor’s consciousness - is not
formation of personality. He shows little sympathy for psychoanalysis, 
however, borrowing much more from social and ego psychology as well as 
from Piaget’s genetic epistemology. See J. Habermas, "Stitchworte zu einer 
Theorie der Sozialisation" (1968) and "Notizen zum Begriff der 
Rollenkompetenz" (1972), in Kultur und Kritik, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1973; plus "Notizen zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetentz" (1974), in 
Vorstudien und Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. For 
a powerful critique from a Freudian angle, see Joel Whitebook, "Reason and 
Happiness: some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical Theory", in R. Bernstein, 
ed., Habermas and Modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 1985.
37J. Habermas, "Erkenntnis und Interest" (1965), in Technik und 
Wissenschaft als Ideologie, pp. 162-3. "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", 
p. 309; "Die Universalitatsanspruch der Hermeneutik" (1970), in Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 345ff; "Theorie der Gesellschaft oder
Sozialtechnologie?", p. 254. "Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialismus" (1975), in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1990 (1976), pp. 145-51; Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 223-6; "A Reply to my Critics", p. 269.
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precisely established. In addition, Habermas introduces a systemic approach so 
as to grapple with contemporary society. It is, thus, apparent that the project 
of burying the "philosophy of the consciousness" by strictly relying upon 
linguistic philosophy begs a great many questions.
In fact, I shall prefer to speak of the overcoming of the philosophy of the 
subject. By this I mean to indict that characterisation of the subject in the 
Cartesian-Hobbesian mould analysed in chapter one. I do not want either to 
reject or acquiesce to introspective means of inquiry into consciousness; 
although I tend to sympathise with Habermas in this regard and despite the 
fact that linguistic or discourse analyses are certainly valuable tools for social 
scientists, it is not necessary to settle this dispute herein. Suffice it to notice 
that the analysis of the processes of constitution of collective and individual 
identity and awareness have a great deal to learn from vital insights of that 
tradition, providing that we connect such investigations to the whole of social 
relations, breaking free from the isolation and sharp demarcation of those 
traditionally conceived subjects.
Rationalisation has been probably the core question in the development 
of Habermas’ thinking. Drawing upon Popper, he establishes a threefold 
division between the objective natural world, the social world and its 
normativity, and the subjective world of individuals. At first, in "archaic", i.e. 
palaeolithic or neolithic, societies these three "worlds" would be hardly 
distinguished in the world images shared by the members of those "forms of 
life". Heavily leaning on Durkheim and above all on Piaget, who supplies an 
optimistic counter-balance to the pessimism of Weber and the Frankfurt School
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(and their meditation only on the growth of instrumental rationality), Habermas 
connects the process of communicative rationalisation of the life-world to its 
progressive decentring. Those three worlds become, thus, differentiated in the 
world-views, which grow, in turn, ever more flexible and open to 
argumentation, to the point at which they mature into "interpretations of the 
world". Individuals, who can now put distance between themselves and society, 
are eventually apt to treat its normativity critically and reflexively in a more 
plastic form of communicative action. Nature is no longer collapsed into an 
extension of an egocentrically instituted social perspective. Individualisation, 
piecemeal universalisation and increase in abstraction of the collective identity, 
morality and legality - yielding "value generalisation" - are processes that 
accompany that growth in reflexibility, alongside the formation of specialised 
areas of knowledge.38
This process of rationalisation makes room for a complexification of 
society and a proliferation of diversified life-worlds. Moreover, it both permits 
and demands the differentiation of subsystems of instrumentally oriented 
action. The weakening of traditional world images and the growth of a space 
of contingency in interactions entail an overburdening of the mechanisms of 
understanding with increasing demands of coordination. Simultaneously, new 
types of organisation and institution historically rise and multiply, based on
38Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 73ff and B. II, pp. 
164 and 219ff. See also his "Einleitung: Historischen Materialismus und die 
Entwicklung normativer Strukturen" (1976), in Zur Rekonstruktion des 
historischen Materialismus. For the paramount role played by Piaget in his 
major work, see Barbara Freitag, "Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns und 
Genetische Psychologie", Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie, v. 35, 1983 
(555:576).
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two means of communication - money and power - that substitute language. 
These "media" make possible the differentiation of subsystems of instrumental 
action, which remain connected to the life-world via its moral-practical 
grounding and the legitimacy of the legal order thereupon erected. Instrumental 
and strategic action can now move in independency from communicative 
action. This means that an "uncoupling" of certain interactive processes from 
the life-world has come about.39
Two forms of integration of society are now at work, even though they 
are not utterly disjointed:
The analysis of these relations is only possible when we 
distinguish between the mechanisms of action coordination that 
match the action orientations of the participants in relation to 
each other from mechanisms that stabilise non-intended action 
relations through the functional webbing of consequences of 
action. The integration of the system of action is produced in 
one case via normatively secured or communicatively generated 
consensus, in the other case via a non-normative regulation of 
individual decisions, which works over the consciousness of the 
actors. The differentiation between social integration, which 
rests upon action orientations, and system integration, which
39J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 109 and 
458; B. II, pp. 259-73.
subdues action orientations, demands a corresponding 
differentiation in the concept of society itself.40
In the case of social integration we are faced with a life-world which must 
be reconstructed according to the perspective of its members. Conversely, 
when dealing with system integration we take the position of an external 
observer who scrutinises individual action in regard to its contribution to the 
maintenance of a functionally structured system.
Even in his first writings, despite reservations, Habermas did not evince 
thorough hostility against functionalism. To be sure, he has always opposed a 
claim to "universality" by system theorists, whose work he regards, to an 
extent, as a superior form of technocratic consciousness. He has consistently 
attacked the idea of self-sufficiency and self-reflexibility of social systems, 
which, he thinks, basically reproduces the basic tenets of the "philosophy of 
consciousness" in another dimension; it would, moreover, drain them of 
meaning, which must inevitably be referred to individuals. The fact that social 
systems are culturally patterned and not merely organically constituted has 
regularly brought him to underline the difficulty of providing criteria for the 
definition of death or conservation as well as of the boundaries of societies 
against a shifting and complex "environment"41 But at the very start he
40Idem, Ibid., p. 179 - and further on, pp. 228-30. This distinction seems 
to have been introduced in his Legimationsprobleme im Spdtkapitalismus, pp. 
13-4.
41Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", pp. 194-6; "Theorie der 
Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?", especially pp. 144,151, 217 and 271-2; 
Der philosophische Diskur der Moderne, pp. 415ff.
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observed too that functionalism does not need to be reductionist, anti-historical 
or anti-conflict, let alone its potential critical utilisation.42
Thus, even though Habermas recurrently hints at the underlying basis of 
this sort of systemic approach in action presuppositions, he tends, as we have 
seen, to play off action against systemic "paradigms". He overlooks the fact 
that social systems theory is by no means a unified field. On the contrary, 
several paradigms have tackled the systematicity of action and interaction in 
social life, making use sometimes of notions derived from biology and from 
Norbert Wiener’s work on systems and cybernetics. Others - such as the young 
Parsons, and to a certain extent the late one as well - gave preeminence to the 
idea of systems of action. This is the case with Giddens, evidently, and also 
with Alexander. Habermas overemphasises the moral dimension of the life- 
world and draws an instrumental systemic sphere totally devoid of some of the 
basic features of social life. Had he wanted to build two broad ideal-types then 
his case would be more defensible. As it stands, it seems hardly tenable, 
contradicting the actual multidimensional intertwinement of different logics of 
rationalisation that obtain in contemporary society, as it did in previous forms 
of life 43
For, in spite of his own reservations, Habermas produces a discussion on 
contemporary society which places great stress on the autonomisation of the 
capitalist economy and of the state apparatus, addressed basically in connection
42Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", pp. 325-7.
43J. C. Alexander, "Habermas and Critical Theory: beyond the Marxian 
Dilemma?", p. 60.
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with the administrative system, rather than with focus on its political 
dimension proper. These domains now become independent from the pre- 
theoretical understanding that individuals enjoy within the horizon of their life- 
world. Organisations consist in the archetypal entities of these "self-steered" 
and "boundary-maintaining" subsystems. They gain "autonomy", he argues, 
through a "demarcation in the face of the life-world", which neutralises it. 
Thereby they manage to become indifferent as to "culture, society and 
personality", acquiring independence from the dispositions and ends of their 
members, and in particular offsetting their peculiar, personal traits. Culture 
plays therein simply an instrumental role and juridification (Verrechtlichung) 
steals the ground from a faint, though minimally persistent, voice of 
communicative action, which still entwines interactions within organisations. 
He posits, however, that the bonds between individuals and organisations are 
in part founded in the interests of the former.44
His circumspection with respect to Parsons’ theory of the "media of 
communication" once again notwithstanding, he makes large use of this idea. 
Influence and value-commitments cannot be placed too closely to money and 
power, since they are neither so calculable nor so manipulable. They cannot 
be detached from the life-world at all. Even power must not be equated with 
money, inasmuch as it requires legitimacy and not just cover (force in one 
case, gold in the other) or legality; it is not that calculable either, demanding
MJ. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 226, 
240ff, 453-60 and 478. See also pp. 507ff.
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continuous exercise.45 Nevertheless, money and power alike substitute 
linguistic understanding and break free from normativity (despite their ultimate 
institutional anchoring in the life-world), mediate between systems and the life- 
world, and functionally specify the processes of social cooperation. The 
economy as a subsystem can only develop autonomously to the extent that its 
interchange with the "environment" is operated via money.46
As critics have pointed out, a central problem in Habermas’ employment 
of system concepts concerns the fact that all his reading of the notion of 
system stems from his acquaintance with Luhmann’s functional- 
structuralism47, which takes up developments in cybernetics and neighbouring 
fields. According to Alexander, Luhmann distorted Parsons* ideas, 
depersonifying and emptying social systems of meaning48 Although 
Habermas has at times clearly proposed to see the distinction between life- 
world and system - and in particular, between the rationalisation of the former 
and the differentiation of the latter - as one that pertains only to the analytical 
level, observing in addition that the first concept is broader and encompasses
45Idem, Ibid., pp. 386-412.
46Idem, Ibid., pp. 240, 256, 269-70.
47Luhmann has, in fact, advanced a claim to "universality", though not 
exclusivity, in, "Systemtheoretische Argumentation. Eine Entgegnung auf 
Jurgen Habermas", in J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, op. cit., p. 378. He fully 
developed his theory in his Soziale Systeme, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1984.
48J. C. Alexander, "The Parsons Revival in German Sociology", 
Sociological Theory, v. 2, 1984 (394:412), pp. 401-2.
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the second49, he has actually come to suggest the view that systems steered 
by money and power are present in substantive terms in the contemporary 
world.50
The notion of social system I shall retain is quite different from the one 
preferred by Habermas. It is much closer to Giddens*, providing that the 
problems discussed in the preceding chapter are borne in mind. The features 
of the "life-world" and the so-called "systems" are, consequently, to be seen 
as aspects of all systems of action, irrespective of the peculiar logics and 
(im)balances that obtain within them. As stated, action has multiple 
expressions and the distinctions Habermas has proposed should be held only 
analytically, since they obtain across the full range of social systems. In turn, 
culture is present in all of them. To be sure, at times the dryness and 
emptiness of some of their varieties may be rather depressing, such as the case 
of the utilitarian-privatist breed and the neutral and objectifying attitude shot 
through contemporary society (within and without formal organisations) - to 
which Habermas himself has pointed.51 Moreover, the bottom line of internal 
consensus in the theory of organisations has conclusively settled that these
49J. Habermas, "Geschichte und Evolution" (1976), in Zur Rekonstruktion 
des historischen Materialismus, pp. 222-3; Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns, B. II, p. 450; "A Reply", p. 262.
50Idem, "A Reply", p. 256.
51Idem, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, pp. 105ff; Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 310-1.
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action systems cannot ever completely do away with their members’ interests, 
intentions and personal backgrounds.52
Hence, it is difficult to see how such a conception of "system” can be 
upheld once it is accepted that they do not evade the intentions of individuals, 
even though here, as much as elsewhere, unintended consequences of action 
are of paramount importance. The idea that the life-world depends so directly 
on the intentions and knowledge of the participants suffers from a reverse 
deficiency: as Habermas himself explains, the participants do not even fully 
realise the comprehensive features of their life-worlds, which can be examined, 
according to him, only piecemeal.53 Giddens’ concept of practical 
consciousness could play a key role in this regard. Bounded rationality 
(instrumental or communicative) is pervasive in the life-world as well as 
unintended consequences of action. Even such sweeping intuitive knowledge 
of the life-world’s members is debatable, especially if the complexities of 
contemporary societies are brought to bear. Neither are systems so opaque and 
independent nor are life-worlds so cosy and answerable to actors. The 
abandonment by Habermas of the idea of an elementary difference between the 
participants’ and the observers’ perspective to ground methodologically the 
theoretical split between life-world and system54 has further weakened his 
proposal. In certain measure, it could be said that his effort at synthesis is, 
thus, only incompletely successful.
52See N. Mouzelis, "Appendix I", pp. 178-80.
53J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 188-9.
54Idem, "A Reply", p. 254.
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An additional intricacy seeps through Habermas’ concept of life-world in 
its definition as a totality. Formerly Habermas seemed to visualise only one 
life-world in the whole of society.55 He moved on to assert their multiplicity 
in societies that have left the "archaic" stage. Whereas they constituted therein 
"unbroken" ([bruchlos) forms of life, their progressive differentiation entailed 
the demarcation of different collective life-worlds in each society, eventuating 
a fragmentation of consciousness in late capitalism. He is relatively aware of 
the fact that the notion of a homogeneous life-world is an idealisation, for 
"archaic" societies are already fairly complex. He also perceives the 
multiplicity of life-worlds in "traditional" societies. But, in general, he wants 
to contrast those differentiated life-worlds to modem ones. He complements 
his portrait of modernity, noticing that, following the differentiation and 
rationalisation of the structures of the life-world, expert cultures established 
specialised domains of art and critique, science and technique, morals and 
law.56 He seems not to be very sure about the "totalising" character of life- 
worlds in contemporary society, which he alternately denies and maintains.57 
In any case, we are given the impression that he attributes an unlikely 
"intimate" character to life-worlds even in modem societies.58
55Idem, "Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologic", p. 65.
56Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 125, 226-34; B. 
II, pp. 168-9, 233-54 and 521.
57Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, p. 91; B. II, p. 134. 
Der philosophische Diskur der Modernet pp. 348-9; "Questions and
Counterquestions", in R. Bernstein, ed., op. cit.t pp. 194 and 197.
58H. Joas, op. cit., p. 108.
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We saw above how Habermas flirts with the Hegelian dialectics of the 
general, the particular and the singular when addressing this issue. His lack of 
sympathy for dialectics, however, prevents him from effectively settling the 
issue. An absorbing and evenly distributed structuring of the life-world, 
dependent upon a Kantian view of totality, can certainly be disputed. This is 
especially true if we recognise that ideologies become much more 
heterogeneous in the subordinate layers of society59 and if Schutz’s partly 
idiosyncratic individuals’ life-worlds is not overlooked. Conversely, that 
Kantian-Weberian differentiation of spheres may be in fact an ideological 
delusion heavily paid for,60 belied by the prevalence of general ideologies 
Habermas himself once denounced,61 the fragmentation of consciousness in 
the popular classes notwithstanding.
This brings Habermas’ conception of structure to the fore. He has 
insightfully observed that current languages cannot be formalised without 
killing precisely their daily and non-specialised character.62 But his 
combination of a notion of world-views and interpretations inspired by Weber 
with the tenets of Piagetian genetic structuralism has brought about a view of
59A. Swingewood, The Myth of Mass Culture, London, Macmillan, 1977,
p. 82.
^Martin Seel, "The Two Meanings of ’Communicative Rationality*: 
Remarks on Habermas’ Critique of a Plural Concept of Reason", in A. 
Honneth and H. Joas, eds., op. cit., p. 37. For another critic, this happens 
because Habermas takes Kant too seriously: Richard Rorty, "Habermas and 
Lyotard on Post-Modernity", in R. Bernstein, ed., op. cit., p. 167.
61J. Habermas, "Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologic", pp. 64ff.
62Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", pp. 260 and 267.
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structures as something substantial and real, at least in part derived from his 
Kantian bias and, in any case, have as a consequence the recasting of that 
philosopher’s notion of totality. Habermas has been criticized for the excessive 
abstractiveness of his conception of morals and its aspiration to avoid the 
foundations of the concrete form of life from which it emerges.63 Another 
Hegelian theme, however, must be introduced, with reference to the internal 
structuring of these totalities, although a broader positive treatment of the issue 
will have to wait to be developed in further chapters.
The hypothesis of a close identification of the three worlds outlined above 
is directly related to this problem. Habermas seems to have in fact committed 
in the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" when he applied Piaget’s cognitive 
and moral developmental concepts to the description and explanation of the 
"savage mind" and to Durkheim’s view of closely integrated primitive 
communities, wherein there would be no room for individual autonomy. 
Should we accept, and this is not necessarily the case, the idea of a socio­
centred community, which - in principle - precludes reflection and in the limits 
of which individuals and nature are completely intermeshed and determined by 
the rigid understanding and parameters of that form of life, it would still 
remain to be shown that their social relations exactly follow the logic of that 
idealised world-view. Even at that stage contradictions and thwarted 
expectations certainly occur, between individuals and groups. This is also how 
a great deal of actual innovation perhaps comes about. Concerned with their 
progressive decentring, Habermas applies a reified view of culture to society
63C. Taylor, "Language and Society", in A. Honneth and H. Joas, op. cit.
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and personality - taking the possible self-understanding of these societies as 
though it obtained in practice; or else, he displays what more than once I have 
characterised (see chap. 2.II), borrowing from Bourdieu, as the substitution of 
reality by a model built by the researcher. It should not be ignored, however, 
that in the evolving of social relations problems are bound to come up which 
prevent the existence of that integrated a social system.
This drawback ensues despite the definition of the structures of world 
images or interpretations primarily as the space within which social problems 
may be solved without reorganisation of highly abstract patterns which 
Habermas calls "organisational principles" - embedded in the life-world and 
in which individuals are socialised.64 Perhaps this underlies his ambivalence 
towards the "homologies" of cognitive and moral structures in individuals and 
societies, for Habermas recognises that these are not substantial nor shared by 
all individuals, but in fact are unevenly distributed.65
Habermas’ conception of structure is, hence, as problematical as his notion 
of social system. Therefore, the entirety of his argument regarding the 
relationship between structures of consciousness and social movements, which 
is central to his theory of evolution, demands debate.
64Idem, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, p. 18; "Einleitung: 
Historischen Materialismus und die Entwicklung normativen Strukturen", pp. 
18-9; "Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus", pp. 168 and 185; 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 72ff; "A Reply", p. 262.
65Idem, "Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus", p. 169; 
Theories des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 74-5. "A Philosophical- 
Political Profile" (1985), in Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 165.
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III)CAPITALISM, IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Habermas has concerned himself with sociological theory above all in 
order to deliver a renewed critical approach to the analysis of contemporary 
society. To a considerable extent, therefore, his main interlocutor is still Marx. 
Weber plays a central role as well, since he brought to the fore the aporias of 
a rationalisation of society that seems to reduce, instead of increasing, the 
scope of freedom. This idea was subsequently borrowed by Lukacs and the 
Frankfurt School. Habermas insists that their concept of rationalisation, 
basically instrumental, was too narrow. Those two logics of rationalisation, 
communicative and instrumental, widen the reach of the discussion, whereby 
he could show an unbalanced process in the course of which the life-world 
comes under the grips of systemic cognitive-purposive logics.66 Collectivities 
are not granted much space in Habermas’ discussion, which moves basically 
along the axes of two rationalities, related to active individuals and inert life- 
worlds and systems. But we can see another way of looking at the problem - 
despite its ad hoc emergence - in his own writings:
the imperatives of the subsystems which have become 
autonomous penetrate, as soon as their ideological veil is taken 
off, the life-world from the outside - as colonial Lords 
(Herreri) in a tribal society - and force it into assimilation; but
^Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 209, 259-61 and 
485; B. II, p. 447.
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the fragmented perspectives of the native culture cannot be 
further coordinated in a way that the play of the metropolis and 
the world market could be made transparent.67
It is as though the pristine situation had been inverted: in the place of 
encompassing life-worlds with systems appended to them, we are threatened 
now by overgrown systems that harass regional forms of life. Habermas wants 
to phrase a diagnosis of this situation without recourse to social groups, classes 
or state elites, holding fast to a description of life-worlds and systems as 
passive entities. Systems "colonise” the life-world, but this is seen by 
Habermas exclusively as the mutual, if basically unilateral, effect of two 
conditioning causalities.
Habermas comes very close to facing issues related to collectivities, but 
falls short of actually taking them up. He criticises Marx for having discerned 
nothing else than the phantasmagoric, mystified relation between classes in 
market structures, whereas these structures would have, in fact, introduced a 
capital mechanism of coordination in complex societies, beyond the "fetishism 
of the commodity". Moreover, class contradictions have been displaced, or at 
least dammed up, by the Welfare-State in late capitalism.68 Although he 
comes close to Weber’s expression - Herrschaft - in the passage cited above, 
Habermas refrains as well from clearly adopting the view of a rational-legal, 
bureaucratic form of domination.
67Idem, Ibid., B. II, p. 522.
68Idem, Ibid., pp. 488-503 and 512ff.
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His depersonification of "systems" has is revealed for its shortcomings and 
the political struggles and alternatives to the political system one might expect 
to find in his work disappear from sight.69 Rather than class struggles or 
political upheavals, we should look for the "pathologies" of the life-world - 
whereby personalities are damaged and socialisation and cultural reproduction, 
which cannot be replaced by systemic surrogates, are endangered. This analysis 
would bring out that process of colonisation and its possible counter­
tendencies.70 We should at last give up Marx’s wishful return to a non­
severed totality through overcoming the division of society into classes, since 
the "reification" introduced by the market and state administration cannot 
entirely be surpassed by means of a return to a romanticised past and to an 
unfettered and spontaneous life-world.71
To be sure, his criticisms of Marx are sometimes warranted, as in the case 
of market relations, which most Marxists today would regard as inevitably 
persisting in any foreseeable future society. They are, nevertheless, overstated 
with respect to other themes, in particular when Habermas imputes to him a 
view of a moral totality in communism without tensions, contradictions and 
differentiation, or the inability of distinguishing between the modernisation and
69T. McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy: or the Seducements of 
Systems Theory", in A. Honneth and H. Joas, eds., op. dr., pp. 128 and 131 ff. 
However, for discussions on alternatives and interstitial public spheres as a 
form of counteracting the colonisation of the life-world and re-introducing 
reflection in daily life, see his interviews in Autonomy and Solidarity and the 
recent, Fakzitat und Geltung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1992.
70J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, p. 576.
71Idem, Ibid., pp. 501-3.
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the colonisation of the life-world. I shall not undertake an analysis of Marx’s 
own view, which is both sympathetic and critical of ’'modernity", suffice it to 
say that what is at stake in his own writings is not a morality that would 
cancel heterogeneity within totalities. Habermas himself addressed the 
legitimacy claims of norms which, not originating in sectional interests, could 
become truly, and not ideologically, universalised.72 It is indubitable that it 
is necessary to "...weaken the claims about totalities...".73 It is Habermas* own 
definition of life-worlds and their cultural structures as homogeneous totalities 
that in part precludes a proper definition of this issue, so much does he seem 
to be caught up within a Kantian notion of totality, wherein a uniform 
universality is simultaneously opposed and directly linked to individual agents.
The lack of meditation on collective subjectivities is also of consequence 
regarding his conception of collective identity. This issue links up with his 
view of the structures of the life-world, the so-called "principles" of 
organisation, and the part performed by social movements in the shaping of 
historical evolution. Individual identity was, in Habermas’ first reflections, 
already connected to the position of individuals in collectivities. Personal 
pronouns - I and we, associated with membership in a group which 
distinguishes itself from strangers (Fremdegruppe) - are in this sense important 
points of reference to the construction of the identity of individuals.74 As his 
understanding of life-worlds brought out their plural character, he begun to
72Idem, Legitimationsprobleme in Spatkapitalismus, pp. 153-6.
73Idem, "Questions and Counterquestions", p. 216.
74Idem, "Notizen zum Begriff der Rollenkompetenz", pp. 222-3.
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suspect that collectivities might also have their identities defined in relation to 
other groups - as we have seen in the first section of this chapter. But he does 
not break through the traditional conception of the self-sufficient subject within 
the life-world and fails to grasp the unavoidable interactive dimension of 
collectivities and their mutual causal impact. As he says,
...the expression "I" can be used as a means for self- 
identification: but the self-identification of an I demands 
intersubjective recognition through another I. Conversely, the 
self-identification of a group is not assigned through recognition 
by another group.75
The construction of the identity of a group could, therefore, be achieved 
with reference to its members alone, constituting a "we" in isolation from other 
collectivities.
Drawing upon Piaget and Kohlberg, Habermas argues that these identities 
are in unison with world images or interpretations which evolve through 
history towards more reflexivity and universality. Societies undergo "learning 
processes" both in this cognitive and moral level and in their capacity to
75Idem, "Einleitung: Historischen Materialismus und the Entwicklung 
normativen Strukturen", p. 22. Somewhat incongruously, Habermas relates 
identities directly to systems and their potential disruption. His functionalist 
compatriot, despite his conviction that systems are self-referential, handled the 
theme of the construction of their identity in relational terms, through the idea 
of "observers that observe themselves observing". See N. Luhmann, "Identitat: 
was oder wie", in Soziologische Aufklarung 5, Opladen, Westdeutscheverlag, 
1990.
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manipulate of nature.76 Social movements have minor importance in the 
definition of such images, interpretations and identities. It is not that they do 
not pervade Habermas’ reasoning and concerns. On the contrary, the problem 
is that they are reduced to agencies which do nothing but actuate the cognitive 
and moral potential already present in those images and identities. He goes as 
far as to say that groups can '‘indicate" (anzeigen), but not "explain" the 
building of an "innovative potential".77 Minority groups, such as Protestant 
sects and, unsuccessfully hitherto, socialist movements, introduce and diffuse 
evolutionary innovations in the whole of society - which, he underscores, must 
not be conceived of after the idea of the species as a totalising subject 
(Gesamtsubjekt). How these innovations are produced is something of little 
curiosity to Habermas, apart from suggestions that evolutionarily problems are 
thrown up by the material "basis" of society, which must then be solved in 
other spheres.78 This lies perhaps at the core of the rigid separation he 
proposes between the theory of evolution and the (narrative) discipline of 
history, wherein the influence of sociology has lent prominence to "collective 
actors" - which act only in a "figurative" sense.79 Whatever the political
76Idem, "Einleitung: Historischen Materialismus und the Entwicklung 
normativen Strukturen", pp. 16ff; Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. 
I, pp. 72ff. See also his "Konnen komplexe Gesellschaft eine vemiinftige 
Identitat ausbilden?", in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus.
77Idem, "Geschichte und Evolution" (1986), in Zur Rekonstruktion des 
historischen Materialismus, p. 231.
78Idem, "Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus", pp. 154 and 
158; Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. n, pp. 463-4.
79Idem, "Geschichte und Evolution", pp. 201-10. To start with because they 
address the same object, such a clear-cut boundary was found wanting by T.
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validity of such an assessment, his qualms about contemporary social 
movements stem from that separation as well, insofar as they do not put 
forward new "principles of organisation" and look backwards, against growth, 
rather than to the future. The sole exception to this would be the feminist 
movement - a contention that could be debated, since the exclusion of tradition 
as a reference in this case underpins his assessment, but by no means that 
movement as a whole.80 A more contingent approach to evolution and change 
in contemporary society, centred in part on collective subjectivities in general 
instead of the unfolding of logics of rationality, might pay off as a reappraisal 
of the problem.
His perception of the construction of a more effective contemporary 
European identity shares the same limitations. He speaks only of universal 
moral patterns and of the co-habitation, within Europe, of culturally distinct 
life-worlds,81 probably bearing in mind situations such as the one endured by 
Turks in Germany. Neither how they shape each other as concrete forms of life 
nor how political groups are operating in order to bring about the European 
Community is touched upon. The same obtains as for the inclusion of Europe 
in the global system, for it has always shaped its identity in interaction with 
other geo-political areas and civilisations. In fact, Habermas clings to a very
McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 268-9.
80J. Habermas, Theories des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 576ff. 
See also, for his appraisal of contemporary social movements, "The New 
Obscurity: the Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian 
Energies" (1984), in The New Conservatism, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1985.
81Idem, "Staatbiirgerschaft und nationale Identitat" (1990), in Faktizitat und 
Geltung.
135
traditional concept of society, enclosed in the boundaries of the nation-state, 
scarcely paying attention to international or transnational phenomena.82
The ultimate basis of Habermas’ fixation on an opposition between 
reflexive action and instrumentally steered systems, which is accompanied by 
a substantive notion of structure, may have originally arisen from his 
underlying notions of causality. These exhibit a strong Kantian bias and 
untempered allegiance to the modem conceptions of active and conditioning 
causality. He had opposed motives to causes, in the forthright intonation of 
neo-Kantian German philosophy: the former would be a unique possession of 
reflexive social actors, not allowing for nomological knowledge. "Why" 
explanations, applying to human intentional action, would be sharply dissimilar 
to causal explanations.83 Less plausibly and with an even stronger Kantian 
accent, he declared too that "objects of the type of moving bodies" are to be 
grappled with in instrumental action, whereas in interaction we must deal with 
"objects of the type of speaking and acting subjects".84 He appears to have 
backed off from this position, since he has more recently suggested that 
corporal (physico-causal or semantic-physical) movements are elements of 
action, but not action proper. At the same time, functionalist and structuralist 
styles of explanation are introduced. Only after their relevance had been
82Johann P. Amason, "Modernity as Project and as Field of Tensions", in 
A. Honneth and H. Joas, op. cit., p. 189.
83Idem, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", pp. 131 and 314ff. 
Elsewhere, nevertheless, he acknowledges that to narrate is already to explain.
See his "Geschichte und Evolution", p. 213.
^Idem, "Einleitung zur Neuausgabe", p. 15.
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delineated, could we address the significance of social movements in a 
particular circumstance. The relation between structure and event, the analyses 
of which he gives up however, should be regarded as central.85 To an extent, 
all sorts of action in his typology emerge now as dependent upon "why" 
reasons, upon motives and their hermeneutic deciphering. Alongside this 
distinctive phrasing of active causality, two varieties of conditioning causality 
are maintained, one of them utterly detached from the actors* intentions, the 
other one hinging on a sort of functionalist reasoning which by no means 
provides grounds for its own acceptance. The rationale for regarding economic 
and political (administrative) systems as functionally integrated is something 
never spelled out.
Habermas misses the opportunity to give consequence to insights he has 
occasionally developed into collective subjectivity and collective causality 
when he hinted at the relational aspect of the constitution of their identity. 
How and to what extent his ideas on causality traverse the division between 
the life-world and systems is not at all clear. They seem to simply duplicate 
the dualisms found throughout Habermas’ work. That they correspond to the 
downplay of collective subjectivity and its transformation into a residual 
category is a conclusion that seems fairly warranted. Organisations, social 
movements, the unrestricted array of collectivities that enmesh social life, are 
not given due importance in Habermas’ theory. I do not wish to belittle the 
achievements of his far-reaching reworking of critical theory, undertaken in 
order to equip it to tackle the challenges of contemporary society. Together
85Idem, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, p. 145; B. II, p. 465.
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with distinctive and far-reaching propositions and conceptualisations, he throws 
up ideas which, even when debatable or imprecise, are extremely suggestive. 
In some instances, however, they obscure important aspects of social life, 
especially his claim that his conceptualisations are capable of integrating the 
notion of class struggle.86 Marx’s concept of collective subjectivity exhibits 
facets that remain hidden in Habermas’ appraisal.
86Idem, "Zur Theorienvergleich in der Soziologie: am Beispiel der 
Evolutionstheorie" (1974), in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialismus, p. 139.
PART TWO
TWO CONCEPTS OF COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY
CHAPTER FOUR
MARX: THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
AND THE SOCIAL CLASSES
I)INTERACTION AND DIALECTICS
Karl Marx developed some of the main alternatives to the presuppositional 
universe of bourgeois ideology to which the sociological tradition is heir. He 
gave pride of place to the notion of interaction and stressed the dialectics 
between subject and object, their mutual constitution; he also made paramount 
a concept that was an even greater break away from that presuppositional core 
- the concept of social class. His approach, in its very essence, was for this 
reason a challenge to bourgeois ideologies, penetrating levels of social reality 
made opaque by the routines of capitalist social formations.
The most famous and explicit assertion of the dialectics between subject 
and object is found in the concise "Theses on Feuerbach", wherein he stated 
the limitations of a materialism that places everything on the object {der 
Gegenstand). Only idealism had given the due attention to the active side of 
the relationship, that is had understood the role of the subject in the 
constitution of social reality. Humans are not the passive product of the 
workings of blind social conditions: to a certain extent they have the power to 
direct the evolution of history. From this derives the bold, although 
exaggerated statement which demands that intellectuals should mobilise to 
change the world, not just interpret it as Feuerbach was prone to do.1
JK. Marx, "Thesen liber Feuerbach" (1845), in K. Marx and F. Engels, 
Werke, B. 3, Berlin, Dietz, 1958, pp. 5ff. The proclamation that men make 
their own history, even though in conditions they cannot choose, shares the 
same ground. See K. Marx, Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon (1852), in 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 8, Berlin, Dietz, 1960, p. 115.
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By the same token, Marx expressed one of his recurrent critiques of 
bourgeois individualism, underscoring the idea of interaction - or social 
relations. Against Feuerbach, he put forward the view of "human society" or 
"socialised humanity". Feuerbach’s formulation, that attributed an internal 
essence to each individual, of which the species {die Gattung) consisted, was 
unacceptable. Instead, human "essence" was seen as comprising the whole of 
social relations, in their historicity. The "generality" {die AUgemeinheit) of the 
species arises not from a platonic human essence, regardless of its materialistic 
phrasing, but from the contingent and ever-changing reality brought about by 
social interaction.2 Their very existence and experiencing of relations 
(Verhalten) is what distinguishes humans from the broader animal realm. 
Language, in this interactive dimension, was bestowed great significance, 
associated with consciousness. Both language and individual consciousness are 
eminently social, emerging in the course and as a consequence of the 
necessities inherent to human relationships.3 We may, therefore, agree with the 
late Lukacs’ suggestion that Marx reshaped the classical notion of substance 
in Western philosophy, which he later expressed scientifically in Capital.4 
These are very synthetical statements as to Marx’s positions, which are 
repeated throughout his work, linked to different themes.
2Idem, "Thesen iiber Feuerbach".
3 K. Marx and F. Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie (1845/6), in Idem, 
Werke, B. 3, p. 30.
4G. Lukacs, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, I. Halbband, in 
Werke, B. 13, Darmstadt/ Neuwied, 1984, pp. 613ff.
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One, if not the crucial issue coupled to this attack on the polarisation 
between individual and society, was yielded by the problematic of labour. 
Since his first writings, Marx placed a strong emphasis on the objectification 
of men in their relationship with nature, such that it is the act of production 
that makes humans human - and furnishes the basis of social relations between 
individuals. Of course, these relations vary according to the historical 
conditions that prevail at any given moment. Under alienated work conditions, 
instead of freely realising their effective being, "men" become estranged from 
both their individual and species’ lives: the latter would become just a means 
for the former, in which self-satisfaction was already ruled out. Men stand, 
thus, as a power opposed to other men in their condition as workers, placing 
them in their service as things, under domination and coercion.5 Communism 
was envisaged, at this stage, as the overcoming of human alienation.
Some political ideas Marx sketched during this period, under the clear 
influence of Rousseau, are closely connected to this abstract philosophical 
perspective. In bourgeois society, individuals suffer a schizophrenic division 
of their selves. In the state, they live the life of the species; their individual 
economic life lies, on the other hand, outside this sphere. Theirs is a bifurcated 
existence: as universal beings, in the political community, and as private
5K. Marx, Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, 
in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, Ergazungsband, Ersterteil, Berlin, Dietz, 
1968, especially pp. 516-9 and 574-8. Marx oscillates, though, over the precise 
connections between individual and society. Although he praised Feuerbach for 
bringing social relations to the centre of his critique of Hegel’s dialectics in the 
later sections of these tentative notes (p. 570), he had earlier advanced 
propositions that were at variance with this idea, assuming a more abstract and 
platonic perspective on the nexus between these two poles (pp. 538-9).
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persons, in bourgeois civil society.6 Marx retained the main elements of this 
postulation until the end of his intellectual and political career.7 They were 
reshaped, under the influence of Saint-Simon and Blanqui, with the 
introduction of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the 
confidence in the withering away of the state. Once the individual and the 
species were reconciled, and no antagonic class interests remained, the 
"administration" of things would replace political power. This constitutes one 
of the major weaknesses of Marxist socialism, but it has little to do with the 
syllogistic relations we shall shortly examine in detail.
Those core reflections of Marx’s historical materialism faded into the 
background in his mature analysis of the capitalist mode of production. They 
remained, however, as important as before. Well known are his ironic 
assertions about the fairy tales of the individual economic man, as portrayed 
for example in the story of Robinson Crusoe. The capitalist market, having 
facilitated a decisive stride towards human individuation, has, nonetheless, the 
faculty of hiding the very pre-conditions for the existence and development of 
this individuality, cloaking the social relations in which it is primarily 
embedded. The operations of the market and the "fetishism of the commodity" 
transform the relations between men into relations between things, the products 
of work. During the Middle Ages, however, the social relations of people in
6Idem, Zur Juden Frage (1844), in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 1, 
pp. 354-5.
7They turn up again in K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifest des 
kommunistischen Partei (1848), in Werke, B. 4, Berlin, Dietz, 1939., p. 482; 
see also, in particular, K. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms (1875), in K. 
Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 19, Berlin, Dietz, 1962.
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their work processes did not have their content disguised. This was so because 
in that period humans still lived under the "natural relations of the species": 
these conditions were destroyed by the growth of the pure economic coercion 
of the market. This, according to Marx’s project and hopes, should in turn give 
way to the "free association" of these already individualised men, with the 
institution of communism.8
There are problems with this, and Habermas’ misgivings (see chap. 3.III) 
have some justification. When carving out his more general and universal 
categories as for the problematic of the interchange between the human species 
and the natural world, Marx seems to have partially returned to a narrower 
conceptualisation of social relations. This occurred in his early as well as in 
his late writings. In the analytical section of Capital on the process of 
production in general, we are presented with a treatment of the relations 
between isolated men and nature. As an "eternal natural condition of human 
life" - and portrayed in its "simple and abstract moments" - that process was 
seen as independent of the social forms it might concretely assume.9 Marx 
was careful to stress that he was not talking about the work process of a 
historical social formation. He intended to bring out only some analytical 
categories that allowed for the approach to any particular situation. All the 
same, this reservation does not suffice, since it is dependent upon essential 
features of a philosophy of the subject that implies individuals existing and
8Idem, Das Kapital, B. I, MEGA II-5, pp. 102ff.
9K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, p. 192. This approach is also prevalent in the 
Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844.
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expressing themselves independently of others. The theorisation of the working 
process ought, therefore, to take into account the interactive aspect of social 
relations at the most abstract level as well.10
But it must be remembered that even in this later work, basically dedicated 
to economics and its critique, Marx was keen on highlighting the need for 
mutual (dialectical) recognition between men in order that they constitute 
themselves as individuals: only relating to the man Paul as an equal does the 
man Peter relate to himself as a man, whereby, at the same time, each assumes 
the form of realisation (Ersheinungsform) of the human species.11 More 
specifically, we are told that a man is a king only insofar as other men behave 
in a subordinate way as to him.12 In this sense, however in incompletely, 
Marx suggested the rudiments of a theory of communicative action. As already 
stated in the previous chapter, rather than separating the dimensions of labour 
and culture even more, we should make recourse to the notion of interaction, 
so prominent in both Marx and Habermas, so as to build a common framework 
between these two spheres.
10This sort of problem in fact traverses the whole of chapter one of Das 
Kapital, B. I - with its reliance upon the isolated producer of commodities,
although the theory of value depends as such on its intrinsic social character. 
The issue came to the fore once more when, for instance, Marx tackled the 
original accumulation of capital and the historical tendency he foresaw of the 
whole process (chaps. 24-25), with, at both stages, individuals being 
expropriated by individuals. Nevertheless, there is no reason whatsoever to 
accept Habermas’ narrow characterisation of the labour process as merely 
oriented by instrumental action. Marx had much more in view - human 
objectification in its wholeness - when he wrote about the labour process.
"Idem, Ibid., p. 85 (note).
12Idem, Ibid., p. 89 (note).
146
These are the presuppositional elements that led Marx to the propositions 
which grant an understanding of social life that denies its origins in isolated 
individuals, in contradistinction to what writers influenced by methodological 
individualism are wont to believe. Social formations actually express the "sum" 
of the relations (Beziehungen and Vehaltnisse) in which individuals find 
themselves entangled with one another - they are hence not slaves or citizens 
in principle: these are social determinations.13 These presuppositions explain, 
moreover, the figures of speech and the underlying conceptualisation of the 
introduction to Capital, according to which individuals are essentially the 
embodiment of economic categories and class relations, despite their 
subjective capacity to stand above the constraining relations they are submitted 
to.14 They can choose not to bow to these relations no more than they can 
prevent the functioning of natural laws. Does Marx thereby deny the role of 
human reflexivity or, even more seriously, the dialectics with which we started 
the discussion of his ideas? As we shall see in what follows, he has by no 
means been ensnared by these pitfalls - at least not in these passages. He just 
eschewed an individualistic appreciation of social processes. The main features 
of his alternative are rooted in the two axes dwelled upon hitherto, which are, 
however, mingled with some other crucial propositions.
13Idem, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, pp. 175-6.
14Idem, Das Kapital, B. I, p. 67.
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II)SOCIAL CLASSES AS COLLECTIVE SUBJECTS
In terms of the bourgeois ideological universe, Marx’s most powerful 
challenge was advanced within the concept of social class, and the inexorable 
struggles between them. If the dialectics between subject and object, plus the 
notion of social relations, were to be fastened upon by several other 
sociological trends afterwards, the same did not obtain for the social classes. 
This concept has ever since been a contentious one in social theory.15 Some 
refuse it any validity, or concede to it just the status of a reification, whilst 
others bring in complementary notions, restricting its relevance.
Instead of the private individuals of bourgeois civil society, we are 
introduced by Marx to their collective determinations, as business men, land 
owners and wage workers.16 It was basically the historical constitution of the 
modern world that set the horizon for Marx’s and Engels’ conceptualisation of 
this social element. Looking back to previous historical stages, their 
terminology was even somewhat imprecise, since they oscillated over the 
conceptualisation of the divisions along which society was structured. Early on 
they clearly discriminated between patriarchalism, slavery, status and class 
societies.17 In The Communist Manifesto, however, they denounced the history 
of all societies up to that stage as the history of class struggles, except for the
15For an overview, consult A. Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social 
Theory, London and Basingtonstoke, Macmillan, 1979 (1975), pp. 119ff.
16Idem, Zur Juden Frage, p. 354.
17K. Marx and F. Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, p. 22.
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phase of primitive societies (reservation later specified), in spite of retaining 
a lot of their original overview.18 The culmination of that process and the 
unfolding of the modem age and the revolutionary development of the 
bourgeoisie, a class that has built the world according to its image and 
interests.
The initial stages of growth of the middle classes owe little to an 
intentional move to a new form of social organisation. We are confronted with 
a blind process, wherein the subjects of that history hardly exhibited projects. 
The accumulation of capital, the increasing division of labour, the progressive 
individuation of men, come about with the force of a spontaneous natural 
development. Only the city, as an "association'’, seems to have enjoyed a 
reflexive attitude, and in a limited sense only, since their inhabitants 
marshalled efforts to resist feudal pressures, sharing with each other the 
interest of furthering productive forces, maintaining the corporate system and 
control over the labourers.19 The ultimate outcome of this historical evolution 
meant the unintended emergence of a new order, with the project of the 
bourgeois classes assuming now a much more consistent outlook.20
18Idem, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, especially pp. 462-3.
19Idem, Die Deutsche Ideologie, pp. 50ff.
20This is in a sense an example of the unintended consequences of 
intentional behaviour, which, impelling the development of the productive 
forces, cracked the delicate balance of medieval traditional society, giving birth 
to capitalism. It has little to do, though, with methodological individualism, 
contrary to what authors such as Jon Elster {Making Sense o f Marx, pp. 4ff) 
would have us believe. It is true that, in a letter, Engels showed that he was 
perplexed by the random consequences that spring up in history, translating 
them in terms of non-intended results of the action of individuals - see F. 
Engels, "Brief an Joseph Bloch" (21/07/1890), in K. Marx and F. Engels,
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The bourgeoisie, no longer a mere status position (Stand), but a class - 
since it transcended the local level, taking over the national space, and brought 
into being a different sort of political institution. The state, separated from 
society, became the main bulwark of private property and of the ruling classes. 
It constitutes the means whereby the bourgeoisie assures the prevalence of its 
interests. The state is the true consciousness of that class and the locus in 
which the civilisation of a certain period can be grasped in its entirety.21 To 
the emergence of the modern age corresponds, therefore, the constitution of a 
new type of collective subject, characterised by its sheer class determination, 
which subordinates everything else to this secularised condition.
The evolution of the working classes showed some similarities with that 
of the middle classes. In the beginning the proletariat fought against the 
individual bourgeois, instead of against the less immediate relations of 
production, manifesting deep hatred even for the instruments of production. At 
this stage it constituted no more than a disperse (zerstrent) and segmented 
(zersplittert) mass, easily and without danger mobilised by the bourgeoisie 
against its own foes. In the long run, however, this political participation, 
alongside a practice of economic resistance, contributed to the developing of 
the working classes’ consciousness. From a dependent political participation
Werke, B. 37, Berlin, Dietz, 1967, p. 464. This does not warrant the 
presumption that Marx and Engels assumed an individualistic methodology. 
The thrust of their approach was actually very distinct from that.
21K. Marx and F. Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, pp. 60-2, and also 
Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, pp. 466-7.
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and timid "coalitions" at the local level, the proletariat ascended to the national 
political sphere, becoming properly constituted as a social class.22
Nonetheless, this is a fragile achievement, for the concurrence in the 
market recurrently sets in motion a tendency towards division and opposition 
between individual workers, renewing the sources of dispersion within the 
class. This chronic process, contravened by the interest and necessity of the 
workers in the organisation of their coalitions, evinces an essential aspect of 
Marx’s concept of class: it is always a movement, not a structural-economic 
determination alone. On the other hand, it attains different degrees of 
realisation, for its levels of consciousness and self-constitution cannot be taken 
for granted. There is when the notions of "class in itself' and "class for itself' 
intervene: whereas the domination of capital creates "common interests" in the 
proletariat, whereby it is already a class vis-d-vis this external determination, 
it is in practice with the construction of a shared identity that the working class 
achieves political maturity and is properly constituted as a class.23
Thus far, we have dealt with Marx’s view of the social classes basically 
in substantive terms. The last questions lend, however, a new inflection to our 
discussion, demanding a more precise definition of the concept of social class. 
It is curious to notice that Marx did not occupy himself enough with this 
problem, not even in Capital, for, as is well known, he left unfinished the
22Idem, Manifest der kommunistschen Partei, pp. 470-1.
23K. Marx, Mis&re de la Philosophie (1847), in K. Marx and F. Engels,
Oeuvres, v. 1, Paris, Gallimard, 1963, p. 135. For the competition and 
collaboration between workers, consult also K. Marx and F. Engels, Die 
Deutsche Ideologic, p. 61, and Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, p. 474.
151
chapter that would grapple with it.24 Provisionally, let me say that he stated 
the concept in connection with the relations - interactions - within and between 
social groups and that it furnished a new causal principle, i.e. a collective 
causality. Before endeavouring to derive a more precise answer from his 
writings, I shall examine a background element to his conceptual proposition, 
which underpinned, usually without warning, the whole of his substantive 
propositions. I shall thereby start to substantiate my divergency with Habermas 
in relation to what he considers to be the idealism and the hang-ups of the 
philosophy of consciousness still central in Marx’s conception of collective 
subjectivity.
Marx’s concept of social class has an important predecessor in Hegel’s 
universal bureaucracy.25 Hegel was the first to place the relationship of the 
general (das Allgemeine), the particular (das Besondere) and the singular {das 
Einzelne) in the centre of his logic. Despite a strong tendency towards 
formalism, abstract totalisation and sophistry, he accomplished an important 
advance, especially because he handled this apparently exclusively logical issue 
as a problem of the "structure" and development of society.26 This strand of 
reflection had widespread consequences, for as Jay concludes:
WK. Marx, Das KapitaU B. Ill (1894), in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, 
B. 25, Berlin, Dietz, 1964, pp. 892-3.
^Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought o f Karl Marx, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 57.
26G. Lukacs, Uber die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Asthetik, in Werke, 
B. 10, p. 604. See also A. Swinge wood, Marx and Modern Social Theory, pp. 
33-50.
152
This acceptance of what we have called ’latitudinal totalities’ 
meant that any part in a larger whole might itself be considered 
from its internal dynamics. Thus reality for Hegel was 
populated by multitudes of hierarchally linked or horizontally 
juxtaposed totalities, which defied comprehension through 
reduction to their component parts.27
If for the idealist philosopher, rather absurdly, the bureaucracy of the 
Prussian state embodied the principle of universal reason, overcoming the 
irrationality of civil society, the working classes crept into Marx’s standpoint 
also to play the role of carriers of the necessary rational unfolding of a certain 
historical period. This idea appears to have struck Marx at first (discounting 
his former discussion on wood and property in the newspaper he directed in 
his youth) in relation to Germany’s backwardness in the heart of Europe: if the 
limited and egoistic bourgeoisie of his country was unable to break through the 
still feudal conditions of its society, the proletariat would have to assume the 
responsibility for pushing this process through. In so doing, however, it would 
bring about a much wider change, since it had to go past capitalism, according 
to its own objective interests, which Marx, in a Kantian tenor, merged with 
philosophy’s rational categorical imperative.28 The proletariat which was 
nothing could become all, and in freeing itself would free the whole of society,
27M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, p. 59.
28K. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung" 
(1844), in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 1, Berlin, Dietz, 1956, pp. 389- 
91.
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changing social conditions to the point of its own dissolution; it had nothing 
to lose, but its chains, historical possibility and necessity opened up by the 
development of the productive forces under capitalism.29
The relations between social classes substantiated for Marx those 
syllogistic relations, and by means of this conceptualisation he avoided a 
reification of society as well as brushing aside a nominalistic approach. The 
syllogism was the instrument he embraced in order to criticise the 
individualistic fictions of bourgeois ideology, without compromises with the 
Romantics’ substantialist and affirmative organicism, already only partially 
absorbed by Hegel. In this context,
the dialectics of the general and the particular play an important 
role, whereby the particular is exactly the logical expression of 
the categories of social mediation between individual men and 
society.
29K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, pp. 467, 
472-3 and 492-3.
30G. Lukacs, Uber die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Asthetik, p. 613. 
That Lukacs learned from this often unexplicit problematic in Marx’s work is 
evident from the very beginning of his materialist production, as is apparent 
in Idem, Geschichte und KlassenbewuBtsein (1923), in Werke, B. 2, Neuewied/ 
Berlin, Luchterhand, 1968. Notwithstanding the troublesome identification of 
subject and object that is drawn in that piece, it is difficult to see how M. Jay 
{Marxism and Totality, chap. 2) can see Lukacs as a "holist". If we stress the 
fact that the categories expounded by Lukacs are known by Jay (pp. 302-3), 
his conclusion sounds even more bewildering. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, syllogism is the "form or instrument of reasoning from generals to 
particulars". I make use of the term in the broad sense Hegel attributed to it, 
implying the relations between elements within a logical or social totality.
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The syllogism, in its Marxist and Luckacsian version, allows, therefore, for 
the understanding of social life beyond abstract individualisms and abstract 
"holisms". Social relations, shaping classes, mediate between these two poles; 
this is, moreover, the way in which the dialectics between subject and object 
concretely operates, since the idea of an immediate impact of individuals upon 
"society" and vice versa is untenable, for collective subjectivities mediate 
between them. However, contrary to Habermas’ indictments, such dialectics of 
the general, the particular and the singular does not lead to idealism, insofar 
as social relations receive due attention. Instead of a Kantian, idealist notion 
of totality, abstractly conceived and directly linked to individuals, the presence 
of collectivities enmeshed in social life embeds and articulates those two poles. 
Individuals cannot be abstractly reduced to themselves nor can collectivities 
be seen as independent from them and the social systems that possess the 
properties which shape these collectivities in their specificity.
Marx’s syllogism provides a further insight, though. It brings out the 
hierarchised character of social life and the ideologies that mask these 
hierarchies. In capitalist societies, the bourgeoisie appears as universal in its 
values and pretensions because it has the capacity to, at the same time, shape 
social life and disguise its own domination. Structuring social relations in a 
particular form, it obscures the unequal distribution of power and resources, 
although this should not be seen as a machiavellian or clearly intentional 
process, since it comes about in part as the unintended consequence of the 
behaviour of its members and sections, or because the social relations which 
make the bourgeoisie what it is are often obscure for the individual bourgeois.
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Society, in its generality, and capital are one and the same thing. At the 
same time, as we will see below, capital should be directly identified with the 
bourgeoisie. The proletariat, however, is capital too, sucked, as it is, into the 
workings of the system, as an element without which it could not exist. Both 
are particulars, but the bourgeoisie, directly identified with capital, looks 
forward to shaping the totality of social life and aspires to universality, which 
remains ideological, though, insofar as this aspiration rests upon the masking 
of social inequalities and of its own particularity. The proletariat, on the other 
hand, affirms itself against the universality of capital. In its irreducible 
particularity, which resists assimilation by the generality of capital, it brings 
forward the possibility of another universality, one in which antagonistic social 
relations would not be present. To be sure, owing as it did, a lot to 
Cartesianism, Marx’s concept of the actor suggested a socialist transition and 
a communist society wherein the state, as an encompassing and universal 
collectivity, would unify the whole of social particularities and would make 
society transparent to itself through the identification of, and planning in 
response to, the general interest.31 If this is an idea that should be 
abandoned, we should not overlook Marx’s main argument and the hopes he 
derived from the identification of the false and ideological universality which 
obtains under the hierarchised generality of capital and its overthrow. It is 
possible to grasp the concrete universality of social life only insofar as we
31 See Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism Revisited, London, 
Haiper Collins, 1991, chap. 1.
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identify the particulars which are its part and product, in their hierarchical 
relations.
Having reached this point we need, however, to take on more directly the 
problems raised by methodological individualism. So far, so good, they might 
say. Marx did introduce levels of mediation and pointed to the "totality" of 
social life. But what then, if one still maintains that society and social classes 
may and must be reduced to their component parts, not just as an analytical 
breaking down of an organic whole into its parts, but as the unveiling of its 
substantial units, which, by means of addition, bring into being entities that 
have no other reality beyond that constituted by those isolated elements? The 
answer to this generally speaking is that Marx did not advance a polished 
response to the question. We can find, however, some indications in his work, 
from which, together with the two presuppositional advances reviewed at the 
beginning of this chapter, we will be able to proceed towards the definition of 
a theory of collective subjectivity. On the other hand, it is necessary to stress 
that it was precisely the syllogism and its tacit articulation with the notion of 
interaction and with dialectics that prevented Marx from adopting a 
homogeneous view of totality when he rejected individualism. Thereby the 
collective subjectivities he depicted, contrary to Habermas’ belief, were merely 
intersubjectively constituted collectivities, rather than substantial macro­
subjects. Marx managed to avoid the split that obtains in bourgeois 
consciousness, in contrast to much of contemporary sociological theory, 
including much of Critical Theory.
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III)PROPERTIES, STRUCTURE AND ACTION
The initial point to establish is Marx’s agreement with some aspects of the 
organicism which Hegel and the French socialists inherited respectively from 
the Romantics and from the beginnings of positivism - although he completely 
departed company with them in regard to the latter*s affirmative use of this 
notion to lay claims related to the intrinsically good character of social 
differentiation and hierarchisation.32 His major work is full of suggestions 
regarding this totalist approach. Society - a totality - was, for instance, 
conceived as an organism in permanent process of change.33 Especially 
instructive are the ideas he cultivated in relation to the themes of cooperation 
and the manufacture. The former originates a new productive power, greater 
than the simple sum of the productive capacity of individual workers, whereas 
the latter creates the "collective worker" {das Gesamtarbeiter), with power and 
characteristics distinct from the individual worker, who is coercively 
transformed into a part of a machine.34 In one passage Marx even hints at a 
term that might well characterise the sort of collective causality I have been 
trying to outline:
As the power of attack of a squadron of cavalry or the power 
of resistance of an infantry regiment is essentially distinct from
32M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp. 27-8.
33K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. 1, p. 68.
^Idem, Ibid., respectively pp. 323 and 366, in particular.
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the sum of the power of attack and resistance those knights and 
soldiers develop individually, so the pure sum of the power of 
the individualised worker is distinct from the social power 
developed when several hands act together (zusammenwirken) 
at the same time carrying out the same operation.35
New ground was broken therein, for his alternative to passive-inert social 
systems was not an anthropomorphic concept of action; although relatively 
oblivious to itself, a new conceptualisation crept in: Marx clearly perceived 
that the efficacy of social systems cannot be rendered by the traditional notions 
of active and conditioning causality. The notion of properties of social 
systems, which we had occasion to meet in the course of our discussion of 
Giddens’ structuration theory, is once more present. According to these 
passages, Marx supported an idea of social phenomena wherein an atomistic 
conceptualisation of social reality has no place, for the systems mentioned 
above cannot be reduced to their individual components. This includes, of 
course, their collective causality, which is closely connected to social relations. 
There is, thus, a sui generis reality in social phenomena, which cannot, 
however, be detached from the relations between individuals and between 
collective subjectivities.36
35Idem, Ibid., p. 263. In German, zusammenwirken means both to 
cooperate and to exert a joint action.
36I therefore in part agree and in part disagree with Anthony Woodiwiss, 
Social Theory after Postmodernism, London/ Winchester, Pluto, 1990, p. 25.
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But Marx went further and established two different ways whereby the 
properties of social systems come about. On the one hand, especially but not 
only, often in the "persona" which capitalists and land owners incarnate, there 
is an internal motivation that drives some individuals according to the values 
of the capitalist world the fetishism of the commodity and its correlate 
internalisation provide for the substantiation of this tendency; on the other 
hand, nevertheless, and this is recurrently true as for the working classes, the 
sheer coercion of the market produces these properties. This certainly affects 
the ruling classes also, since they cannot evade the limiting conditions posed 
by the mercantile relations they have to confront. The pressure these relations 
exert on the proletariat are, nonetheless, even stronger. Unable to elude the 
"freedom" to sell their labour force in the market, workers can only partially 
dodge the despotism of the capitalist that reigns in the factory - even though 
the bourgeoisie denounces cynically the socialist project as the institution of 
tyranny over society as a whole.37 I do not want to imply by these ideas - 
which were perhaps more forceful in his early writings, in terms of 
motivational drives - that Marx had a really multidimensional notion of "social 
action"; they point to ideas found scattered throughout his reflections, 
nonetheless, in connection with the structuring of social systems. A pure
37K. Marx, Das KapitaU B. I, pp. 102ff and 349-1. See also K. Marx and 
F. Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, passim. If the general 
motivational set of individuals and classes stems from this socio-economic 
situation, we have an explanation for their trying to secure, in all spheres, the 
interests thereby yielded (as we see in the last cited text, p. 479). For a further 
view, with a general "systematicity" for social systems being brought about 
through coercion (or without it), see F. Engels, "Von der Autoritat" (1874), in 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 18, Berlin, Dietz, 1962.
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division of system and life-world is, therefore, untenable in his writings, in 
which, irrespective of the materialist concentration on economic interests 
instrumentally pursued, power and culture play an essential role - let alone the 
theme of alienation, which highlights the manifold features of human 
personality.
Having said that, it is important to fasten upon the connections between 
these properties and the dialectics between subject and object plus the notion 
of interaction. The contention I want to sustain is that these are actually the 
elements that ground Marx’s notion of social properties, despite the fact that 
he hardly payed attention to its more general relevance. What, therefore, 
constitutes the peculiar properties of manufactures and collective workers, but 
a certain organisation of the interactive setting? Why is language, and even 
individual consciousness, a social product, developed through the interchange 
between human beings in society, as pointed out above? How is the political 
system structured, if not around the contradictory relations between the social 
classes? Finally, what is the mysterious meaning of surplus-value, if not the 
appropriation of the results of the work of one class by another, basically a 
collective social relation?38 It is the crucial idea of relations between the 
social classes that set Marx’s conception far beyond a mere statistical or 
ecological approach.
This is valid for the absolute surplus-value as much as for the relative 
surplus-value, which is exactly an outcome of the struggle between capitalists 
and workers. Whilst capitalists want to guarantee their right to make the most
38K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, pp. 198ff.
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use of the labour force possible, as commodity purchased, workers strive for 
its limitation. Therefore,
...the history of capitalist production appears as the 
normalisation of the working day as a struggle around its 
limitation - a struggle between the collective capitalist 
(Gesammtkapitalisten), that is the capitalist class, and the 
collective worker (Gesammtarbeiter) or the working class.39
This is how Marx described the whole history of the emergence of relative 
surplus-value, intended to compensate, through dead labour, the shortening of 
capital’s living part. With this we are offered a statement on the relation 
between the classes and the structuring impact they exert on the social system 
in its encompassing dimension.
This is a feature we perceive in other Marxian texts, alongside a looser 
description of the relations within each class. The tone is quite debatable, as 
is the underlying hypothesis; despite this, the point is clear in his reflections 
on the role of the peasantry during the revolutions of mid-nineteenth century 
France. The text is famous, amongst other reasons, for its description of the 
amorphous character of the peasantry, which is compared to a sack of potatoes. 
Their dispersion across an agrarian space where communications were 
restricted posed severe limits to their constitution as a class: on the one hand, 
the very economic conditions of existence made them involuntarily a class; on
39Idem, Ibid ., p. 241.
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the other, their isolation, preventing any association or political organisation, 
made impossible their full constitution as a class. Once again Marx summoned 
the problematic of the "class in itself’ and the "class for itself'. The peasantry, 
in contrast to the proletariat, was seen as inexorably stopping at the first stage, 
relying in the end upon Bonaparte in order to have its demands met.40 I have 
already drawn attention to Marx’s theses of the working class and the unstable 
relation between competition and collaboration that obtains within it, plus the 
vicissitudes this entails to its full constitution as a class. Notwithstanding the 
important stride forward, there are many complications therein.
The most conspicuous is produced by Marx’s straight identification between 
social movement and class constitution. He actually tended to blur the 
distinction between the two concepts, with resulting theoretical and political 
negative side effects 41 The problem, which we can just allude to for the 
moment, is that Marx uncritically adopted a great deal of the core notion of the 
philosophy of the subject, whose main aspects we have seen in the foregoing 
pages, that the constitution of one’s identity and consciousness is founded on 
the centring, usually in a reflexive way, of one’s ego. That is precisely what 
loomed large in Marx’s model, even when he endeavoured to achieve a radical 
break with individualism. A social class would, thus, be fully constituted 
inasmuch as it could become a "class for itself. The dialectics inherited from
40K. Marx, Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, p. 199.
41They can be largely referred to a too immediate identification between 
socialist parties and the working classes, with the loss of specificity of the 
political level. For his programme in connection with this, see Eric Hobsbawm, 
The Age o f Capital, 1848/1875, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, pp. 
108ff.
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Hegel held negative sway in this sense, for they implied a constitution of 
identity - individual and collective - that meant precisely, through the 
utilisation and overcoming of contradictions, the increasing control and 
clarification of one’s consciousness. This would be reflected in the constitution 
of the proletariat and in the development of humanity globally considered, as 
a process of civilisation.42
Inadvertently, Marx partially adopted a formulation that harks back to a 
conception the premises of which he did not share. His confidence in the 
widening of human reason, which was somehow associated with the 
development of productive forces43, placed him in a trap. And yet he was not 
altogether caught by it, for more subtle and divergent ideas related to class 
constitution were present in his work. First of all, the passage from "class in 
itself’ to "class for itself' included the notions both of dialectics and of 
interaction. Hegel’s Jena period Spirit, discussed by Habermas (chap. 3.1), was 
somehow duplicated by Marx. There is no class constitution except in 
connection with exploitation and struggle, which, as seen above, proceeds from 
basic revolt, through economic coalitions, to political organisation. 
Furthermore, because of its very position in the process of production, the 
bourgeoisie has only limited possibility of achieving consciousness of its
42R. Bodei, "Strategie di Individuazione", Aut-Aut, v. 32, 1985, pp. 94-8.
43See, for instance, K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen 
Partei, p. 465 - wherein they linked the necessity of a rational collective 
approach to the future to the mutability brought about by the bourgeois 
revolution.
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historical situation, as Lukacs later underscored.44 Power, interests, identity 
constitution, local cultures, communication, are elements always present in 
Marx’s more concrete descriptions of bourgeois and working class social and 
political life.
Although only sketched, Marx moreover suggested a crucial alternative, 
which places us on the path to overcome the fixation of sociology with the 
poles of passive and conditioning causality.
According to Perry Anderson,45 Marx was never able to choose 
effectively between two explicative logics and causal principles, which took 
turns at each stage of his intellectual evolution. One is found in the class 
struggles of The Communist Manifesto; the other is displayed in the 
"structures" of his 1859 introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, with its fixation upon the interplay between forces and 
relations of production, which, at certain stages of development, enter in 
mutual contradiction.46 Giddens is, in practice, of the same opinion, and 
rephrases that disjunction. After an interesting and precise analysis of Marx’s 
texts he refutes the belief that Marx was keen on making a differentiated use 
of terms such as contradiction (Widerspruch), antagonism (Gegensatz), conflict 
(Konflikt) and struggle (Kampf) - although struggle was used more
^G. Lukacs, Geschichte und KlassenbewuBtsein. This insight does not 
warrant, of course, his identification of subject and object with respect to the 
proletariat.
45P. Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, pp. 33-4.
46K. Marx, Zur Kritik der Politischen Okonomie (1859), in K. Marx and 
F. Engels, Werke, B. 13, Berlin, Dietz, 1961, pp. 8ff.
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conclusively to imply actors. He appeals, from this understanding, for a clear- 
cut distinction between conflict and contradiction. Whereas the former would 
designate struggles between actors or collectivities, the latter would specify the 
disjunction of structural principles of system organisation.47
We may, however, discover a novel solution to Anderson’s question which 
may facilitate the overcoming of the sort of settlement proposed by Giddens, 
which gives privileged and immutable status to the contraposition between 
active and conditioning causality, regardless of the collective character of the 
actors (inconsistendy, we must remember) hinted at in his formulation. We 
will come nearer our goal by taking this step, achieving a deeper definition of 
the concept of collective causality.
I want to draw attention to Althusser, when he denied that Marx restricted 
his discussion of the social classes, in Capital, to its last chapter. In fact, he 
says, they cut across the whole book, since all economic processes obtain 
within social "social relations" which are, in the last instance, the relations and 
especially the struggles between the classes.48 Marx himself had pointed to 
the fact that the history of the creation of the economic categories of 
capitalism was part of the phenomenon of the creation of the social classes
47A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 131. For an opposed 
reading, which stresses a supposedly more conscious and differentiated use of 
these expressions by Marx, consult J. Elster, Making Sense o f Marx, p. 43, and 
Logic and Society, p. 90; see also J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im 
Spatkapitalismus, pp. 44-5.
48L. Althusser, "Marxisme et Lutte de Classe" (1970), in Positions, pp. 62-
3.
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under this mode of production.49 For this reason, he referred to "capital" as 
wanting this or that, carrying one or another activity out; it merely constitutes 
the economic categorial equivalent of the bourgeoisie as a class. This is the 
reason why he switched back and forth from terms such as wage work and 
capital to working class and bourgeoisie, and vice versa.50 Early on this 
position was clear, and so were its ties with the concept of totality and the 
question of social relations:
To be a capitalist means not only to assume a personal position, 
but a social one in production. Capital is a general social 
product and can be grasped only through the generality of its 
several members, that is that in the last instance only through 
the generality of all society members can it be set in 
movement.51
This is also the underlying rationale for the definition of the trinity formula 
- capital, ground and work - as a reified, though faithful, expression of social
49K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, pp. 644ff and 681-3.
50See especially Idem, Ibid., pp. 268-9, and also Lohn, Preis und Profit 
(1865), in K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, B. 16, Berlin, Dietz, 1962 - in 
particular pp. 147ff, wherein he spoke about "the struggle (Kampj) between 
capital and labour and its outcome". All the above mentioned struggles around 
the working day press home this ontological, as well as methodological, 
principle, despite its invisible status.
51K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, p. 475 . 
As they substantively devised further on (p. 468), "structural" and "actional" 
terms are interchangeable: "the bourgeoisie, i.e. capital".
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relations,52 and the justification for the above cited remark on individuals as 
the "persona" of social relations. It is not that individual action has no place 
in history, although Marx was resolute on the limits posed by constraining 
market conditionings. Individual action, either reproducing or changing those 
relations, in a radical or limited form - as we do see throughout Capital - finds 
real expression within collective movements, for which individual participation 
is determining. We are in fact presented the dialectics of collective 
subjectivity, which definitely takes us beyond the enchanted universe of 
individual inventors of new worlds and utopias.
The riddle of the "method of exposition" of Capital can be made out once 
we bear in mind the line of reasoning proposed above. We have seen in the 
first chapter that the contraposition between individual and society stands at 
the core of bourgeois thought; we have had in front of us also the alternatives 
to that presuppositional universe: the dialectic realisation of the relation 
between individual and society, the notion of interaction and the notion of 
collective subjectivity. We can, thus, ask why the commodity is the 
"elementary form" of the capitalist mode of production, as Marx stated in the 
first pages of that book.53 The answer might be that the commodity is the 
basic cell of that mode of production because it expresses the relationship 
between two individuals, its reified configuration notwithstanding; thereby it 
opens the door to the general understanding of the functioning of the whole
52K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. Ill, pp. 822ff.
53Idem, Ibid., p. 17. For the methodological problems involved in this 
regard, see the "Nachwort zu zweiten Auflage" to Das Kapital (B. I, p. 709) 
and the 1857 introduction to the Grundrisse.
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system. Marx unfolded the diverse forms of equivalence until he arrived at its 
universal form, money, and finally at surplus-value, whereby the social classes 
were dragged into the scene. These are all reified configurations of social 
relations between individuals and between collective subjectivities. From the 
more abstract one - commodity - Marx reached out to the classes, aiming at 
expanding his analysis up to the point wherein he would have considered the 
state and the world market. The "concrete universal" - the full expression of 
the relations between collectivities and the international social system of which 
they are part and product - was his ultimate target.
These considerations press home one of the basic hypothesis of this study, 
i.e. that social systems should neither be taken as the mere sum of their 
members nor as passive entities. The concept of collective subjectivity and its 
counterpart, collective causality, are intended to address problems already in 
part worked out by Marx, as we can see. Subject and object are, in this 
perspective, one and the same thing - although one must be wary not to slide 
into an expressive and undifferentiated view of totality, as tended to be the 
case with the young Lukacs.54 The dialectics between social systems is what 
actually makes true this identification, which is limited though, insofar as they 
are subject and object in relation to one another. If they exert a causal impact 
on themselves, by means of their internal differentiation, this just brings out 
the multilayered aspect of social life. The syllogism of the general, the 
particular and the singular undertakes to grasp these multifarious interactive
^See, for that and the problems thence generated, M. Jay, Marxism and 
Totality, chap. 2.
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networks and the constitution of several partial totalities.55 Hence, we have 
not two, but one general logic, and Anderson’s account of the problem 
discloses the shortcomings of an acceptance of those traditional 
presuppositional poles, as much as does Giddens’ proposition.56 A serious 
drawback to this innovation was Marx’s still teleological certainty as for the 
necessary constitution of the proletariat as a class "for itself and the 
consummation of its historical mission grounded, as mentioned above, on an 
excessively totalising view of dialectics and on the tight model of (bourgeois) 
individual subjectivity.
The reasoning developed above points in the direction of a general picture 
of causal relations. The causal efficacy of each element in the interactive 
process (between individuals and classes) concurs with the formal - internal -
55To achieve that we must count on the notion of "polysyllogism", 
discussed in G. Lukacs, Uber die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Asthetic, p. 
361. Despite its basic reference to the social classes in Lukacs, it opens up a 
universe broader than that.
56Whereby positions that establish, in economic terms or not, the structural 
positioning of classes turn to be misleading - and in the end dependent upon 
a reliance upon the notions of class in itself and for itself. Such is the case of 
the study by G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1979 (1978), pp. 73ff. At the same time, subjectivist 
positions (which, in the last instance, at least partly accept this backdrop of 
structural determination) do not fare that well either. Thompson suffers from 
this limitation, notwithstanding his perception of classes as "relationships" and 
as processes, and his later too far fetched onslaught on Althusser. See Edward 
P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1981 (1963), pp. 8-9; and The Poverty o f Theory & Other Essays, 
London, Merlin, 1978. Moreover, a deeper acceptance of the contingent 
character of class consciousness might entail a vision of the relation between 
proletariat and socialism much closer to Lenin than Thompson would be 
willing to grant.
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causality of the whole;57 thereby the total character of the system is grasped, 
as a (dis)order constituted by multiple interactive processes. The material cause 
is, in contrast, despite the human belonging in the realm of nature, what must 
be placed outside social relations, whereby the famous thesis of the economic 
determination in the "last the instance"58 gains partial plausibility, 
notwithstanding the lack of any justification for the attribution of causal 
superiority or priority to it. The status of a final causality, in terms of 
collective intentional action, is more ambivalent, not only because the 
unintended consequences of this collective action must be necessarily borne in 
mind, but also because the still slightly touched upon idea of collective 
intentionality demands further examination - discussion of which I shall 
postpone for below. In any event, Marx’s notion of totality needs to be recast. 
It is very clear that we cannot count any longer on teleological principles 
which rigidly bind longitudinal and latitudinal aspects of social totalities, to 
recall Jay’s categories. A much more fragmented and contingent notion of 
totality is in order, in both the latitudinal and the longitudinal dimensions of 
social systems. If history must be seen an open process, which is not
57It does not affect my argument whether Marx held a view of dialectics 
as triadic - with thesis, antithesis and synthesis - or not, although one must 
agree that at least in Capital he did introduce other intermediate strata in the 
model of the capitalist "class structure". See Alan Swingewood, A Short 
History of Sociological Thought, pp. 84ff. Moreover, if he showed a tendency 
to simplify "class structure" in modem times in The Communist Manifesto, this 
did not imply, rather the opposite, anything similar in the past. The hypothesis 
sustained herein on the formal causality of social systems means, therefore, a 
complex and manifold dialectics between multiple elements, though they 
might, of course, be only two, in concrete cases.
58K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, p. 112, and F. Engels, "Brief an Bloch", p.
463.
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determined by material conditions of production, the comprehension of the 
generality of a social formation must not obscure the fact that particular 
collectivities and singular individuals retain a certain degree of autonomy and 
perhaps of distance regarding the overall patterns of value and organisation of 
the encompassing social system. Marx stressed that competitive market 
relations in capitalist society narrowly limit the options of classes and 
individuals, and in this case he seems to have been right. Subsumed by the 
generality of capital, the proletariat could affirm its particularity only by means 
of collective struggles. In other circumstances, however, with reference to other 
system, the relations between the general, the particular and the singular are 
much looser. I shall expand on this in a later chapter.
A final weakness in Marx’s treatment of the issue must be tackled. If the 
notion of social class represented an attack on sacred bourgeois categories, and 
an important conceptual move as well, Marx’s complete attachment to his 
innovation produced, on the other hand, a significative drawback. The notion 
is clearly too narrow to furnish the theoretical and narrative instruments that 
the analysis of social life demands, a quandary manifest in his own writings. 
In the celebrated study of the social stalemate that engendered Bonaparte’s 
coup-de-etat Marx shed light over the role played by several collectivities, 
from the distinct fractions of the bourgeoisie (here Marx probably idealised the 
uniformity of the proletariat), the army, the newspapers, and other 
organisations. Whilst at the same time however probably making too close an 
approximation between classes and parties. What is particularly important to 
discern is the limited function the discourse about the social classes was asked
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to perform, the depicting of their mutual constitution in the course of the 
struggle of the movements enrooted in their being notwithstanding.59 Pace the 
central importance of classes in social life, it is necessary to recognise their 
insufficiency in terms of concrete explanations and descriptions. Additionally, 
even in Marx’s discussions of the political restlessness of the French, the 
classes were, in fact, presented in a much more decentred and heterogeneous 
way, at least with respect to the several fractions he discerned in the 
bourgeoisie of that country.
Several Marxists, from Lenin to Gramsci, have been attentive to this issue, 
although mainly in substantive terms. The latter, for instance, observed that 
partially following Hegel’s insight into the public-statist nature of social 
organisations that pre-figured political parties, Marx had arrived at a 
theorisation of political organisations. Sharing with that philosopher basically 
the same historical experience plus an awareness of mass politics, Marx 
fastened upon the dynamic of professional organisations, newspapers, jacobin 
clubs and small secret conspiratory groups.60 But in the Gramsci, as much as 
in Marx, the classes, in a non-specified way, still furnish the backdrop of the 
conceptualisation, in spite of Gramsci’s enormous amplification of the concrete 
problematic of political collectivities already found in Marx’s more historical
59K. Marx, Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, passim.
60Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Careere, v. I, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, pp. 
56-7 (text of 1929/30).
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writings and of his break through the more rigid teleological vision and hopes 
of the founder of the "philosophy of praxis".61
As we shall see later on, the reshaping of the broadest features of the 
concept of social class - in the terms of a general theory of collective 
subjectivity, since we shall not deal with its substantive content - is essential 
to specify its range of application and lend it a sharper edge. This step may 
have even wider consequences, insofar as the general thrust of this concept 
spilt over into other categories. After the main traits of Marx’s social classes 
a number of others have been devised as historical subjects, such as those of 
race, gender, age, and so forth.62 Also in these cases, the relation between 
generality and particularity assumes a false and ideological dimension. 
Inasmuch as genders and specific races and ethnicities are hierarchically better 
positioned and thereby manage to define the generality of social formations, 
masking their own particularity, it is incumbent upon social movements of 
gender, races or ethnic groups which originate from a subordinate position to 
denounce this false universality. Often we see, however - as in some strands
61A recent critic is thereby correct when he indicts Marx’s reduction of the 
political to the "social" realm, in his writings on the French Revolutions, with 
arbitrary political statements being cast to legitimise that simplification. See 
Francois Furet, Marx et la Revolution Frangaise, Paris, Flammarion, 1986, pp. 
93-6, 106 and 109. In contrast, the incongruity of an individualistic Marxism 
is brought out, in spite of a "plea" for this type of methodological canon, in 
a very interesting discussion on socialism and electoral systems in 
contemporary Europe (p. 97); we are, in fact, introduced to a complex setting 
wherein political parties and unions as well as social classes - unfortunately 
frozen as structural dimensions of individual perspectives - are endowed with 
much more central explicative capacity. See Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and 
Social Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press/ Paris, Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme, 1988 (1985).
62K. Eder, The blew Politics of Class, pp. 44-5.
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of feminism, anti-racism, or by and large in nationalist movements - these 
subordinate collectivities claim a universality which carries with it vested 
interests and ideological delusions.
Once we bear in mind Marx’s syllogism, and widen it to deal with the full 
array of collectivities in social life, we can at least in principle avoid this 
ideological transfiguration of social relations. The analysis of those 
collectivities and movements could benefit from an approach based on the 
syllogism of the general, the particular and the singular. Feminist "dual 
systems" theories tend to evolve in this direction, especially when they 
encompass racial stratifications. They, however, often reproduce the idea of 
centred subjectivities with reference to women and men and in addition 
indulge in the exclusion of women from the (exclusively male) ruling classes - 
since they would be merely married to them - or diminishing the role that 
family units play.63 These shortcomings may be otherwise avoided to the 
extent that greater cognisance of the differentiation, criss-crossing quality and 
variable homogeneity or heterogeneity of social systems, is forthcoming.64 
These are insights that will become henceforth central for our discussion.
63This is the case with Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1990. See, for the family, p. 65; and for women not belonging in 
the ruling classes, p. 183.
^See, for instance, the works of Lynne Segal, Is the Future Female? 
Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism, London, Virago, 1987, 
specifically pp. 65 and 231; plus Slow Motion. Changing Masculinities, 
Changing Men, London, Virago, 1990.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARSONS: SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND COLLECTIVE ACTORS
I)INDIVIDUALISM AND ANALYTICAL REALISM
The second main version of a theory of collective subjectivity is found in 
the work of Talcott Parsons. However, it did not come about in his first 
formulations, and Parsons never freed himself completely from the constraints 
of the heritage of the liberal thought he acknowledged as his world-view. 
Nevertheless, he advanced some very interesting ideas, connected to his notion 
of social system, which consisted in an important departure from some key 
elements of Enlightenment principles. But, lest the expectation of a break away 
from that movement’s centred subject occur to the reader, it must be stated that 
Parsons did actually accept this as a core feature of his notion of collective 
actor.
His was a version of collective subjectivity that essentially differed from 
Marx’s concept of social classes, which he accepted as relevant, without, 
however, adopting either its political dimension or even the particular sort of 
causality Marx attributed to those social entities. In fact, Parsons tried to get 
rid of Marx, treating him as a somewhat minor and, in any case, outdated 
figure in the social sciences. On the one hand, Weber, Durkheim and Pareto 
were deemed the true founding fathers of sociology. On the other, drawing 
upon his own former efforts as well as, presumably, Weber’s understanding of 
social stratification, Parsons introduced a pluralistic view of social 
differentiation (or, in a less "value-free" manner, inequality). It depicted the 
collective aspect of social classes in a form that very closely resembled the 
structural-passive character attributed to social classes by a good number of
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Marxist theorists. Above all, he did not regard classes as essentially in 
conflict.1
Despite these drawbacks, one must agree with Alexander,2 when he 
attributes a synthetical character to Parsons’ first phase, which tended to be 
relinquished with the introduction of the paradigm of the four functions. This 
means that his theory of collective subjectivity was couched in the framework 
of a theoretical synthesis, conversely to what we have observed in terms of 
contemporary theorisation, insofar as these have constituted strands that have 
run parallel to each other.3
I made reference to an important facet of Parsons’ understanding of what 
he called "social action", in its so-called "voluntaristic" version. This grounded 
his first phase of theoretical production. In the opening chapter (l.II) of this 
study, I dwelled upon the most individualistic aspect of his elaboration, which, 
curiously enough, but not unexpectedly, has been the one retained by vast 
majority of his followers - in conjunction or not with his increasingly
lT. Parsons, "Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent 
Sociological Theory" (1949), in Essays in Sociological Theory, New York, 
Free Press, 1964; and, for his later view of Marxism, "Some Comments on the 
Sociology of Karl Marx", in Sociological Theory and Modern Society, New 
York, Free Press, 1967. One must notice that Parsons never quoted Marx from 
his original texts. For his understanding of social stratification, see Idem, "A 
Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification" (1953), in 
Essays in Sociological Theory.
2J. C. Alexander, The Modern Reconstruction o f Classical Thought: Talcott 
Parsons (v. IV of Theoretical Logic in Sociology), Berkeley/ Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1983, especially pp. 151-2.
3Although Parsons had very little sympathy towards Marxism, he 
underscored the already synthetical character of that theory, which had brought 
utilitarianism and idealism together. See T. Parsons, The Structure o f Social 
Action, pp. 118 and 489-93.
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functionalist bias.4 Perhaps, one might point out his perception of 
individualistic theories as responsible for that subsequent misapprehension. The 
problem is that Parsons used to interpret utilitarianism as the expression of 
individualistic thinking.5 In terms of the historical origins of individualism he 
was certainly right, but his reading of Weber’s work, under the strong 
influence of Durkheim’s penchant for a more "collectivist" approach to social 
life, betrays his mistaken perception of that conception as pertaining to a 
supposedly superseded stage of social theory. According to this standpoint, 
therefore, the diverse forms of domination - or, in his bizarre translation, 
"imperative control" - play an outstanding role. As Weber did not share with 
the utilitarians a biological organic-materialistic interpretation of social 
processes, putting forward a multidimensional sociological theory, Parsons 
ended up overlooking the extent to which the German writer partook in the 
individualism of those pristine sources of modem European social science.6
Nonetheless, even in this earlier phase he was aware of problems related 
to the issues I have been trying to tackle. Above all, his commitment to the 
problematic developed by Alfred Whitehead, the English philosopher, furnished 
crucial elements for his development towards a non-individualistic approach. 
Parsons accepted Whitehead’s critique of the "fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness", advanced against the substitution of theoretical abstractions for
4The exception in this case, although rather partial, Richard Munch, 
Theorie des Handelns, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988, pp. 61ff.
5T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp. 90ff.
6Idem, Ibid., chaps. VIII-XVIII.
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the organic character of the world. Whitehead refused the atomistic conception 
of human perception that the thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries had established in conjunction with the progresses of modem physics. 
Thereof Parsons drew a notion of social action as a wholeness, wherein actors, 
ends, situations (divisible in conditions and means) and norms, should be 
grasped in their interrelationship - in spite of the fact that they could, and 
should, be broken down into discrete elements. That is the reason why, 
following the philosopher, Parsons supported the idea of analytical realism - 
whereby we could bring out the anatomy, i.e. the structure of social action.7
With Pareto, and Whitehead, Parsons depicted society as an organic whole, 
whence a great deal of his enthusiasm for the former’s system of theory, 
which, although incomplete, was rendered altogether compatible with his own
7Idem, Ibid., pp. 28-44 and 730. For that Whitehead’s view, see his 
Science and the Modern World, especially pp. 64 and 203. For the differences 
between their conceptualisations, consult Bernhard Miebach, Strukturalistische 
Handlungstheorie, Opladen, Westdeutcher Verlag, 1984, pp. 51-2 and 66. This 
aspect of Parsons’s thought has occasioned recent discussions on his possible 
"Kantianism" - which would be linked also to a theory of "interpenetration", 
to be touched upon below - and to the a priori character of his concepts, 
dispute also fostered by his own later self-definition - in, for instance, T. 
Parsons, "A Retrospective View", in Richard Grathoff, ed., Correspondence of 
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1978, (1940/1), p. 117. The contemporary positions are diversified in relation 
to this question. In favour of this interpretation, see R. Munch, op. cit., pp. 46 
and 63; J. C. Alexander, The Modern Reconstruction o f Classical Thought: 
Talcott Parsons, p. 175; and Harold J. Bershady, Ideology and Social 
Knowledge, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973, pp. 63 and 72; against it, see J. 
Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. 2, pp. 298 and 337; and 
B. Miebach, op. cit., p. 12. Insofar as one centres on the relation between 
utilitarian interests and norms, this Kantian influence appears real enough, 
although it progressively gave way to a more Freudian perspective; in regard 
to epistemology, the idea of a priori concepts in Parsons just does not make 
any sense, pace his later self-misunderstanding.
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theoretical position.8 With Durkheim, on the other hand, concurrently with a 
"collectivist" view of social life, according to which (at least in his 
interpretation) society would play a prominent whole, he stressed the 
interpenetration between social totalities and individuals. A common 
normative, therefore individually internalised system produced the basis 
whereupon this question found a solution. Parsons’s incomplete split with 
individualism was, nonetheless, manifest in his acceptance of Durkheim *s 
notion of society as a "sui generis reality". With that, against utilitarianism, he 
wished to ground a multidimensional sociological theory, with room for 
individual reflexive action, which would, however, be collectively structured 
by the internalisation of those norms. He read into Durkheim ideas that could 
barely be said to lie in his work, for Parsons introduced, clearly under 
Whitehead’s influence, a distinction between abstractly taken individuals and 
concretely aggregated individuals that would bring about "emergent 
properties", giving rise to social life.9 If that distinction is rather interesting, 
one should be ready to discard that notion of emergent properties, since it 
supposes previously given individuals who, by their aggregation, constitute a 
new reality. Parsons, in one and the same breath, assumed, and disposed of, 
the individual cherished by the Enlightenment, with its prior existence as to 
society.
Many years later this lasting view had occasion to come up once more 
when he dealt with the notion of interaction: Parsons was adamant on its
8T. Parsons, The Structure o f Social Action, p. 32 and chaps. V-VI.
9Idem, Ibid., chaps. VIII-XIX.
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paramount importance in the constitution of social life. Its peculiar character 
was not acknowledged, though, for it ended up being regarded as a mere 
outcome of the action of individuals given in advance, who come across each 
other in the social realm, an interpretation that has been severely criticised by 
some contemporary writers.10
The kernel of Parsons propositions at that first stage was produced by his 
reflection on the concept of unit act, which translated, analytically, the 
multidimensionality of social action, tying together actors, ends, situations 
(encompassing means and conditions of action) and norms. The last pages of 
The Structure of Social Action hinted at new and more complex issues, though, 
wherein those just mentioned problems became manifest. The concept of actor 
came then to the fore. According to Parsons, personalities comprise "nets of 
unit acts" (and the actor’s body was taken as a conditional element of the 
situation, with a Cartesian division between matter and mind lurking behind). 
At the same time, however, he stated that groups should be considered as 
systems of action and as actors. Both individual actors and groups were 
portrayed as possessing "emergent properties" - and organic character, they 
could be understood as the units of social systems, alongside unit acts. The 
problem is that these new collective units were demoted to "secondary 
descriptive schemes", always reducible to an elementary level - insofar as the 
passage from acts to personalities, and from these to groups, would operate
l0Idem, "Social Interaction" (1968), pp. 155-6 and 164-5. For a critique, 
which suffers from making a contraposition between system and life-world, see 
J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. 2, p. 301.
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through an aggregation carried out by the social scientist.11 It is hard not to 
view this supposition as in fact dissolving the organic internal nexus of 
personalities and groups, and even that of action as such.
At the core of his shortcomings lied an arguable distinction between 
analytical units - in fact ideally moulded - and analytical elements - which 
would be real, cutting across those fictitious units. According to this 
distinction, the former are individually given, whereas the latter are intertwined 
in reality. Unit acts belong in the first category, the elements that compose 
their structure in the second.12 Alfred Schutz seems to have been essentially 
wrong when he interpreted Parsons’ propositions as though they attached units 
to a concrete level and elements to an abstract one, to which the American 
sociologist retorted asserting their validity at both levels of analysis.13 His 
critique, and Parsons’ impatient answer, make clear that both should be viewed 
on the same plane of generality and on an equal analytical footing. Unit acts,
HT. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp. 746-7.
12Idem, Ibid., pp. 38-44.
13A. Schutz, "Parsons’ Theory of Social Action", in R. Grathoff, ed., op. 
cit., pp. 24-5, 64 and 74. Moreover, the postulation that action can be 
analytically broken down only by the actor is not a tenable one, contrary to 
what Schutz believed (pp. 37-43). We need to recognise, however, the process 
of abstraction that this operation inevitably represents, in any of the above 
listed cases, so that the atomism of the Enlightenment theory of perception is 
brushed aside together with its social individualist correlate, a point that eluded 
Parsons’ discussion. The idea that action is per se already a "system" (or, 
better put, an organic structure) and thus a concept that presupposes that of 
"element" is commendable. See N. Luhmann, "The Future of a Theory", in The 
Differentiation of Society, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. He, 
however, derives from this the unjustifiable thesis that the notion of subject 
should be entirely discarded; this does not prevent him from pointing to 
something such as "collective action", which is reminiscent of Parsons’ 
"collective actors". See Idem, Soziale Systeme, pp. 270ff.
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individual actors and collectivities are to be dealt with as elements of social 
systems, which can be taken isolatedly only inasmuch as we proceed the 
analytical breaking down of the whole to which they belong. This 
comprehension would have led Parsons further in his critique of individualistic 
thought, more deeply assuming Whitehead’s appraisal of Newtonian mechanics 
(closely related to the social atomism given pride of place in the social 
sciences firstly by Hobbes and later by others). Parsons fell short of taking this 
decisive step, for at the back of his mind the traditional concept of individual, 
so central to liberalism, still enjoyed a privileged place.
Unlike Whitehead, Parsons seems to have paid limited attention to 
contemporary physics, above all to quantum theory, and its essentially anti- 
atomistic thrust, although his second phase introduced ideas that moved in this 
direction. Whereas the relational characteristics of modem physics were taken 
up by Whitehead, the model that Hobbes had established, building upon 
Newton’s achievements, as cardinal to the social sciences was largely retained 
in Parsons. He could not, therefore, renounce individualism wholeheartedly.
The notion of "emergent properties" must receive part of the blame for this 
weakness, arising at least partially from the tendency towards individualism. 
It constitutes, in fact, despite its apparent rejection of atomism, a compromise 
with its most entrenched principle. The term itself hints at this accommodation, 
for if something "emerges" from something else it is this last dimension that 
underpins the "emergent" reality: the properties of social systems would, 
therefore, be a mere outcome of an underlying individual reality rather than an 
overall, specific - and, in this precise sense only, sui generis - feature of the
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interactive processes that constitute them. These properties should be broken 
down into their elements as well as social systems into individual actors solely 
in analytical terms. This would actually allow for the analytical "emergence" 
of the elements of social systems, in contrast to the individualistic tenets 
presupposed by the notion of "emergent properties". Nevertheless, we should 
not take this idea too far, since social systems* properties cannot be thought 
of without reference to the individuals and to the interactive and dialectical 
processes that produce them.
All the same, the collective dimension of "social action" held of Parsons’ 
attention thereafter, with a strong emphasis placed upon the active aspect of 
social systems. This problematic belongs, though, with the other intuitions that 
blossomed in his second phase. At this early stage however his formulation 
was utterly trapped within the polarisation of passive social totalities and 
active-reflexive individual actors, with no room for dialectics and blind to 
concepts of interaction. It was a while before he began to overcome these 
limitations.
II)SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND COLLECTIVE ACTORS
The Structure o f Social Action, a work in which are located the theses 
hitherto discussed, was published in 1937; Parsons’ next major book, The 
Social System, came out only in 1951. In the meantime he had published a 
series of articles, several of which touched upon social movements and social 
structure, issues closely related to the problem of collective subjectivity. He
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discussed class structure and social stratification in general; he examined the 
social structure of Germany in the period previous to the ascension of Nazism 
and the reasons which had led to the seizure of power by that movement as 
well as its own characteristics; during the war, working directly for the U. S. 
government, he worked on a planned change to the foundations of German 
society; he investigated the main features of Japanese social structure and 
analysed kinship, sex and age in the United States, paying heed also to the 
characteristics of the legal profession.14 This effort in terms of substantive 
research was, however, carried out on more modest theoretical bases, since as 
Parsons had not as yet crafted instruments that might enable him to grapple 
with collective subjectivities and he had to rely upon the ideas of previous 
sociologists. It was with that second crucial publication that he became 
equipped to answer those questions theoretically.
The architecture of this vast intellectual effort employed a manifold web 
of concepts. Parsons retained some essential traits of his first theoretical "frame 
of reference", which was transcended by means of some far-reaching 
alterations, though. A social system was characterised, in its simplest 
expression, as the interaction of a plurality of individual actors, motivated in 
terms of an "optimization of gratification" - but not its maximisation. 
Interactions take place in situations, defined at least partly in physical terms, 
counting, moreover, on a commonly shared and culturally structured "system 
of symbols". The new scheme thereby aspired to adopt a relational perspective,
14A11 these articles are gathered in T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological 
Theory, which includes, in its revised edition (herein quoted), a later discussion 
on MacCarthyism.
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although Parsons fastened upon the orientation, in given situations, of 
individuals - which were regarded, analytically, as the most elementary 
components of any system of action.15
But Parsons was quite keen to a double distinction. On the one hand, he 
characterised his actors both as a point of reference and as a system of 
action; in the first case, they constituted the main unit of analysis, whereas in 
the second they should be broken down into the actions that bring them about. 
The notion was reminiscent of the problem already discussed in the closing 
pages of The Structure of Social Action, for he once more spoke of 
"aggregation", although in the new version of his theory he seemed to move 
away from his prior semi-atomistic persuasion. A parallel distinction between 
individuals and collectivities was introduced, which hinged primarily on 
whether the actor that was taken as the point of reference was an individual 
or a social system.16
Individual actors, however, act according to their motivation, which was 
grasped by our author via the concept of "need-dispositions", wherein the first 
term brought out the personality’s necessity of equilibrium and the second 
stressed its volitional component. Both elements were said to work in terms of 
an inidividual’s "gratification-deprivation" balance; therewith we are introduced 
to a sort of renewed version of the utilitarian understanding of human actors.
15Idem, The Social System, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979 (1951), 
pp. 3ff.
16Idem, Ibid., p. 4, and T. Parsons and Edward A. Shils, "Values, Motives 
and Systems of Action", in T. Parsons, E. A. Shils et al., Towards a General 
Theory of Action, New York, Harper& Row, 1962 (1951), p. 56.
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It is imperative, though, that we underline the role played by cultural values, 
most certainly according to a culturalist reading of Freud: internalised, they 
channel the flux of energy of the organism, orienting the actors, positively or 
negatively, to the objects that comprise their situation; in the interactive 
process, culture furnishes the parameters - what he called the "pattem- 
variables" - to the relation between "ego" and "alter". Simultaneously, he 
traced a distinction between social systems, the systems of the personalities of 
the individual actors and the cultural systems enmeshed in their action. This 
is just an analytical distinction, insofar as the three of them would always be 
present in any concrete system of action.17
Parsons has often been accused of postulating a static view of society, 
conservatively concerned with the problem of order at the expense of the 
universe of change. The charge, though exaggerated, is warranted, less possibly 
for some of his central concepts per se, but rather because of twists he was 
prone to impinge on them - although the aesthetic character of a theory, in this 
case fashioned more according to stability than to change, has also political 
implications, since it evinces a specific sensibility. His general concept of 
interaction, grasped at first through what takes place between ego and alter, 
was, at least in principle, more flexible than those put forward by a good many 
others. He spoke about a "double contingency" that would be at the core of the 
relation between those two actors, whereby they would adjust themselves, and
17T. Parsons, The Social System, pp. 4-13, and T. Parsons, E. A. Shils et 
al., "Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: a General 
Statement", pp. 5-10, and T. Parsons and E. A. Shils, op. cit., p. 57, in T. 
Parsons, E. A. Shils et al.t op. cit.
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the norms that regulate their interaction, to each others expectations and actual 
behaviour. The shortcoming was produced by his quick shift towards rampant 
normative standarts as a solution for this fluidity that threatened to introduce 
too much indeterminacy in his theory.18
In order to account for the structural description of social systems, Parsons 
introduced a new group of categories in this intermediate period.19 The "unit 
of action" furnished the most basic category of his scheme - substituting the 
former "unit act": it would be even more elementary, since the actor’s 
expectations do not necessarily yield clearly expressed and pursued ends. No 
reference was, however, made to collective actors. The "role-status" category, 
chiefly aimed at "macrocoscopic" analyses, came next, in a higher order, 
insofar as the structure of the social system consists of the structure of the 
relations between the actors in interaction. But he devised two other units that 
could help with our analytical effort to break down the structure of the social 
system. These were the "individual" and the "collectivity". The former should 
not be mistaken for the personality, being composed of a group of statuses and 
roles; the latter, in turn, constituted the main axis of Parsons notion of 
collective subjectivity. We must expand on it at length now.
The collectivity was seen as a composite unity, as an actor and as an 
object to which other actors are oriented, and in whose centre is placed the
18T. Parsons, The Social System, pp. 36ff. In this same book (pp. 439ff),
the breakdown of boundaries and the instability potentially present in the 
doctor-patient relation were witness to this fluidity and Parsons’ attempt at 
overpowering it.
19T. Parsons, The Social System , pp. 8-9 and 25-6.
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role-status structure that articulates the actions of the individuals that make up 
the system. The individuals’ actions that are relevant for a specific social 
system must be distinguished from their other activities. In his joint reflections 
with Shils, Parsons was, moreover, quite keen on stressing that the definition 
of a collectivity implied "...the three properties of collective goals, shared 
goals, and of being a single system of interaction with boundaries defined by 
incumbency in the roles constituting the system...". These boundaries might, 
however, be latent; conversely, the stress put on the goals shared by the 
individuals that comprise the collectivity was absolute. The action of a 
collectivity was, therefore, defined as "the action in concert of a plurality of 
individual actors". Therein the integration of the members around a common 
system of values held centre stage, and their orientation towards the 
collectivity, rather than to their self-interest, was decisive for the establishment 
of the collectivity, guaranteeing its internal solidarity.20
They proposed two senses in a which a collectivity should be regarded as 
an actor:
l)as a social system in relation to a situation outside itself. In 
the most important case, the collective actor is a subsystem of 
the larger social system interacting as a unit with other 
subsystems and/ or individual actors (which are taken as objects 
of its situation). Viewed internally the collective actor must be
20T. Parsons and E. A. Shils, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action", 
in T. Parsons and E. A. Shils et al., op. cit., pp. 192-3. See also p. 180 of the 
same publication for more on the collectivity and on motivation.
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interpreted as a concert of actions and reactions of individual 
actors, and the conceptual scheme for its analysis will thus be 
that used for the analysis of social systems. The conceptual 
scheme used in the analysis of personality systems is hence 
inappropriate for the description of a collective actor. The 
mechanisms which explain the action of a collective actor are 
those of the social system, not of the personality. 2)A 
collectivity may be viewed as an actor when it is the point of 
reference for the action of an individual actor in a 
representative role.21
The effort they made to separate these collective actors from two other 
"types of social aggregates" is revealing of their commitment to the 
Enlightenment’s subject, an issue on which I shall concentrate below. The first 
denoted a "category of persons" who have some attribute in common, such as 
age, sex or education; it did not entail "action in concert". The second type 
consisted of a "plurality of persons who are merely interdependent with one 
another ecologically"; an ideally competitive market, for instance, would 
exemplify this sort of social system. An important differentiation between two 
kinds of social system had crept in, therefore, which nonetheless assumed 
greater prominence in the later phase of Parsons’ theorisation. They concluded 
their sketch of the collectivity as an actor describing the relationships of sub- 
collectivities within a "larger inclusive collectivity". They might be
21Idem, Ibid., p. 61.
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independent from each other, with no "overlapping" membership; they might 
overlap, sharing some members, but not all; and the smaller system might be 
utterly encompassed by the larger collectivity, the former perhaps constituted 
by the specification of role-expectations and actions that stem from the overall 
value-pattem of the latter. In this last case, we have what was known as the 
"onion-like" metaphor. They carried these ideas further, clinging to a most 
traditional notion, which also harked back to the Enlightenment, and put 
forward the thesis that a society (actually the social system delimited by the 
modem nation-state) must be treated as the "total social system", for it is self- 
subsistent.22
It should be evident at this stage that all the operations contemplated by 
Parsons in this second phase of his career demand a lot from analytical 
procedures. One could say that his understanding of what he used to call 
"analytical realism" was now deeper - action was treated as a system, to be 
then decomposed. The same is true as for collectivities and the groups of 
status-roles. It is arguable, however, the extent to which it is really warranted 
to lump all these concepts together, as if they belonged with one another. The 
"unit of action" - in precisely the same way as its antecessor, the "unit act" - 
as well as the status-role structures - are fictitious entities to be crafted by the 
researcher. The opposite obtains as for individuals and collectivities. Although 
one could support the idea that these two concepts may be construed as 
aggregations constructed by the social scientist, they in fact exist in concrete 
terms. The aim of the operation of abstraction is, therefore, different. These
22Idem, Ibid., pp. 193-6.
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two pairs of concepts - unit of action/ status-role and individuals/ collectivities 
- criss-cross each other, for they are defined in distinct levels of analysis and 
with a different ontological basis. On yet another plane we find the tripartite 
division of cultural system, social system and personality - which Habermas 
is right to criticise because it implies a reification of culture, which is detached 
from its concrete interactive settings, despite his own structuralist reification 
of the latter concept.23
It is necessary to attack Parsons’ version of collective subjectivity for its 
complete reliance upon the traditional model of the centred individual actor, 
which was transposed to the level of collectivities and unjustifiably entailed an 
anthropomorphic view of the social system.24 Shared collective goals and 
solidly defined boundaries - given by the presence of status-role structures - 
are ideas borrowed directly from the most traditional notions of individual 
subjectivity. Equally debatable is his refusal to allow for dispositions that 
would refer to collectivities. The same is true as for his reduction of collective 
dispositions to the motivations of individual agents. These two 
conceptualisations, in distinct ways, are dependent upon notions that stem from 
the Enlightenment. Whilst in the former the collective subject was crafted in
23J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. II, pp. 328-33 
and 355. One of Parsons’ original collaborators had already disagreed with this 
conceptualisation - see Richard C. Sheldon, "Some Observations on Theory in 
Social Sciences", in T. Parsons, E. A. Shils et al., op. cit.> p. 39. The main 
exponent of the neo-functionalist movement refuses, however, this critical 
attitude: J. C. Alexander, The Modern Reconstruction o f Classical Thought: 
Talcott Parsons, p. 349.
24Stephen Savage, The Theories o f Talcott Parsons, London, Macmillan, 
1981, pp. 191-2. He comments on the harmful repercussions of this step when 
the "polity" (see below) was honoured as the "collective mind of society".
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the mould of the individual actor, in the latter it was reduced, ontologically, 
to its individual component members. By this I do not mean to imply that 
collective subjectivities always possess clearly defined motivations, a thesis 
which is not, incidentally, very congenial to contemporary psychology even in 
individual terms. Rather, I wish to suggest, and later develop, the idea that 
collectivities - i.e. social systems - may develop certain collective impulses and 
put more or less clear goals to themselves. This is a contingent possibility, 
which hinges on the peculiar type of social system we happen to be focusing 
on and its situation at a specific stage.
Parsons’ commitment to the notion of the individual which, from Descartes 
and Hobbes on, has been one of the pillars of modem social theory, was 
plainly stated when he approached the concept of personality. He vigorously 
stressed the dimensions of integration and equilibrium. His emphasis on the 
role of the "superego" was symptomatic of his point of view; furthermore, he 
frowned upon Freud’s attempt at a deconstruction of individual subjectivity, 
as carried out in his division of the personality into the ego, the superego and 
the id. The unit, continuity and orderliness of the subject was assumed by 
Parsons as a core notion of the "sciences of action".25 At the level of 
collective subjectivity the implication of this approach was the confinement of 
the concept of actor to a specific type of collectivity.
25T. Parsons, "The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems" (1952), in 
T. Parsons, E. A. Shils and Robert F. Bales, Working Papers in the Theory of 
Action, Illinois, Free Press, 1953. Decentring of the subject (multiple selves 
and interactive formation), both in the individual and the collective level were, 
however, hinted at in Idem, "Cooley and the Problem of Internalization", in 
Albert Reiss, Jr., ed., Cooley and Sociological Analysis, Ann Harbor, The 
University of Michigan Press, 1968, pp. 59-62 and 65.
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Despite the wealth of suggestions, and especially the awareness of the 
problem he showed, Parsons tended to water down his notion of collective 
actor. Inasmuch as he rendered their subjectivity as the "concerted action" of 
their individual members, he could not help embracing once more the 
traditional dichotomy between passive social systems - society even, since, as 
we have seen, this was the most inclusive social system he recognised - and 
active individual actors. This is certainly the most severe obstacle to the 
utilisation of Parsons’ notion of collective subjectivity in the endeavour 
proposed by this study, and we must altogether reject it.26 If we need to 
reckon with the properties of social systems, there is no reason to insist on the 
idea that they should be reduced to their passive dimension. We should try to 
bridge the gap between passive systems and active individuals instead.
Robert Dubin27 had already pointed out inconsistencies in Parsons’ 
definition of collective actors, in particular in their relation to the so-called 
"pattern-variables", i.e. the concepts that establish the values that orient the 
actors in a certain situation. He showed the lack of links between these two 
concepts, which should produce no wonder if we bear in mind that Parsons
26It is not by chance that we can even observe Parsons’ students imagining 
to be faithful to the master, whilst simultaneously disposing of the concept of 
collective actor because of a commitment to methodological individualism. The 
outcome is a deformed reading of Parsons, encapsulated in the expression 
"institutional individualism", which, originally devised to interpret a specific 
phase of the social evolution of the West, is misused to supposedly describe 
the main thrust of his theory. The source of confusion lies in Parsons’ own 
work. See the misguided effort of Frangois Bourricaud, VIndividualism 
Institutionnel, (Vendone), Press Universitaires de France, 1977.
27Robert Dubin, "Parsons’ Actor: Continuities in Social Theory", in T. 
Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, pp.523-4.
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was prone to reduce these collectivities to the action of their individual 
members. What was certainly missing was a notion of interaction between 
collective subjectivities. The production of culture and its continuous 
transformation should be addressed at this level as well. The "onion-like" 
character of social systems - or even their only partial interpenetration - is, 
moreover, consistent with Hegel’s and Marx’s insights on the syllogism of the 
general, the particular and the singular, discussed in foregoing pages (chap. 
4.II).28 The multilayered and unevenly intertwined aspect of social systems 
in their ongoing interactive processes was highlighted in certain central 
passages of Parsons’ own writings.
A further problem in this regard concerns his view of social change. 
Notwithstanding the assumption that a "good theory" should be able to deal 
with processes of transformation within the system and processes of change of 
the system, he postulated a basic "law of inertia", which meant a basic 
theoretical stability of the patterns of "boundary-maintaining" systems. The 
"homeostasis" in relation to the environment, as in the case of biological 
organisms, was, therefore, adopted. Changes of the system were as yet hard to 
grasp for we lacked concepts that could appraise mutations of the patterns 
within the system. Empirical generalisations, descriptions and comparisons 
should be introduced to fill the gap.29
We can recall Dahrendorf’s critique and his suggestion of a sort of 
"structuration" theory that would substitute an approach that dwelt upon the
“ See M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, p. 14.
29T. Parsons, The Social System , pp. 480-6 and 534-5.
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fluid and changeable character of reality for Parsons’ perspective, focused, as 
it was, on ideas of "equilibrium".30 More interesting, perhaps, in the context 
of this study, is to note not only a sliding of the theoretical notion of 
equilibrium into empirical assumptions, but also to draw attention to the total 
disappearance of his onion-like scheme and the action of collectivities in his 
discussion of social change. Not even the analysis of Nazism and Soviet 
communism profited from these ideas: what stood out in his treatment was the 
pair passive systems and motivated individuals, despite references to the 
"charismatic movements" that brought about those historical changes.31 As 
will be seen, he later on reinforced the rigidity of such an approach.
Having said that, I want to recover Parsons’ interpretation of the concept 
of structure. In his opinion, structures would be devices, analytically designed 
by the researchers, according to the needs of their work. They do not possess, 
thus, an ontological, substantial reality.32 This seems to be a more appropriate 
definition of structure, very distinct from the one Giddens advances. It is much 
closer, on the other hand, to the ideal and operative models supported by 
Bourdieu. If we are dealing with collective subjectivity, its structure may be 
brought to the fore, in terms of an abstract model, conditional to the particular 
social system in focus and to the purposes of the inquiry. The structuring of
30Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: toward a Reorientation of Sociological 
Analysis", American Journal o f Sociology, v. LXIV, 1958 (517:527).
31T. Parsons, The Social System, pp. 520ff. A more flexible, though 
cursory, treatment is found in T. Parsons and E. A. Shils, op. cit., pp. 230-3.
32T. Parsons, "Some General Problems of Sociological Theory" (1970), in 
Social Systems and the Evolution o f Action Theory, p. 236.
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the social system, which stems from the social relations that obtain within it, 
can be therefore brought out by such a model.
III)FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY
A central component of this period of Parsons’ theorisation consisted of 
his use of "structural-functional" strategies. These would constitute handy 
devices, a "second best" alternative, for we could not as yet count on a 
developed system of deductive propositions similar to the one classical physics 
offered as a model. The main tools of the social scientist were, hence, the 
proposed "generalized categories" of analysis, alongside the definition of 
"mechanisms" that might permit the grasp of the functionality or 
disfunctionality of the motivational processes of the individual members of a 
social system for its maintenance or development. It would equip us with a 
paradigm that might enable great advancements, although it stopped short of 
providing a proper system of analytical categories and laws of the sort he 
yearned for already in his first book. The connections between individuals and 
social systems were, therefore, grasped in terms of the motivations of the 
former, through the mediation of culture, and its embodiment in the interactive 
network of the latter. The notion of "equilibrium" was essential to this sort of 
operation.33 It triggered off a long polemic in which "conflict theories" were 
played off against Parsons’ model.
33Idem, The Social System , pp. 36 and 481-3.
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It is feasible and to a great extent correct to suggest that functional 
analysis was not that important in this intermediate phase of Parsons* career; 
structural description was responsible for the bulk of the analytical work.34 
Subsequently, though, the relation was inverted, with negative consequences 
for Parsons* theory. He was rather explicit on the distinguished task the 
concept of function should perform in his final theory, discarding the 
expression "structural-functionalism" on behalf of a concentration on functional 
operations.35
Greek pre-Socratic cosmology imagined that the whole universe could 
have its most intimate secrets revealed through its reduction to four elements - 
earth, fire, water and air. Likewise, Parsons presumed he had found the key 
that would open the door to the thorough analysis of social life with the four 
functions of his AGIL scheme. The decisive inspiration for that stemmed from 
Robert Bales’ work on interactive processes in small groups. Parsons, Edward 
Shils and Bales endeavoured to bring their lines of thought together, with a fair 
amount of distortion and change to the original Parsonian concepts ensuing 
from this. Some writers consider that this last phase of Parsons looked from 
the system down to the actors, whereas the antecedent ones looked from the
■^Frangois Chazel, La Theorie Analytique de la Societe dans VOeuvre de 
Talcott Parsons, Paris, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes/ Mouton & Co., 
1979, pp. 89-91.
35See T. Parsons, "The Present Position and Prospects of Sociological 
Theory" and "The Prospects of Sociological Theory" (1950), in Essays in 
Sociological Theory.
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opposite direction.36 This is a reading which, however, is compatible only 
with an extremely individualistic conception of the actor (in which case, at any 
rate, Parsons would believe his scheme still to be valid).
At the heart of Parsons’ new approach we once more encounter the 
concept of equilibrium; whereby the notion of change implied imbalances that 
could be introduced from outside the system. From this basic idea he derived 
four analytical phases, which a system undergoes during an interval of time, 
once it is set in movement by an external impulse: A)the phase of adaptation, 
marked by "adaptive-instrumental" activity, whereby the system seeks to meet 
the demands of reality and the transformation of its external environment; 
G)the phase of goal-attainment, characterised by "expressive-instrumental" 
activity, associated with the attainment of the system’s aims and, therefore, 
with its "gratification"; I)the phase of systemic integration, wherein 
"expressive-integrative" activity has a key role to play, making the unity 
compact and demarcated vis-d-vis its environment; and L)the latency phase, 
in which "symbolic-expressive" activity comes to the fore and the maintenance 
of the motivational and cultural patterns is secured.37
The concepts of "inputs" and "outputs" supplied a new tool to the 
identification and explanation of a system’s activity, addressing the processes
36R. Dubin, op. cit., p. 530, and J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns, B. II, pp. 387ff.
37T. Parsons, E. Shils and R. Bales, "Phase Movement in Relation to 
Motivation, Symbol Formation and Role Structure" and T. Parsons and R. F. 
Bales, "The Dimensions of Action-Space", in Working Papers in the THeory 
of Action, pp. 164-5 and 138ff, respectively. The definition of these phases was 
linked to a reinterpretation of the pattem-variables developed by Parsons.
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of disequilibration and equilibration, and leading up to the interchange theory, 
which grappled with the trade between the system and its environment. The 
former referred to the contributions that come either from outside the system 
or from the erstwhile phase; the latter alluded either to the state of the system 
or to its situation at the end of a phase or else of the process as whole.38 
Later on he introduced into his systems’ theory the notion of cybernetic 
hierarchy, whereby those phases or functions that compose the AGIL scheme 
stood in a relation of control and flow of energy. Those rich in information 
were placed at the top of the hierarchy of control, whereas those rich in energy 
were assigned the bottom of this edifice, despite, at least in principle, although 
not in Parsons’ subsequent formulations, their equal importance for the general 
process.39
The riddle of social change was to be at last solved with recourse to the 
new functional method, which would afford the knowledge of processes within 
the system. The notion of "inputs" was instrumental in this case: in spite of 
oscillations, he attributed the changes of the system to sources outside or
38T. Parsons, E. Shills and R. F. Bales, op. cit., pp. 215ff.
39T. Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System", in T. Parsons et al., 
Theories o f Society, New York, Free Press, 1961, pp. 30-7. Even his main 
follower today has, thus, to acknowledge the "sociological idealism" coupled 
with Parsons’ attempt at a multidimensional social theory. See J. C. Alexander, 
The Modern Reconstruction o f Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons, pp. 152, 
212, 219 and 273. It should be clear that the phases of the AGIL scheme, 
originally drawn in terms of the movement of a system, tended henceforth to 
be treated basically in static terms. For more on his final version of systems’ 
theory, consult T. Parsons, "Social Systems" (1968), in Social Systems and the 
Evolution o f Action Theory.
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inside it, i.e. derived from its previous situation.40 Thereby he moved away 
from an exclusive concentration on internal processes (in principle making 
room for external contingent influences). This did not mean, regrettably, that 
he appreciated the interactive dimension of social systems, on which I shall 
insist later on.
With this theoretical asset, Parsons not only undertook to explain social 
systems, but also applied his now completely developed functional premises 
to the relations between social, cultural and personality systems and the 
"behavioral (biological) organism" (later reshaped as the "behavioral system"). 
Taking his ambition and formalism to astonishing heights, he tried even to 
include the human condition and physiological processes within his scheme. 
These are efforts that need not to be analysed here. We must focus our 
attention on how his collective actors related to this new paradigm.
Already the notion of collective actor had presented problems to which 
Parsons was oblivious. The power the AGIL scheme was endowed with just 
made things more complicated. Hitherto the concepts of collectivity and 
collective actor were virtually identical: they were synonymous with each 
other. Thereafter this was true no longer. The conflation between the analytical 
level - wherein the functions were warranted - and the concrete level, as
40T. Parsons, R. F. Bales and E. A. Shils, "Phase Movement in Relation to 
Motivation, Symbol Formation and Role Structure", pp. 164 and 215. On the 
other hand, the concept of "adaptation", though subordinated to his growing 
"sociological idealism", took on a key role in the explanation of change in 
evolutionary terms. See T. Parsons, Societies. Evolutionary and Comparative 
Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 20ff.
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Alexander argued clearly occurred widely in Parsons’ last phase,41 wrought 
havoc in his formulations. In collaboration with Neil Smelser, Parsons 
distinguished social systems from collectivities: that first concept encompassed 
the second, but the reverse did not hold true. Therefore,
A social system...is any system generated by the interaction of 
two or more behaving units.
In contrast,
A collectivity, on the other hand, is a special type of social 
system which is characterized by the capacity for ’action in 
concert’. This implies the mobilization of the collectivity’s 
resources to attain specific and usually explicit goals; it also 
implies the formalization of decision-making processes on 
behalf of the collectivity as a whole...The formal organization 
(e.g., a bureaucracy in the widest sense) is the prototype of such 
a system 42
The economy, the subject of their book, was, as a consequence of that, 
conceived of as a social system, but not as a collectivity. It was seen as a
41J. C. Alexander, The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: 
Talcott Parsons, p. 192.
42T. Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society, London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1956, pp. 14-5.
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subsystem of society, differentiated in terms of its specialised functions, a 
quality it shared with the other subsystems Parsons later conceptualised - the 
"polity", the "societal community" and the "pattem-maintenance" system.43 
A collectivity, in turn, was supposed to be always "multi-functional", 
notwithstanding the fact that some collectivities might have primarily 
economic functions. On other occasions he completed his depiction of 
collectivities as social systems that fulfil two other criteria - clarity in terms 
of membership status and internal differentiation of statuses and functions.44
He proceeded, then, with an analysis of formal organisations, confirming 
his general postulation. They included a range of collectivities such as 
governmental bureaucracies or departments, business firms, hospitals, 
universities, etc. A family was only in part an organisation and other kinship 
groups even less so, the same obtaining as for local communities, society as 
a whole, etc.; informal working groups, cliques of friends, etc., did not exit as 
organisations.45 He confused the issue, however, when he treated elementary 
and secondary schools - supposedly organisations - as "agencies" that act 
having as a "primary function" the socialisation of individuals and the 
allocation of human resources in society, singling out the class room as the
43For this notions, see Idem, Ibid., chaps. 1-2, and T. Parsons, "An Outline 
of the Social System", pp. 34ff.
44T. Parsons, The System o f Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- 
Hall, 1971, p. 8.
45Idem, "A Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations", in 
Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Illinois, (Glencoe), The Free Press, 
1960; on the family, see his "The American Family: its Relation to Personality 
and to the Social Structure" (1956), in T. Parsons et al., Family, Socialization 
and Interaction Process, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.
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place wherein this process in fact occurs. He recognised, moreover, peer 
groups with "fluid boundaries" as relevant for this process as well.46
This was an awkward statement. It tended to blur the distinctions that 
Parsons was at pains to establish. It put in question also an element which, 
already present since the fifties, took on a major importance with the 
burgeoning influence of biology in his work during his final years. Following 
the lead of the physiologist Lawrence J. Henderson, he regarded social systems 
as "living organisms", differentiated from their environment by means of 
boundaries, which they must maintain so as to secure their equilibrium - 
understood as "homeostasis" at this stage - and continuity 47 If collectivities 
demand clear goals and decision-making centres, social systems necessarily 
imply a clear-cut separation from their environment and a compact internal 
constitution.
It is amazing to observe how much Parsons was a prisoner of the most 
traditional concept of actor and of a similar conception of society. His 
collectivities were built very much after the model of a purposive, reflexive 
and centred subject; his concept of social system was, likewise, embedded in 
this tradition, for it also implied similar principles of constitution, given by the 
attributes brought out through his AGIL scheme. Adaptation, goal-attainment, 
integration and latency reproduced, in a slightly different manner, respectively 
the attempts at mastering the situation in which a collectivity "acts", in order
46Idem, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions", in 
Social Structure and Personality, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1964.
47Idem, "On Building Social Systems Theory: a Personal History" (1971), 
in Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, pp. 27-8.
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to achieve clearly stated goals, plus the solidity and reflexibility, associated 
with decision-making centres, that typify these collective subjectivities.48 A 
fundamental dissimilarity was yielded, however, by the causality these two 
categories exhibit. Whereas collectivities were seen as causally active, social 
systems defined in terms of the AGIL scheme were deemed passive, unless we 
credit functional statements with onto-teleological qualities, rather than with 
methodological, counter-factual status. Parsons himself, except occasionally, 
was not prone to assume the first alternative. Furthermore, he recognised that 
functional explanations do not demand, in fact tend to put off, causal 
connections49 - especially if they are thought out in terms of efficient impact. 
His realisation of the importance of collective subjectivity nonetheless 
prevented him from completely neglecting his former collective actors, which, 
even so, received diminished attention. The theory of evolution he sketched out 
in his last years was witness to the distorting reverberations of the all- 
embracing application of the AGIL scheme.50
A number of Parsons’ students and more recent neo-functionalists have 
shown a much more subtle understanding of this issue, in concrete terms only, 
though, for they have not addressed the underlying theoretical shortcoming in
48It is interesting to notice that Parsons characterised American culture and 
society in terms of an "activist" ethos, according to which individuals strive to 
master their environment rather than adjust passively to it. Cf. Idem, "A 
Tentative Outline of American Values" (1959 or 1960), in Roland Robertson 
and Bryan S. Turner, eds., Talcott Parsons, Theorist of Modernity, London, 
Sage, 1991.
49T. Parsons, "Cause and Effect in Sociology", in Daniel Lemer, ed., Cause 
and Effect, New York, Free Press, 1965, pp. 66-7.
50Idem, Societies and The System of Modern Society, both passim.
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regard to collectivities that informed the flawed final conception Parsons 
advanced with such confidence. Although they have often concentrated on 
what Alexander defines as more "intermediate" levels of analysis, in which 
groups and collectivities are of outstanding and immediate significance, they 
neglect the central question I have been trying to highlight.51
Had Parsons sustained a broader and looser conception of subjectivity 
there would have been no need for such clear-cut separation between those 
concepts. More specifically, the social systems that do not follow the centring 
that distinguishes "formal organizations" - such as the economy, the polity, the 
pattern maintenance system and the social community, leaving aside the 
validity of this particular conceptualisation - could, and should, be 
characterised as collective subjectivities. In spite of their decentring, they exert 
their collective causality in very much the same way those others do, 
irrespective of the lesser level of intentionality, that is of final causality, they 
possess. Moreover, he would have no reason to overlook Marx’s notion of 
social classes as collective subjectivities, for him a mere aspect of the 
structural stratification of society. With these closing remarks we tread beyond 
the limits of Parsonianism and head out on the path we must now follow in 
order to arrive at a transformed notion of collective subjectivity.
51See J. C. Alexander, The Modern Reconstruction o f Classical Thought: 
Talcott Parsons, p. 194; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Institutionalization and 
Change", American Sociological Review, v. 29, 1964 (375:386); and also 
several of the papers amassed in J. C. Alexander, ed., Neofunctionalism, 
Beverly Hills, Sage, 1985, plus J. C. Alexander and Paul Colomy, eds., 
Differentiation Theory and Social Change, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1990.
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PART m
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY
INTRODUCTION: THEORY AND SYNTHESIS
Having looked at the main syntheses in contemporary sociological theory 
and the two main theories of collective subjectivity in the social sciences, the 
final stage of this study will attempt to rework some central themes that are 
present in these two broad strands. A synthesis of those two theories, Marx’s 
and Parsons’ conceptions of collective subjectivity, will be undertaken. 
Furthermore, I shall make an effort to integrate the chief elements we find in 
the work of Giddens and Habermas, but also in other contributions to 
sociological theory, some of which display a synthetical ambition. 
Contemporary authors, who have tackled the concepts of collective actor or 
similar notions will be focused on in the course of the discussion. The concept 
of collective subjectivity thereby produced will, moreover, demand that some 
other contributions are brought into play, especially those related to the idea 
of the "decentring" of the subject as well as certain reflections that will assist 
in a further development of my conceptualisation.
Instead of a mechanical and abstract synthesis, which would just 
amalgamate Marx’s and Parsons’ approaches, the one proposed herein will, on 
the contrary, imply a broadening of the concept of collective subjectivity, 
which will not simply consist of a Hegelian "negation of the negation". Rather, 
it will be pursued with recourse to what Bachelard referred to as the opening 
up of concepts, for they need to be brought to another, higher level of
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generality.1 The concepts of social class and collective actor will be, 
consequently, encompassed by a more general one, the concept of collective 
subjectivity, which will allow not only for the causality of these two types of 
social system, but for the full range of collectivities we can find in social life.
Alexander, however, embraces an excessively blunt mechanism, which 
would govern such processes of synthesis, so as to arrive at an "objective 
logic" that would warrant the autonomous development of theoretical 
sociology.2 I regard as mistaken his conception of theory as entirely 
independent of more empirically oriented domains of social science. For him, 
there would be just a movement of specification from the more general to the 
less general levels of theorisation (despite his acceptance that the less general 
levels produce new data),3 hypothesis that lends an abstract and in the end 
epistemologically idealistic flavour to his view.4 Marx had already targeted
1G. Bachelard, La Philosophie du Non, pp. 30-3 and 137. I move in the 
direction of what could be characterised as a process of "abstraction" and 
"generalisation". See also Jean Piaget and Rolando Garcia, Psychogenesis and 
the History of Science, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989 (1983), 
p. 270. They put forward the concept of "reflective abstraction" for the 
operation earned out herein. A more "empirically oriented" discussion - 
original source of inspiration for this research, and finally "middle-range" 
outcome - that has concretely handled the concept of collective subjectivity is 
found in my "A Amdrica. Intelectuais, Interpreta^Ses e Identidades", Dados, 
v. 35, 1992 (267:289).
2J. C. Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, v. 1, pp. 114ff.
3Idem, Ibid., p. 4.
4That happens, to a great extent, because he works basically within a 
Kuhnian framework, wherein the connection between empirical data and 
theoretical reasoning is totally one-sided.
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this sort of operation, in its original Hegelian version,5 and I regard his 
critique as relevant to Alexander’s standpoint: general theories are totalities, 
however sometimes heterogeneous, that ought not to be thought of in utter 
separation from empirical inputs. They have their own internal logic and 
development, but must be open to empirical imports which have a central role 
to play in their formation and change. Middle range theories, in particular 
when already concerned with theoretical problems, can be especially useful to 
connect general theories with empirical progress.
I support, nevertheless, a relative autonomy to the theoretical realm. It is 
in this space of relative autonomy that this study originates. It must be clear, 
at any rate, that the perspective of general theory worked out here is at the 
opposite pole to a Kantian, "foundational" attitude towards general theory.6 To 
be sure, Marx’s discussion on the social classes is directly empirically oriented, 
as is Parsons’ collective actor, built in part after the model of organisations. 
Other writers will be reviewed who also bring up some important empirical 
questions. I shall resort to some middle range theories and moreover make use 
of some concrete, though imaginary, examples in order both to help develop, 
via inductive insights, the theory of collective subjectivity and facilitate the 
understanding of my ideas.
5K. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, pp. 21-2.
6For a critique of such foundational attitude, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy 
and the Mirror o f Nature, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. However, contrary 
to Rorty, I espouse a realist perspective, which should be seen in relation to 
an idea of "research programmes" that precludes "instant" falsification or 
induction.
211
I shall start by proposing some basic conceptual definitions in chapter six, 
which will bring together some of the main strands of contemporary 
sociological theory, although they will receive a formulation which I regard as 
more interesting. I must proceed then to tackle two other tasks. The term 
"constitution" has been recently utilised by Giddens to underline the ongoing 
processes that characterise the existence of social systems in general. I will 
attach to it a further meaning, which is intended to bring out the main elements 
whereof they are made up. This was the main thrust of Parsons’ AGIL scheme, 
supposedly multidimensional, but in fact impaired by a sort of sociological 
idealism, as Alexander clearly perceived, and completely connected to a very 
traditional notion of subjectivity. Moreover, Parsons cast his theory in a 
functionalist mould, lumping together issues that belong to different realms, 
such as intentionality and causality (goal-achievement), identity and centring 
(integration) and the constitution of those systems as such (adaptation and 
latency) (see chap. 5.III). Chapter seven will dwell at length upon those two 
first matters, lending them a thoroughly distinct perspective, and turn them into 
contingent possibilities. Chapter eight will concentrate on the remaining 
elements, on space-time, resources and social stratification. Finally, a typology 
and a controlling frame of reference will be proposed in the conclusion, which 
will be applied with respect to the impact of Protestant sects in the emergence 
of modem society. The concept of social systems as collective subjectivities 
will remain throughout the core of my reasoning.
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CHAPTER SIX
INTERACTION, SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE
I)A CONCEPT OF INTERACTION
We very often come across definitions of the elementary units of analysis 
in the social sciences as consisting of individual actors, as in the propositions 
of methodological individualists, or of types of action, as in Weber’s case 
(despite his intuition that relations between actors are focus of social processes 
for social scientists), or of "unit acts", as suggested by Parsons (see chap. l.III- 
IV and chap. 5.1). Although these may be useful approaches to the analytical 
breaking down of social phenomena, I shall follow Marx and deem interaction 
the "cell", the "elementary form" for the analysis of social life. As we have 
seen (in chap. 4.III), in its reified commodity expression under capitalist 
conditions, it received a privileged place in his approach to the analytical study 
of that mode of production. I therefore agree also with other authors such as 
Georg Simmel and Jonathan Turner, who hold a similar point of view.1 It is 
by fastening upon interactions that we can understand individuals’ behaviour 
and action; otherwise we are caught up in the same dilemmas first faced by 
individualists of different kinds and even by Parsons, when he tried, after his 
analysis of the unit act, to move on and investigate broader features of social 
life.
More precisely, I regard the "dyad", already focused on by Simmel,2 as
1J. Turner, A Theory o f Social Interaction, p. vii.
2G. Simmel, "The Dyad" (1908), in The Sociology of George Simmel (ed. 
by Kurt H. Wolff), Glencoe, Free Press, 1950, especially pp. 122-5. He was 
predisposed, however, to treat the dyad more substantively than analytically, 
the inverse of the case with Parsons, for whom it laid the ground for the 
examination of some of the most elementary aspects of interaction in general.
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the most basic unit of sociological analysis, the most elementary form of 
interaction, which can be found in a clear-cut form exclusively by means of 
abstraction. Interactions in general can be dealt with in isolation as abstractions 
only, since it is their intertwining that constitutes social life.
Ego and alter establish "figurations", networks of relations and 
"interdependency", wherein the basic properties of social interaction are 
present. From this elementary relationship we can derive other figurations, 
making use of personal pronouns.3 "I" and "you", in the singular, comprise, 
therefore, the elementary dyad. Once the "you" or the "I" (which becomes 
"we") are treated as plural pronouns, there comes about an expansion of the 
interactive web. One person composing the "I" vis-d-vis two composing the 
"you" - or vice versa - establish a figuration wherein collective subjectivity is 
already present. An enlargement of the interaction entails, firstly, an expansion 
of both the "we" and the "you". And, with one further step, we arrive at the 
appearance of the "it", "she", "he" and "they" pronouns, by means of which 
other figurations may be assessed within the relation between ego and alter.4
As has been so often stated recently, the ego is constructed in the course 
of interactive processes. We must be attentive also to the difference between 
the way people are seen and interpreted by those with whom they interact and
See Donald Levine, Simmel and Parsons: Two Approaches to the Study o f 
Society, New York, Amo, 1980, pp. 107-13.
3See Norbert Elias, What is Sociology?, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1978 (1970), pp. 123ff.
4We will see further on that these figurations do not necessarily experience 
complete or even, in a border case, partial consciousness. At this elementary 
level this lack of awareness is, though not impossible, more unlikely to occur.
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the way they reflect upon their own identity. Mead reserved the pronoun "I" - 
whereby the individual, the "me" is able to reflect upon him or herself - for 
this reflexive process.5 This insight can be widened to deal with the plural 
"we", if we expand one of the poles of the figuration in which now two or 
more individuals are included and exert a joint action. The "we", moreover, 
should be usually thought of reflexively, for, apart from moments of total 
conflation of the "I" and the "me", and thus of a direct identification of the 
individual with the group6, there is a certain distance between the singular self 
and the inclusive figuration in which it belongs. Otherwise we would be 
presented an utterly undifferentiated totality, with absolutely no space for 
individual autonomy, or exactly a "collective mind", which entails the 
problems I pointed out when discussing Habermas’ view of "archaic" societies 
(in chap. 3.II).
I want at this stage to highlight the fact that when speaking of interaction 
I am referring essentially to face-to-face relations. These necessarily imply co- 
presence (although electronic media, telephones and the like have effected a 
certain change to this characterisation). Diverse relationships can be brought 
under this rubric, inasmuch as they share that basic trait. Face-to-face relations
5G. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 174ff.
6Idem, Ibid., p. 273.
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comprise interactions7 of a fleeting nature or of a more recurrent character. To 
discuss other types of interaction, further elaboration will be required.
II)PROPERTffiS AND ELEMENTS OF INTERACTION
Certain properties need to be reckoned with when we address interactions. 
They will be taken up again when I introduce a more fully-fledged concept of 
social system. A minimal assessment of those properties must, however, be 
carried out now with respect to face-to-face interactions. We can say, thus, that 
interactions possess a "hermeneutic" and a "material" as well as a "space-time" 
dimension; they are endowed with a peculiar type of causality, namely a 
collective one; and they are often, though not necessarily, hierarchically 
stratified. As Georges Gurvitch noted, this sort of "micro" phenomenon is 
already "total". As Goffman put it, face-to-face relations constitute "a little 
social system".8 We may uphold Goffman’s position to an extent, moreover, 
when he makes use of the differentiation between situated and situational
7Goffman’s typology, developed for public spaces, is probably the best one 
available regarding face-to-face relations. He lists "gatherings" (two or more 
people directly in mutual presence), "situations" (when basic "mutual 
monitoring" in a spatial environment takes place) and "social occasions" (a 
"wider social affair", delimited in time and space). Alongside this, he speaks 
of "focused" and "unfocused" interaction. E. Goffman, Behavior in Public 
Places, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 18-9 and 24. See, for a transformed 
version of this typology, A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. 70ff.
8Georges Gurvitch, "Probleme de Sociologie Generale", in G. Gurvitch, 
ed., Traite de Sociologie, 1.1, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, p. 
172; E. Goffman, Behavior in Public Places, p. 243. It is unlikely, though, that 
they are, in principle, more flexible than larger ones, contrary to Gurvitch’s 
view.
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aspects: whereas the former refers to anything occurring within the interaction, 
the latter points to what belongs exclusively to a specific situation.9 Provided 
we do not accept this distinction as a concrete and rigid one, for social life is 
created and reproduced in interactive processes, values, norms, language, 
stratification and so forth can be assessed with this analytical device in mind. 
Otherwise we revert to a problematic similar to that of the structuralist 
distinction between langue and parole, assuming a particular instance of the 
"fallacy of misplaced concreteness".
The hermeneutic dimension has received great attention: symbolic 
interactionists and dramaturgists, phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists 
have consistently pondered it. With synthetical ambitions, Turner amalgamated 
these contributions and proposed a set of elements that can comprehensively 
answer to this dimension.10 Humans use gestures to signal their respective 
lines of conduct and convey general information. "Imaginative rehearsal" and 
"deliberative capacity" are faculties with which competent actors are equipped, 
which they bring to fruition making use of their "stocks of knowledge" and 
operations of "indexability" that render precise the meaning of gestures in 
particular contexts. Role taking and framing, staging and ritualisation, claiming 
and accounting for the common world, are central processes in the course of 
interactions.
The "material" dimension, conversely, apart from important remarks on the 
role of peoples’ bodies and interactive "settings", has remained unattended,
9E. Goffman, Behavior in Public Places, pp. 21-2.
10J. Turner, op. cit., pp. 74ff and 102ff.
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whereas the organisation of space and time has received more of the attention 
it deserves.11 Humans not only interact within "settings" wherein they "stage" 
their conduct. In fact, interaction must not be reduced to individual actors or 
even to the symbolic universe supposed and (re)produced in the unfolding of 
their relations. Interactive processes are constituted by material features of 
transformed nature - to start with by our bodies, but also by the manifold 
elements of lodging and clothing, transportation and instruments, all of which 
are intertwined with the behaviour of individuals. Space and time in natural 
terms also belong with the material elements mentioned above; the space-time 
constitution of interaction - that is how interactions receive configuration and 
rhythms of unfolding - should be, however, viewed as one more dimension to 
grapple with.
The more general features of social stratification are present in interaction. 
However, those actually present in face-to-face relations do not necessarily fit 
neatly into what could be taken abstractly (i.e. structurally - see below) to be 
those broader layers. Moreover other, specific inequalities are possibly 
spawned in the micro situation as such.12 And, above all, in part due to the 
pervasive individualism and nominalism that reigns in "micro" theorising, that 
peculiar type of (collective) causality has not been scrutinised, even though it 
is presupposed by the discussion developed by writers such as Nobert Elias
"See especially the commentary on Goffman’s work in A. Giddens, 
"Erving Goffman as a Systematic Social Theorist", in Social Theory and 
Modern Sociology.
12E. Goffman, "The Interaction Order", American Sociological Review, v. 
48, 1983 (1:17), pp. 5-6 and 14-6.
219
when examining groups’ figurations.13 In order to avoid repetition, I shall 
leave these issues aside for a deeper conceptual analysis in later sections of 
this study. It is necessary to stress, however that common routines are often 
crucial for the reproduction of social relations and processes. Of course, the 
greater the preeminence and the higher the positions of the individuals in the 
social hierarchy, the less trivial the interactive settings and the processes in 
which they are involved. Their horizons of life and experience may be broader; 
their "everyday life" is likely to have distinct contents and influence in large 
measure other interactive processes. All the same, across history and social 
layers, the basic, general features of interaction are always, invariably present. 
A King and a plebeian live in different worlds, but their common social 
humanity is in part affirmed by this general ontological condition.14
Interaction hinges also on the motivations that establish the foundations of 
individual behaviour within them. Turner seems to be correct when he 
observes that the concept of needs, very much used by early sociologists, 
having gone out of favour, ended up being reintroduced into sociological 
theory by the "backdoor". In order to remedy this situation, he undertakes a 
typologisation of "need states" that energise interactions.15 He tells us about 
"needs for the group" and "group inclusion", which stem from expectations 
connected to "cooperative activities"; he speaks about "needs for self­
13N. Elias, op. cit., pp. 80ff.
14A. Heller, Everyday Life, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984 (1970),
p. 6.
15J. Turner, op. cit., pp. 24ff.
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confirmation", identity construction and sustenance; he draws attention to 
"needs of symbolic and material gratification"; he sheds light on our "needs for 
facticity", of "making sense of a common world"; and, finally, Turner brings 
to the fore our "needs for ontological security", a certain amount of 
predictability and possibility of anxiety management. At more concrete levels 
we could speak about political, economic, cultural, sexual needs and so forth.
How to grapple with the "double contingency" of interaction so strongly 
emphasised by Parsons, whose concern became the core of much of 
ethnomethodology’s inquiry into how people guarantee a minimum amount of 
agreement about common goals, shared beliefs, meanings and perspectives?16 
How to understand the recurrent Goffmanian appraisal of the cynical and 
manipulative behaviour of people during the staging of their interactive 
performances?17 Finally, how to explain why daily interactions do not 
demand the problematisation of the claims to truth, normative adequation, 
veracity and sincerity, which, according to Habermas, are continuously 
presupposed by actors in the enactment of their quotidian interactions (see 
chap. 3.n)? Not infrequently actors do not share the same goals and
16See chap. 5.II and H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, pp. 30-4.
17See particularly E. Goffman, The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life, 
passim. I do not mean by this to extrapolate from the middle class groups 
which, having relinquished the Protestant normative core of social 
commitments that informed American culture and were left with a more pliable 
ego and a straightforward utilitarianism, furnish the subject for Goffman’s 
investigations - as A. Gouldner (The Coming Crisis o f Western Sociology, p. 
381) has, for example, insisted on. Goffman’s studies have, however, 
challenged a lot of "normative" assumptions in sociological theory.
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perspectives; in fact, they often adopt false pretences in order to attain their 
objectives. As Goffman observed,
Effective cooperation in maintaining expectations implies 
neither belief in the legitimacy or justice of abiding by a 
convention contract in general..., nor personal belief in the 
ultimate value of the particular norms that are involved.18
A solution to this apparent social paradox may be provided by the 
recognition that individuals with different needs, who come across and interact 
with one another, do not necessarily care for the actual intention of those with 
whom they deal with, inasmuch as they are able to secure the realisation of 
their aims. A certain degree of pragmatism seems to be unavoidable for a 
smooth passage of individuals through their daily interactive settings. This 
possible pragmatic acceptance of norms and patterns characterises an attitude 
that calls for classification under the title of instrumental or - to be fair to 
Habermas’ categorisation - strategic action. It could be said to be rational, 
since actors can produce justifications for their conduct,19 but it can also be, 
as in this case, purely manipulative. At any rate, it does not imply a more 
thorough and consistent commitment of the actor to the values that structure 
the interaction; nor is it obligatory that actors are in fact deceived - contrary
18E. Goffman, "The Interactive Order", p. 5.
19J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 170-1.
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to what Habermas presumes.20 Although they may accept the other’s 
"presentation", there is no reason to conclude that they naively take it at face 
value, even though they may refrain from making use of "discursive" 
procedures that might, as Habermas observes, check the actual meaning of the 
situation and the perspective of the participants. It goes without saying that 
certain relations, in particular those which involve trust, depend much more 
on the veracity of self-presentation and on more or less consensual 
constructions and the following of common norms. For all that, a general 
assessment of interactions demands a separation of "norms" of interaction from 
motivation and related dispositions to act in terms of interests and values.
The suggested claim that Habermas’ notion of communication as 
understanding is only partially tenable (discussed in chap. 3.II) can be now 
more consistently substantiated. Social interaction by no means entails the 
necessity or desire of coming to any sort of agreement. Individuals in face-to- 
face interaction (or for that matter, in any type of interactive process) must 
adapt to or counter their partners’ moves, joining or hindering them, even if 
they seek agreement. It should be clear, however, that "individuals 
sympathetically take the attitude of others present, regardless of the end to 
which they put the information thus acquired".21 Besides, it can be safely 
stated that we call a halt to our interpretations of others in daily life "...when
20Idem, Ibid., v. I, p. 141.
21E. Goffman, Behavior in Public Places, p. 16.
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we have found enough to answer our practical questions", since daily attitude 
is in principle "pragmatically determined".22
In order to address this issue more cogently, I want to introduce a clear 
analytical distinction between rules and norms. Accordingly, cognitive 
capacities must be neatly separated from internalised patterns. The forms of 
sanction connected to these behavioural regulations are, moreover, of different 
kinds.
Initially Habermas’ treatment of this issue conflated these distinctions. 
Speaking of role-taking competence, he equated cognitive competence to the 
socialisation and the normative make-up of biological individual actors.23 
Progressively, as he drew more carefully upon Piaget, he came to categorise 
interactive competence in terms of a threefold differentiation - moral 
evolution, cognitive and linguistic competencies.24 This did not mean, 
however, a possibility of actual sustained distancing of individuals from social 
normativity. Departing from a neo-Kantian perspective, Habermas still holds 
fast to a perception of norms as necessarily internalised by actors - he even 
suspects that there are no limits to the socialisation of human inner nature;25
22A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1967 (1932), p. 38.
23J. Habermas, "Stichworte zu einer Theorie der Sozialisation" and 
"Notizen zum Begriff der Rollenkompetenz", in Kultur und Kritik, respectively 
pp. 118 and 195.
^Idem, "Notizen zur Entwicklung der Interaktionkompetentz", in 
Vorstudien und Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, p. 
224.
“ J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismusy pp. 63-4. His 
commentators influenced by psychoanalysis denounce in this position,
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what has essentially changed is that now he considers as possible that at a 
certain stage of the moral evolution of society, as the autonomisation of 
individuals advances they become able to question the validity of certain 
norms, counting on expanding reflexive powers.26 This explains why he is not 
really willing and prepared to tackle issues such as those thrown up by 
Goffman.
The historically dated character of a perspective that stresses the 
internalisation of norms has been illuminated by Richard Morse, who has 
contrasted to it the Iberian tradition and shown how much that normative thrust 
owes to the Protestant notion of conscience, with the establishment of the new 
locus of morality and sovereignty in the individual. Parsons is an explicit 
example of this deep-seated presupposition.27 In that other Western tradition, 
according to Morse, norms remained much more external to individuals. That 
normative tenet is pretty clear in Habermas’ case, but by no means does this 
hold true even for more utilitarian offshoots of Western culture, as Hobbes and 
Parsons were cognizant of, notwithstanding the latter’s eager espousing of the 
normative dimension so as to avoid a mere instrumental view of the social
however, a loss in comparison to the early Frankfurt School, for which a 
conflict between individual and society was in the last instance unbridgeable. 
See J. Whitebook, "Reason and Happiness: some Psychoanalytic Themes in 
Critical Theory", in R. Bernstein, ed., Habermas and Modernity.
26Originally, see J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, 
p. 122; more recently, the whole "Einleitung" to his Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns (B. I, pp. 15-195) is dedicated to this issue, which 
comes out explicitly in p. 133.
27R. Morse, El Espejo de Prospero, passim, but especially chap. 3.1.
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order and interactive relations (see chaps. l.II and 5). In any event, complete 
internalisation of norms should not be imagined universal or necessary.
Giddens’ view of structures as rules and resources whereupon actors draw, 
and his perception of the importance of routine for social life, tips the balance 
in the other direction (see chap. 2.II). He seems to have been inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s "anti-metaphysical propositions", according to which meaning 
is to be treated as an external, purely linguistic phenomenon,28 and his 
definition of rules as merely cognitive 29 His idea of structures is both too 
rigid in terms of the relation between model and reality and excessively fluid 
in terms of the actual internalisation of at least a certain set of norms by 
individual actors. Structures, however, should not be necessarily regarded as 
"paradigmatic"; that is they do not always pertain to a "virtual order", internal 
to actors and instantiated in interaction. They should be conceptualised 
according to a twofold classification: as internalised by actors, whereby they 
become part of their personality, and as directly existant as patterns that 
organise interaction, in extreme situations regardless even of all the actors 
involved in a given situation. This last proposition runs counter to Giddens’ 
explicit insight.30 Structures, in other words patterns of interaction, may be 
learned without commitment or internalisation as imperative norms; they may
28See Ernest Gellner, Words and Things, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979 (1959), pp. 18 and 25 (of the 1978 introduction). Although critical 
of normatively charged visions, Giddens has never provided a justification for 
his apparently total scepticism about the internalisation of norms by 
individuals.
29J. Habermas, "Einleitung zur Neuausgabe", Theorie und Praxis, p. 25.
30A. Giddens, Central Problems in Sociological Theory, pp. 62-3.
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remain completely external to the actor, however, purely rooted in 
"institutional contexts". The extent to which they are internalised and underpin 
motivations must, therefore, be regarded with caution and interpreted according 
to specific contexts and periods.
The meaning of the distinctions suggested above is, thus, clear. To the 
extent that the values that support an interactive pattern remain purely external 
to the actor, we are warranted to call them "rules" and "resources". The actor 
has appropriated them cognitively (although it should be apparent that this may 
happen in purely practical terms, without further reflection), but has developed 
no commitment to sustain them personally, although s/he may do so. 
Conversely, norms should be seen as patterns of interaction internalised by the 
actor. Not only does his or her (cognitive) consciousness takes account of 
them, for his or her conscience is filled with the values that underpin those 
patterns, although the actor may even be oblivious to his or her own 
constitution. They become part of the actor’s personality - and, at least in 
some measure, they structure his or her own body.31 The mechanisms of 
sanction at work in the two cases are also distinct: as for rules, social 
sanctions are to be expected, and as long as the actor is not caught 
transgressing them he feels no discomfort; as for norms, guilt is the outcome
31P. Bourdieu, Le Sens Pratique, pp. 99 and 11 Iff. It is not clear, however, 
whether Bourdieu’s allegiance to Wittgenstein’s perspective, focused on 
practice, leaves enough room for reflexivity. Giddens, however, clearly 
distinguished between "practical" and "reflexive" consciousness.
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when the actor violates the pattern.32 But, if individuals treat certain rules 
merely instrumentally, by means of their cognitive appropriation of a value or 
pattern, they can certainly utilise it simply as a resource, pretending or not to 
others with whom they interact that they take that value or pattern seriously, 
although they may, in fact, hold it in low esteem, not care for it, or even 
transgress it on the sly.
Of course, this sharp distinction is rarely observable in reality. At the 
analytical level, however, it is necessary to keep it in mind in order to 
synthesise contemporary insights and overcome their one-sidedness.33 
Habermas for example could better theoretically address his own recognition 
of the withering away of central aspects of normativity in the contemporary 
world, to the extent that "bourgeois consciousness" has become cynical.34 
This would, however, not need to be coupled with the far-fetched idea of a 
"motivation crisis" in late capitalism, which would have moreover the effect 
of producing a "legitimation crisis".35 Once we do not necessarily regard rules 
as norms internalised by the majority of the population, we do not need to 
conflate those two dimensions. Instead of looking for a "crisis of motivation"
32T. Parsons (The Social System, pp. 36ff) recognises these two types of 
sanction, but to collapse them into a direct association with norms, whose 
differentiation from cognitive elements is not intelligible enough either.
33A typology of norms which runs in the same direction is found in Jack 
P. Gibbs, "Norms: the Problem of Definition and Classification", American 
Journal of Sociology, v. 70, 1965 (586:594).
34J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, p. 168, and
"Einleitung: Historischen Materialismus und die Entwicklung normativer 
Strukturen", in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus, pp. 10-1.
35Idem, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, pp. 105ff.
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as correlative to a "legitimation crisis", he could not only accept their distinct 
character, but also more fully draw upon Held’s remark that capitalism has 
survived less because people legitimise it and more because no clear 
alternatives have been available.36 The relations and strategies - more centred 
or more disperse - of different groups and classes would thus be at stake.
III)SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURING
We have carried out a basic analysis of the properties of interactions, 
breaking them down into their constitutive elements and processes. It is 
necessary to go further and introduce a minimal definition of the concept of 
social system and state where it differs from both the concepts of interaction 
and structure.
Discussing Giddens’ concepts of system and structure (in chap. 1 .II), I 
accepted the clear distinction he establishes between them; on the other hand, 
I inverted the meaning of his concepts . Whereas for him structures have real 
substance and systems are just abstractions, I stressed that structures are, 
conversely, ideal scientific constructs, whilst systems consist of patterned 
relations with actual existence.
Elementary social systems are made up of patterned relations between 
individual actors. The concept of social system encompasses the concept of
360n this, see, D. Held, "Crisis Tendencies, Legitimation and the State", 
in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, eds., Habermas. Critical Debatesy pp. 189-93; 
and J. Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", in A. Honneth and H. Joas, 
Communicative Action. Essays on Jurgen Habermas The Theory of 
Communicative Action, p. 281.
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interaction. It exhibits all the properties I have attributed to those 
relationships, but has more extensive application being restricted to face-to-face 
relations. I accept, thus, Giddens’ conclusions when he asserts that the dyadic 
interaction is already a social system - the basic one; but I depart company 
from him when he maintains that we should forbear any attempt to derive the 
properties of social systems in general from the dyad, since social integration 
in relations of co-presence ought to be demarcated from systemic integration, 
which calls forth a number of other questions.37 The introduction of numerous 
other interactive layers, producing a complex tissue of interwoven social 
systems makes the tapestry concretely much more complex indeed. 
Nonetheless, the basic properties of social systems, which I have already 
presented and shall take up again in the course of the next chapter, are found 
already in dyadic systems. What is in fact absent from dyads is the property 
of collective causality, which Giddens is determined to negate. This property 
is yielded only when, but as soon as, we leave the dyad and insert another 
individual actor info the scheme. In any event, the relation between 
collectivities assumes increasing importance the further we go from immediate, 
face-to-face interactions.
Having resisted Habermas’ split between system and life-world (in chap. 
3.II), I have asserted the universality of the concept of social system, 
embracing the strand which is, in fact, more pervasive in sociological theory 
and which I have also deemed more flexible and adequate to its specific 
object. As for the concept of structure, against Giddens and structuralists, I
37A. Giddens, Central Problems in Sociological Theory, pp. 73-4.
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want to adopt Parsons’ definition, which is close to Bourdieu’s concept of 
model (see chaps. 2.II and 5.II). Structures are considered herein as abstract 
and useful models. As "snapshots" of social systems it might be interesting, 
rather than singling out one moment alone, to have different structural 
configurations of an unfolding relational setting: this may better reveal, through 
the comparison of different "stages" of the system, its situation at each of 
them.38 Structures must, therefore, be built according to the researchers’ 
comprehension as well as, to a certain extent, their interests, insofar as they 
select their material under the leverage of their own perspectives and goals, 
individually and collectively.
Weber’s ideal type is to be dwelt upon.39 This sort of ideal-type concept 
should be composed of the selection of typical features of reality, not the 
average characteristics thereof. If we follow this idea we may, however, end 
up with the construction of a structure that only incompletely does justice to 
the concrete level of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the given social system. 
This does not apply in the case of certain of his ideal-types - the transhistorical 
ones, such as the concepts of domination, which are analytical, rather than 
directed to historically concrete phenomena; in the case of those that refer to
38As suggested by Patrik Baert, Time, Self, and Social Being, Aldershot, 
Avebury, 1992, pp. 6 and 33-4.
39M. Weber, "Die ’Objektivitat’ sozialwissenschaftischer und 
sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis", in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 
pp. 190ff. He seems to be positively alert to the problem (p. 203). Ideal-types 
should be considered as basically descriptive devices, even in their 
nomological versions. Structures, therefore "fictitious" devices, should be 
distinguished from (analytical) categorial expositions of the sort Marx 
undertook in Capital - which partially inspires this study.
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"historical individualities" - such as "capitalism" or the "Protestant ethic", 
wherein the application of those transhistorical ones is carried out - this 
problem comes to the fore, an intricacy of which Weber was only relatively 
aware. Hence, to understand a collectivity often requires more than its 
definition in terms of an ideal-type, and we should be attentive to the problems 
implied by Weber’s methodological operations, which are actually much more 
sweeping than usually recognised, for a great many writers - despite sometimes 
their avowed positivism - make use of agendas similar to his, without, on the 
other hand, much insight into the problem.
Alfred Schutz highlighted the centrality of this process - which he labelled 
"typification" - in daily social life and prescribed a similar strategy to social 
science methodology.40 Despite its obvious usefulness, this approach must be 
carefully employed. The more the subject to be grasped is heterogenous, the 
more serious the problem. To express the solution I envisage in one sentence, 
it could be said that the structure of one dimension of a social system should 
be manufactured by the researcher taking into account precisely the level of 
homogeneity or heterogeneity with which the system under his or her 
observation is endowed. Moreover, a reduction of the "practical logic" that 
guides the perception and conduct of actors to the "logical logic" of the social
40A. Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Experience 
and Thought Objects", in Collected Papers, v. I, pp. 17 and 27; "The Social 
World and the Theory of Action" and "The Problem of Rationality in The 
Social World" in Ibid., v. II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 13 and 
17; and "Some Structures of the Life-World", in Ibid., v. Ill, TTie Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 133ff.
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scientist must be averted:41 the heterogeneity and contradictory traits of social 
reality must not be obscured by the models we design to grasp it. To be sure, 
specific discourses - such as legal ones42 - may persistently strive towards 
consistency, because of their own particular requirements, but this should not 
be seen as a universal characteristic of structures. In this precise case, it 
obtains as a consequence of the law being devised to effect the structuring of 
social processes.
Turner’s discussion of "structuring" elements in interaction resumes 
Schutz’s concerns, with particular emphasis on six dynamic properties: 
categorisations, which define the degrees of intimacy and the amount of 
practical, ceremonial and social content; regionalisation, that is the organisation 
of space; normalisation, which may change or become stabilised; ritualisation, 
implying definite patterns of conduct, which are repeated for the sake of a 
smooth development of interactions; routinisation, involving quite a great deal 
of Giddens’ concept of "practical consciousness"; and stabilisation of resource 
transfers between participants in interaction43 We should probably add to 
those structuring ties which originate from identifications which ensue from the 
"socio-emotional dimension" of human groups. Durkheim was very keen on 
this element, which he saw as essential for the "solidarity" of collectivities. 
Contemporary social psychology has lent other and more contradictory and
41P. Bourdieu, Le Sens Pratique, pp. 144ff.
42See A. Woodiwiss, Social Theory after Postmodernism, p. 117.
43J. Turner, op. cit., pp. 150ff.
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conflictual inclinations to this idea, stressing, however, the same point.44 The 
notion of power, crucial for the relations between Elias* figurations (and which 
will be investigated in greater depth in the chap. 8), should also be added to 
these structuring processes.45 Thereby we complement our discussion of 
interaction as face-to-face interactions.
Structurings obtain across the full range of social systems. We can think 
out, furthermore, typologies that insist on the more or less rigid character of 
the structurings of social systems and the vacuousness brought about by the 
poweriessness individuals feel in relation to them. This partially inspired 
Weber’s perspective with regard to the "rationalisation" of contemporary 
society, with its resulting loss of meaning and freedom. It buttresses as well 
Habermas’ theoretical approach to the "reified", "self-steered", "boundary- 
maintaining" economic and political systems in the West today, which are 
empty in terms of meaning. This despite his acknowledgement of social 
arrangements of power, legality and legitimacy that back them up - which, 
nonetheless, does not suffice to deter him from upholding the misleading 
separation of these systems from the life-world (see chap. 3.II). This also 
provides the rationale for Giddens* perception of the expansion of "abstract 
systems" (substantiated in "symbolic tokens" and "expert systems") in 
contemporary society and their disembededdness from daily meaningful
^E. Durkheim, Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse, pp. 329ff
and 602ff. For a contemporary discussion, see Susan Long, A Structural 
Analysis o f Small Groups, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 68-9.
45N. Elias, op. cit., pp. 77-8 and 92.
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relations.46 Individuals may feel powerless vis-d-vis powerful systems, 
although we should be aware of differentials in terms of the location of 
individuals and groups in social hierarchies and stratifications. In any case, 
systems cannot subsist without individuals and their manifold specifically 
human characteristics, which so strongly come out in the analysis of face-to- 
face interaction. Markets, for instance, do not conform to structurings which 
are altogether insulated from other processes of "social coordination". Nor are 
power relations. As "network" research has shown, market relations and power 
structures by no means forego highly personalised ties - even between 
competitive firms or within organisations. According to this research tradition, 
hierarchies (based on power), networks (based on personal bonds) and markets 
(universalistic and impersonal) are types of structuring of social life that seem 
to often concur with rather than oppose each other47
IV)FROM INTERACTION AND BEYOND
We have already discussed some possible ways of building bridges 
between the basic notion of face-to-face social interaction and what has been 
called, particularly in North-American sociology, macro concerns: "levels", 
"interaction chains", "duality of structure", uncoupling of life-world and 
system, and so forth, at least to an extent and often liable to indulge in
46A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 80.
47For an overview and case studies on this topic, consult Jeniffer Francis 
et a i , eds., Markets, Hierarchies & Networks, London, Sage, 1991.
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individualistic approaches to action, have been envisaged as alternative paths 
out of the impasse characterised by the split between individual and society. 
Such a quandary befalls sociology even when interaction, wherein action takes 
place, is conceived of as entirely passive, which entails the permanence of a 
critical gap between the "micro" and the "macro" dimension, for we cannot 
extrapolate from situated interactions to more "macroscopic" systems, as one 
exponent of the former approach has trenchantly asserted.48 Two strategies 
have often been pursued so as to close that gap, but they are patently 
insufficient. Those ventures either point to "macro" phenomena as emerging 
from the "aggregation" or "repetition" of "micro" ones, which may be seen as 
represented also by the view of social systems as nominal fictions; or else they 
impress on "unintended consequences of action" 49 Whereas the latter strategy 
allows for the introduction of other questions and for dealing with broader 
issues of the sociological tradition, the former, for all that has thus far been 
argued, is wholly unsatisfactory. Faced with this some authors resign 
themselves to waiting a solution to this thorny issue appearing only in the 
future.50
Marx and Parsons had previously avoided that gap via the postulation of 
mediating subtotalities between elementary interactions and encompassing
48E. Goffman, "The Interaction Order", pp. 8-9.
49See K. D. Knorr-Cetina, "Introduction: the Micro-Sociological Challenge
of Macro-Sociology: towards a Reconstruction of Social Theory and 
Methodology", in K. D. Knorr-Cetina and A. Cicourel, eds., Advances in 
Social Theory and Methodology, pp. 25ff.
50J. Turner, op. cit., p. viii.
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societies or social systems. Afterwards the scene completely changed, with a 
regression to more limited understandings of social life ensuing, advances in 
other domains of sociological theory of course notwithstanding. To couple 
interactive orders with "figurations" of broader reach and/or more endurance, 
we must bear in mind two essential ideas: the mediation between the singular, 
the particular and the general, on the one hand, and the onion-like scheme of 
criss-crossing or encompassing social systems, on the other, which were 
proposed respectively by Marx and Parsons (see chaps. 4.II and 5.11). They 
will provide the foundations for an elaboration of the concept of collective 
subjectivity in connection to the issues underscored and developed by the 
contemporary sociological syntheses. Furthermore, they will contribute 
decisively to in my view a more pertinent notion of totality.
Habermas has a strong case when he puts forward his version of life- 
worlds as rather stable universes of meaning, with superficial plasticity. The 
same is of course valid for social systems, in the broad sense they receive in 
my analysis, in their totality. Giddens’ stress on the openness of "structures" 
with respect to individual action sounds, thus, exaggerated, although his 
perception of the necessities of "ontological security" by individual 
personalities and the role of power and domination in social relations in the 
end contribute to a more sober picture. In any event, dialectics must be 
reckoned with, for not only diverse subjectivities influence each other in the 
course of the constitution of social systems, as those structurings attain only 
relative totalisation; that is only partially do they achieve the unification of
237
patterns - under one or some basic principles and whatever the heterogeneity 
of specific conducts derived from them - of social behaviour and relations.
Although somewhat narrowed by an individualistic bias, which stems from 
his affiliation to Husserl’s phenomenology, a criticism made by both Giddens 
and Habermas (see chaps. 2.II and 3.II), Schutz’s original insights have some 
advantage over a concept of life-world that puts excessive emphasis on its 
intersubjective constitution. To be sure, this is central to the definition of social 
and individual perspectives, stocks of knowledge and typifications. But his 
approach, dependent upon an internal analysis of consciousness, helps shift the 
focus to the partially idiosyncratic character of each individual’s life-world, 
which is never totally the same as that of the other members of society.51 
When we contemplate a collective life-world we should not lose track of its 
uneven and sometimes fragmented "structure", derived from biographical 
differences and the uneven distribution of social knowledge, which may look 
neat only through its hermeneutical reconstruction by the social scientist and 
its crystallisation in a model. The stability of life-worlds and the contingent 
achievements of individuals in interaction, stressed by Habermas, no longer 
demand a sharp distinction: since individuals share only incompletely a life- 
world, stability and contingency, necessity and accident, are not opposed to 
each other, but may be placed in a continuum of shared and non-shared 
elements. These allow for, or make more difficult, communication, and 
possibly agreement, between actors.
51A. Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Experience 
and Thought Objects", in Collected Papers, v. I, pp. 11-4; "Some Structures 
of the Life-World", in Ibid., v. Ill, pp. 116ff.
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From the vantage point of this conception of totality, Mead’s liberal 
concepts - so concerned with social consensus - are also to be met with 
caution, although it should be noted that he explicitly rejected any notion of 
"collective mind".52 Granting too much weight on societal structurings his 
concepts of play, game and, finally, "generalized other", assume a very 
compact form. He argued that the "attitude of the whole community", with all 
its conceivable and distinct roles, comes to constitute individuals’ 
personalities.53 He seems to detract from the possibility of misrecognitions 
and of the as a rule only partial knowledge singular actors and social groups 
possess about one another and their frequently mutual aloofness. This explains 
why, for instance, "...the more direct attribution of characteristics to particular 
groups by other particular groups often occurs more projectively than 
veridically", although it may end up superimposing identity traits to them.54 
For this reason, also within the symbolic interactionist tradition, Howard 
Becker can speak of "secret deviance" plus, in particular, the fallibility of 
processes of "labelling" deviance, which may fall upon people who have not
52G. Mead, "Cooley’s Contribution to American Social Thought", American 
Journal of Sociology, v. XXV, 1930 (693:706).
53Idem, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 153-5. In the last instance, the 
"generalized other" includes "...the universal functioning of gestures as 
significant symbols in the general human social process of communication" (p.
158). Money, one might suggest, is the form the "generalized other" assumes 
when human labour acquires an abstract form and takes on the aspect of a 
"universal equivalent", which levels out all the concrete differences of social 
labour - as theorised in K. Marx, Das Kapital, B. I, chap. 3. As to this, we can 
probably refrain from stressing the points made above.
"S. Long, op. cit., p. 70.
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Vcommitted deviant acts or let go others who have done so.55 This seems to 
hold true even if we refuse the conflation of deviance with labelling, or 
separate primary from secondary, socially categorised, deviance.56 Thereby, 
in fact, the distance between individuals - with respect to the construction of 
their identity - and social systems is recognised.
Network research has had a lot to offer to a more complex and interesting 
picture of the relations between different social systems, sharing some basic 
insights with Marx and Parsons in regard to the multilayered and interactive 
aspects of social life. And although it had remained undertheorised hitherto, 
Harrison White has recently changed this situation. Cast in its own theoretical 
language, a number of his ideas are very close to the propositions developed 
herein: links between material and social space-times, identity construction, 
collective agents, organisational problems and heterogeneous systems are key 
elements in his reflections.
An excessively centred notion of social systems as actors, nevertheless, 
curtails the reach of some of the suggestions of his study. Although he 
correctly and engagingly perceives identities as coming out of the casual and 
contingent results of other processes, White directly associates them with 
control, which would be "...both anticipation of and response to eruptions in 
environing process", not as "some option of choice", but as an essential feature
55Howard Becker, Outsiders, New York, Free Press, 1973 (1963), pp. 9 
and 187-8.
56See, respectively, Bob Fine, "Labelling Theory: an Investigation into the 
Sociological Critique of Deviance", Economy and Society, v. 6, 1977 
(166:193); and Edwin M. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and 
Social Control, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1972 (1967), p. 48.
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of identities. These are as likely to ’’target" themselves as other identities for 
"control efforts".57 Not by accident, he often refers to organisations in order 
to illustrate his ideas.58 "Disciplines" are, in his view, successful attempts at 
control, whereas networks proper are composed of "ties", which represent 
failed attempts at control (his recognition of their specificity notwithstanding) 
and bring about looser connections between actors.59 Despite numerous 
insights and a precise critique of the polarisation between individual and 
society,60 his notion of collective agency - which remains underdeveloped - 
implies a type of subjectivity indebted to the Enlightenment’s image of the 
individual actor. He goes no further than Marx or Parsons. His notion of 
boundary is excessively tight, to an extent at least because of this control- 
seeking conception of agency, in spite of its contingent accomplishment.61 For 
reasons I shall fully develop in the next chapter, the transformation of such a 
concept of collective actor is of fundamental importance. Thereby disciplines 
and ties might be placed in a continuum, instead of the latter being understood 
merely as an abortive configuration of the former. With this, we forcefully 
point to the question of the (de)centring of collective subjectivities.
57Harrison White, Identity and Control, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1992, p. 9; see also pp. 312-4.
58See his examples of triage in a hospital or of strategies of airlines 
companies: Idem, op. cit., pp. 11-2.
59Idem, Ibid., pp. 16-7, 22ff, 66-70, 78ff and 89.
^Idem, Ibid., pp. 1 and 315.
61Idem, Ibid., p. 128.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONSTITUTION OF COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITIES
I)THE DECENTRING OF THE SUBJECT AND COLLECTIVE 
SUBJECTIVITY
One of the outstanding themes in contemporary philosophical and social 
science debates has consisted of the dissolution of the classical figure of the 
subject instituted by the Enlightenment. Against that cherished entity a 
prospective theoretical decentring of the subject has been advanced. Some 
writers link this process of decentring to piecemeal developments in Western 
culture, which took place even before the complete emergence of this 
individual subjectivity: Copernicus showed that the earth is not the centre of 
the universe, Marx displaced the "human subject" from a non-existent centre 
of history, and Freud brought out the decentred character of the individual 
subject.1 Others prefer to locate this changing nature of subjectivity within a 
more recent period: the constitution of individual and collective subjects - the 
state and the classes - and even, in some cases, their relative decomposition, 
prompted a questioning of that centred subjectivity.2 Generally speaking we 
are presented with the puzzle of a fluid, contingent and possibly uneven 
subjectivity, with the operations that steer its constitution coming to the fore. 
Regardless of the underlying reasons for this development, the fact is that it 
delivered two closely bound results. The presumption of a naturally centred 
and absolutely sovereign identity has had its validity challenged; likewise, the
!L. Althusser, "Freud et Lacan", in Positions, pp. 33-4.
2R. Bodei, "Strategic di Individuazione", Aut-Aut, v. 32, 1985, p. 98.
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notion of a transparent consciousness was called into question; furthermore the 
intentionality of human conduct became question begging.
The necessity of rethinking that presuppositional universe does not imply, 
however, that we should join in the celebrations of what has been described 
as the "death of the subject". Structuralists, in France at first, trod this path, to 
which I want to oppose a genuine decentring, instead of remaining prisoner of 
the categories of conditioning and active causality, as they inadvertently are, 
despite their supposedly revolutionary intellectual achievements.3 For some, 
the idea was to leave behind a concentration on consciousness in order to 
discuss the achievements of the "epistemic" subject - and this meant that the 
individual empirical subject should be brushed aside.4 By and large, 
nevertheless, both individual and epistemic subjects tend to vanish in 
structuralism. Moreover, the very opposition between them evinces a conflation 
of the analytical and the concrete realms.
Throughout this study I have introduced, and shall still do so, different 
types of social systems, of collectivities: cities and regions, distinct kinds of 
organisations (from parties and schools, armies and hospitals, to nation-states 
and multinational organisations), families, social classes, smaller or bigger 
groups of more or less formal or informal character (school classes, migratory 
populations, scientific and ideological trends of thought), the concrete
3For an overview of the battle field at that moment, see Francois Dosse,
"Le Suject Captif entre Existentialism et Structuralism", VHomme et la 
Societe, v. XXV, 1991/3 (17:40); and P. Anderson, In the Tracks o f Historical 
Materialism, chap. 2.
4J. Piaget, Structuralism , pp. 138-9.
244
economic and the political systems, social movements of ethnic, gender, racial 
or general socio-political bases. To come to terms with their specificity and, 
simultaneously, weld them together in a single general concept of collective 
subjectivity, I have hitherto made a steady effort to deconstruct the concept 
of the subject to which contemporary sociology is heir, both in its individual 
and collective dimensions. I shall now seek out a positive solution to this 
problem.
The recognition of subjectivity as something fluid is of far-reaching 
consequences. The idea of centred subjectivity - well demarcated, closed and 
autonomous, built upon a clear identity, steered by a well-established decision­
making nucleus - cannot be taken for granted any longer. A whole series of 
collectivities do not fit in such a narrow mould and even the ones that could 
be enveloped by this clear-cut concept do so in contingent terms only, for their 
centring as social systems is not given, being always under internal and 
external pressure. A social system may, and may not, be centred; it may, and 
may not, be well demarcated, closed and relatively autonomous; it may, and 
may not, manifest a clear identity; it may, and may not, be steered by well 
established decision-making nuclei.
Alongside this internal decentring of the subject, we must introduce an 
external decentring. This has been the thrust of Habermas’ critique of the 
’’philosophy of consciousness". Although he in essence refuses to address this 
issue at a collective level, the problem he has so forcefully confronted needs 
to be worked through at that level. As I have already emphasised, the rejection 
of isolated subjects as the main or even exclusive reference for social analysis
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and the stress on the notion of interaction, should by no means eclipse 
problems related to identity and the constitution of subjectivity.
II)THE INTERNAL CONTINGENCY OF SUBJECTIVITY.
Sigmund Freud brought into the open the contingent character of 
individual consciousness with his penetrating challenge to the Cartesian 
subject, whereby he breaks it down into three components, the ego, the 
superego and the id. In addition, he asserted that psychoanalysis must not 
locate the being or essence {das Wesen) of the psychic in consciousness, which 
must be understood as a quality whose realisation is conditional.5 The Marxist 
concept of ideology, disclosing the blanket areas of individual and collective 
reflexibility, dwelled upon the same topic.6 On the other hand, structuralists 
and post-structuralists, with their fierce attack against what they see as the sin 
of "humanism", have more recently drawn attention to the precarious 
constitution of social identities, whereby a social system attains its collective 
self-awareness. Levi-Strauss touches upon this unstable character of social 
identities when he conceptualises them as a "virtual focus", thereby rejecting 
a notion of "substantial identity" - since this would simply be a "logos" that
5Sigmund Freud, "Das Ich und das Es" (1923), in Psychoanalyse. 
Ausgewahlte Schriften, Leipzig, Phillip Reclam, 1990, p. 301.
6See K. Marx and F. Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, in Idem, Werke, B. 
3, pp. 26-7.
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undertakes to capture the differences that in fact constitute the social space.7 
Inescapably, the main victim of this double-edged critical charge against the 
idea of a centred subject is one of its associated tenets, the belief that 
intentionality is a requisite component of action. This means, thus, that the 
level of intentionality within social causation is relative, such that the so-called 
teleological causality of a subjectivity - individual or collective - depends on 
its level of centring, which is necessarily relative as well. This hinges on the 
level of decision-making capacity of the social system, on its definition of 
collective identity and self-recognition, and on its variable demarcation vis-d- 
vis other systems. Furthermore, the potential unintended consequences that 
stem from intended activity must be always accounted for.
The backdrop to Levi-Strauss’s discussion is in large an onslaught on the 
philosophical notion of "substance". Jacques Derrida is probably the major 
exponent of this campaign, which was to gather momentum with post- 
structuralism, featuring the notion (not exactly a concept, according to him) of 
difference - or differance, as he would have it - as its centre piece.8 If the 
dissolution of substantial beings in his writings in a sense shares with Marx the 
rejection of Western metaphysics, the limits of his approach in regard to the 
analysis of social systems are evident. Whereas Marx highlighted the 
importance of social relations, Derrida is only concerned with structures of 
discourse, an approach duplicated by many of his peers and followers.
7C. Levi-Strauss, "Avant-propos" and "Conclusion", in C. Levi-Strauss, ed., 
L’ldentite, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1983, pp. 11 and 332.
8Jacques Derrida, "La Differance" (1968), in Marges de la Philosophies 
Paris, Minuit, 1972.
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Moreover, as already highlighted, the problematisation of subjectivity, 
presented by post-structuralism as an absolute breakthrough, has been at stake 
since the heyday of German philosophical idealism.9 In fact, Marx’s more 
consistent discussions on the obstacles to class unification can be credited in 
part to his acquaintance with this literature.
The syllogistic relation of the general, the particular and the singular, 
which is so crucial to Marx’s notion of social class, as well as Parsons’ onion­
like scheme - despite his own commitment to a traditional view of subjectivity 
- are of help in furthering this notion of decentring. If we contemplate a social 
system as a network of subjectivities, each with its own logic and dynamic, it 
becomes clear that there should be no reason to expect, in principle, a centred 
subjectivity, regardless of the possible homogeneity or forced centring of the 
collectivity that theoretically and empirically are possible.
Nevertheless, we are confronted with opposite ideas to the contrary in the 
propositions made by some writers that have recently undertaken the 
elaboration of concepts to tackle the dimension of collective subjectivity. In 
Barry Hindess’ and James Coleman’s cases this is particularly strong: Parsons’ 
collective actors loom large therein. But Mouzelis, who simultaneously recalls 
Marx’s solution, is not too distant from them.
Attacking as "spurious" the notion that social classes, societies and "men" 
are actors, Hindess defends a minimal concept of actor, which encompasses 
both individuals and "social actors". Accordingly, an actor is a "locus of
9See J. Habermas, Der philosophisches Diskurs der Mode me, pp. 361-2, 
and Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration, London, Verso, 1987, pp. 19-24.
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decision and action" - a formulation through which we can immediately detect 
the author’s debt to the philosophy of the subject. Actors depend not only on 
their social situation, but on the "styles of reasoning" at their disposal. Social 
actors comprise capitalist enterprises, state agencies, political parties, football 
clubs, churches, etc.10 In turn, his commitment to rational choice analysis 
notwithstanding, Coleman highlights the increasing role played by "collective 
actors" in contemporary society - actors which, despite continuous vacillations, 
he tends to identify as entities legally constituted. More clearly than Hindess, 
he is indebted to Parsons, although this is not explicitly recognised. His 
division of the actor’s self (in "principal" and "agent") notwithstanding, he 
portrays a very centred subject.11 Leaving room for some minor variations, 
with regards to our problem his actors are basically the same as Hindess’, 
although they have criticised each other with reference to other questions.
Mouzelis’ conceptualisation displays the peculiarity of bringing, at first 
sight at least, those two strands together. Moreover, he is explicitly concerned 
with the general sociological syntheses currently developing, pointing out the
10B. Hindess, Choice, Rationality and Social Theory, pp. 38-9, 44ff, 7Iff 
and 103-4; Political Choice & Social Structure, pp. 5, 80 and 86ff.
1 Barnes S. Coleman, The Asymmetric Society, Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press, 1982, pp. 6ff; Foundations o f Social Theory, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 28ff, 86, 367, 421ff, 503ff, 53Iff. His 
general view of the theme of properties of social systems as well as his 
methodological standpoint definitely oscillate. See Idem, Individual Interests 
and Collective Action, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press/ Paris, Mason 
des Sciences de l’Homme/ Universitetsforlaget, Toyen, 1986, p. 144; and 
"Properties of Collectivities", in J. S. Coleman et ai, Macrosociology, Boston, 
Allyn and Bacon, 1970, pp. 6 and 9; but also the formerly cited books, pp. 1-2 
and 5ff, respectively. The central political issue he raises - the asymmetric 
relations between corporate actors and "natural persons" - is, nonetheless, 
critical.
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lack of "collective actors" in both Habermas’ and Giddens’ writings. These are 
important insights, but his notion of actor is still excessively centred. On the 
one hand, he underscores Marx’s notion of social class; on the other, however, 
he reduces it to its expression in terms of organisations, centred collective 
actors. The latter are even explained away, at a certain stage, as a "shorthand" 
device, which may have its underlying elementary reality spelled out. They are, 
furthermore, paralleled by single, though powerful, individuals, whom he calls 
"mega-actors"12 - introducing a subreptitious displacement of the plane of 
analysis, inasmuch as these individuals, it should be observed critically, are 
units of those social systems, holding preeminent positions within them. Once 
more, the status of collective subjectivity is that of a centred and active entity, 
modeled after the individual as traditionally envisaged by the Enlightenment’s 
philosophers.
In order to carve out an alternative form of coping with this issue in a 
sociologically precise manner, I shall make recourse to one of Robert Merton’s 
most incisive, even though to some extent misunderstood, contributions. 
Discussing the role of functional explanations in social theory he proposed two 
distinct ways of conceptualising the processes that warrant such operations. 
Manifest and latent functions are the cornerstones of his proposition. The 
former rest upon intentional collective action and the latter bring up unintended 
consequences of action. Manifest functions imply motivations for the 
(individual) agents, whereas latent functions allude to non-intended objective
12N. Mouzelis, Back to Sociological Theory, pp. 48ff, 107, 130-1 and 
passim. The issue was hinted at in his former book, Post-Marxist Alternatives, 
pp. 22-4.
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consequences.13 I shall remain in agreement with the idea, supported by 
Giddens, that functional statements are valuable only in contra-factual terms. 
However, Giddens’ reduction of Merton’s distinction to the "unintended 
consequences of action"14, will not be followed. If Merton relied too much 
upon functional premises, his formulation is, nonetheless, quite suggestive, 
with implications that cannot be coped with by the theory of structuration.
The causal efficacy of collective subjectivity does not depend on its 
conscious character, either in absolute or in relative terms. The impact of a 
given collectivity in social life may be completely unintended and, moreover, 
utterly overlooked and unacknowledged by its individual members. Of course, 
this is an extreme case, for it is generally at some intermediate point that most 
social systems have their "manifest" causality, that is their intended - 
teleological and final - causation. The properties a certain social system 
possesses may not be appreciated by its members, at least not completely, 
which with respect to collective causality is more likely the weaker and looser 
are its decision-making centres. The consequences of its impact upon its 
inclusive social system may remain unseen or faintly devised. And, more 
classical theme - for individual actors, though here met in a collective
13Robert K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions" (1957), in On 
Theoretical Sociology, New York, Free Press/ London, Macmillan, 1967, pp. 
104ff.
14A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 21 Off. His position 
is moreover informed by a rejection of general law-like statements in the social 
sciences: Idem, The Constitution of Society, pp. 343ff. Despite his outspoken 
historicism, we must ask whether the theory of structuration - or, for that sake, 
any general sociological theory - would make any sense had it no universal 
bearings, let alone those presented with an "ontological" flavour.
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dimension - it may bring about unintended outcomes when a strong intentional 
conduct happens to develop. This is the positive gist of Merton’s proposals, 
generated in the effort to grasp the "formal" causality of a system upon itself, 
when stripped of its functional shackles and conveyed into the dimension of 
collective causality. Collective subjectivity corresponds to collective 
practices, which have specific systemic properties. Nevertheless, it should be 
also stated clearly that these recognised properties may work on the members 
of the social system which they "structure" as motivational factors, in other 
words, normatively, or as external regulative or coercive elements. In any case, 
intentionality varies in intensity, attaining diverse levels, according to the type 
of social system we refer to and to its concrete situation at any given moment.
It follows from this that dialectical thinking must accept its own 
transformation. It is plausible enough to suggest that its contemporary 
questioning is the result of the conclusion of a historical period. It seems 
certain as well that it is bound to remain as a means to generate growth 
through the overcoming of impasse situations and contradictions.15 It is 
necessary, however, to further develop this sort of consideration: the dialectical 
unification of subjectivity hinges on each social system intrinsic potential of 
centring. The extent to which this potential becomes effective is, in addition, 
contingent. Marx’s notion of predetermined class unification is, therefore, 
untenable. The same problem appears in Parsons’ compact collective actor. 
Whereas the former may not take place, the latter is excessively clear-cut to 
embrace the full array of actual social systems. In fact, people do not
15R. Bodei, op. cit., pp. 108-9.
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necessarily become aware of their collective subjectivity. We may, instead, 
have a dialectical development of utterly blind direction, although an extremely 
high level of centring and intentionality must be accepted as possible. In other 
words, to recall Freud’s insight, the being (Sein) of a social system may or 
may not become conscious, known (bewuBt) to its members. The concrete 
social system establishes the limits for this variation of awareness.
It is from Giddens himself that we can borrow the conceptual distinction 
between practical and reflexive consciousness (see chap. 2.II) so that we can 
deepen our understanding of collective subjectivity in relation to the perception 
of the so-called "lay members" of society. These concepts help bring out to 
what variable degree the individual members of social systems manifest 
awareness of the existence of the collective causality they yield and of their 
contribution to it. Of course, ideologies and the whole cultural tradition in 
which these individuals are immersed facilitate or hinder reflexive 
consciousness in regard to collective causality, although in the course of their 
daily life they have to grapple with it continuously, in practical terms at least. 
In societies organised according to liberal ideologies reflexivity with respect 
to collective subjectivity is usually very slight, substituted by utterly 
individualistic convictions. But this is not the universal case, by any means. 
Moreover, these doctrines have been under pressure for a number of decades, 
contradicted by opposing beliefs and by the practice of the working class 
movement (and, later on, by racial, feminist and ecological movements, let 
alone the so-called "ethnic revival"); these doctrines have been threatened, 
more recently, as the above discussion on Coleman evinces, also by the
increasing importance of corporations and other collectivities in contemporary 
social life.
The collective dimension of human action must be brought to bear on 
themes which, through the critical appraisal of Habermas’ ideas, were formerly 
expounded (in chap. 3.II). Individual action, as assumed therein, necessarily 
entails communicative, strategic and instrumental aspects. Further issues must 
now be considered. The flow of the actions of the individuals who make up 
the units of the system may produce a clearly instrumentally, communicatively 
or expressively oriented collectivity. Otherwise, individuals may contradict one 
another, once they refuse - not necessarily upon articulate deliberation - to 
"agree", and therewith spawn a rather decentred collective causality. It may 
also be that, pursuing goals that unevenly emphasise those diverse aspects of 
action, individuals concur with the formation of a more centred collectivity, 
once their diverse purposes are not only non-contradictory, but also 
complementary. It may be, therefore, that a high level of centring, 
unintentionally or intentionally, comes about. Such a higher level does not, 
however, depend solely on this possibility. As we will see, structuring 
processes, being hierarchical, may favour extreme centring without actual 
willingness, at least in principle, of the individuals that comprise the system 
to strive for its goals, which often ultimately obtains.
Formal organisations, to which a great deal of study has been devoted in 
sociological theory, epitomise the highest possible level of centring that social 
systems can achieve. But the analysis must also proceed cautiously in this 
regard. Organisations are habitually defined by the quality of having explicitly
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stated goals. Irrespective of these outspoken resolutions, however, the 
displacement of those goals may come about. Lip service may be paid to them, 
which are, hence, used as mere legitimatising symbols. Furthermore, the means 
supposed to implement aims may become ends in themselves.16 This was, for 
instance, one of the issues that stood out in Michels’ misgivings about the fate 
of modem political parties, with the formation of oligarchical bureaucracies 
within them.17 On the other hand, the bounded character of organisations* 
"rationality" discloses the problems that beset their "optimal" level of centring: 
to difficulties in their functioning as "information processors" must be added 
advantages and disadvantages related to burdens on supervision, restrictions of 
choice, divergency of goals of subordinates from those of the organisation.18 
This was, in part, the problem Lenin had to face when he defended the 
centralisation of command in the Social Democratic Party of Russia under 
autocratic rule, which should be, in principle, counteracted by maximal 
autonomy for its militants.19
16David Silverman, The Theory of Organizations, London, Heinemann, 
1970, pp. 8-14.
17Robert Michels, Political Parties, New York, Dover, 1959 (1915), pp. 
389ff.
18Herbert A. Simon, Models o f Bounded Rationality, v. 2, Cambridge, The 
MIT Press, 1982, pp. 405, 409-10, 420 and 449. This is a problem that has 
also secured consideration in "small groups", often experimental research. See 
Theodore M. Mills, The Sociology o f Small Groups, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice 
Hall, 1967, pp. 81-2.
19Vladimir I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (1902), in Collected Works, v. 
5, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, chap. IV.
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On the other hand, for instance, the consumers of a certain product are 
likely not to generate any intentional joint action, as is usually the case with 
consumers in general, who are scattered across the market.20 In spite of that, 
their collective behaviour still has an impact upon those who are the producers 
of that commodity: whether they carry on buying it or vote with their feet and 
change for another brand does have consequences for that company and the 
more inclusive market situation. And this probably comes about as an utterly 
unintended consequence of their actions. The case of the concrete economic 
system, that is the economy of a city or a country, deserves consideration from 
this perspective.21 Although its level of centring is very low when it is 
institutionalised autonomously from the political system, it still exerts an 
enormous impact upon the other social systems that comprise the totality of 
social life - the political system, classes, families, peer groups and so forth. 
The changes in gear of free market economies, which had their extreme level 
of unintentional fluctuation in the West during the nineteenth and at the 
beginning of the twentieth centuries, are an example of that impact, with the 
violent and uncontrollable alternation of growth and recession being partially 
superseded only after new social relations permitted some mastery over these 
unintended outcomes. Of course, its concrete intermeshing with the
20See Claus Offe, "Alternative Strategies in Consumer Policy" (1981), in 
Contradictions of the Welfare State, London, Hutchinson, 1984.
21It ought to be clear that I do not refer to the analytical element Parsons 
named the "economy", but to concrete social systems. A reformulation of that 
category will be endeavoured in the following chapter.
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aforementioned (in chap. 6.IV) hierarchies and personal ties complicates the 
actual process of (de)centring.
The syllogism I have been stressing must, moreover, be connected to this 
discussion of "economic" systems. Alec Nove presses this issue home when 
he states that whereas Soviet socialism put excessive emphasis on the whole, 
economists such as Friedman and methodological individualism in general "go 
too far in the other direction":
Pace, Mrs Thatcher, there is such a thing as society, and within 
it there are sub-units which are more than the individuals 
composing them: these could be the city of Glasgow, the 
Grenadier Guards, the rightly famous architectural ensemble of 
the Bath terraces, the Chicago symphony orchestra, the Munich 
city transport system, a botanic gardens, Marks and Spencer’s,
Sony, St Mary’s hospital and so on.22
Whatelse should we add to this characterisation, but the concept of 
collective subjectivity?
Speaking about social movements in general, in terms of "collective 
action" in the pursuit of "common interests", Tilly has also remarked on broad 
issues of "organization" - the extent to which "common identity and unifying 
structure among the individuals in the population" are generated - and,
22Alec Nove, The Economics o f  Feasible Socialism Revisited, p. xii.
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conversely, of "disorganization" - the decline of those two elements.23 In this 
regard, we can observe that classes, races and genders, despite a pervasive 
though often contradictory awareness of shared attributes, rarely exercise a 
joint movement that would set in motion the whole of their individual units 
and sections. Rather, they usually share a reasonable, but not extremely high, 
potential level of centring. It may happen, however, that all the individuals and 
sections that comprise classes, races or genders decide to build precisely that 
centred and compact subjectivity. Leaving aside problems of organisation as 
such, it is more than feasible to suggest that such effort might, in fact, achieve 
limited success. Divergent perspectives and inclinations - for example: radical, 
socialist or liberal feminism, separatist or non-separatist feminism; class 
oriented or liberal working class programmes, communists and social- 
democrats; black-nationalism or integrationism, to cite just the main variants 
of these movements - may clash and in the end lead to fragmentation or, more 
likely, only partial centring. Musing on this sort of problem, Antonio Gramsci 
rightly suggested that
The philosophy of a period is not the philosophy of one or 
another philosopher, of one or another group of intellectuals, of 
one or another large part of the popular masses: it is a 
combination of all these elements which culminates in a certain 
direction, in which its culmination becomes the norm of
23Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1976, pp. 7 and 54.
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collective action, that is it becomes concrete and complete 
(total) history.24
Irrespective of the intention of the members of these movements, the final 
direction of that "culmination" - brought about by the unintended consequences 
of their action - may be quite heterogeneous and perhaps conflicting. 
Nonetheless, this does not signify the ineffectivity of these movements; on the 
contrary, such heterogeneity may represent, within certain limits and given 
certain conditions, an advantage, as we shall see later on in our discussion of 
the Protestant sects. As is well known, Gramsci was, within a Leninist 
perspective, concerned with the unification of the working class around the 
Communist Party, a purpose that most probably pays off in certain 
circumstances. Perhaps, however, the more decentred socialist parties 
envisaged by Rosa Luxemburg might be more effective in the long run, 
inasmuch as they cultivate the initiative of the masses, although, in the short 
run, they might face problems of organisation and strategy, as she 
recognised.25
The face-to-face interactions discussed in the foregoing chapter (6.II) allow 
for similar considerations, since collective subjectivities are permanently 
formed within the daily routines upon which all sorts of social system are
24A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, v. II, (text of 1932/5), p. 1255.
“ See Rosa Luxemburg, "Organizational Questions of Social 
Democracy"(1904), in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, New York, Pathfinder, 1970; 
and The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, London, 
Merlin, n/d (1906).
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dependent. Within factories, pubs, households or the the streets, people sustain 
or create relations of diverse kinds, and in so doing give continuity to or bring 
about figurations which can be more or less centred. The internal contingency 
of collective subjectivity is present across the whole range of social systems.
III)INTERACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF COLLECTIVITIES
Exceptional emphasis must be laid on the relational aspect of collective 
subjectivity. This is a truly general feature, which affects all the dimensions 
of social systems hitherto discussed, but also some that will still be considered. 
The identity of social systems, in particular, rests upon this interactive 
dimension, which has been underscored for individual subjects, but has not 
received, nonetheless, the same attention in the collective dimension. How 
much this has been an underestimated topic can be grasped by glancing at a 
very interesting point made by Homans. After discussing the impact of the 
environment upon the "Norton Gang", he realised the necessity of mentioning 
the impact of the gang in its town, Comeville: he then spoke of the money 
they spent in restaurants, their contact with politicians, the example they 
furnished for the creation of other gangs. But this issue was explicitly 
introduced merely for the sake of "logical completeness".26 Thereby an 
important intuition, which might have led to other possibilities in his empirical 
investigation, was left aside.
26G. Homans, The Human Group, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951 
(1950), p. 188.
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Foucault dedicated part of his thought to the interactive dimension of 
collectivities, largely under the - although not openly admitted - influence of 
Marxism and its insistence on the relations between social classes. Two main 
problems are present in his pronouncements, in relation to the theory of 
collective subjectivity. He refused any idea of collective perspectives, which 
he saw as reproducing Durkheim’s "collective conscience", preferring to it the 
idea of "subject positions", held by individuals, from which social 
subjectivities, with diverse levels of centring, emerge.27 The "general theme" 
of his research was couched in the coordinates of the "different modes" 
whereby "human beings are made subjects". Those modes would be three: the 
scientific one, the dividing practices (as, for instance, the one between the sane 
and the insane) plus, at last, the form through which they are self-constituted 
(as in his late work on sexuality). If the former two point to structural effects, 
the latter brings up traditional reflexive individuals. No site was assigned to 
collective subjectivity in his picture.28 His debt to, and active participation in, 
the process that brought about the aforementioned "death of the subject" is 
well know. Although in his last stage he retreated from his former position, 
Foucault consistently attacked the notion of the individual subject. His only 
alternative was, however, to fall back upon a notion of passive structures,
27Michel Foucault, V  Archeologie du Savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, pp. 
126, 150, 160 and 254.
28Idem, "The Subject and Power", in Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow, eds., Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
London, Harvester, 1982, pp. 208-9.
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bereft as he was - in actual theoretical terms - of a real concept of collective 
subjectivity.
His monistic and all-embracing notion of power, which can be questioned 
for its intrinsically troublesome non-specification, has, nonetheless, an 
essentially relational character, for the operation of both its dominant poles 
and "points of resistance".29 It is, besides, constitutive, and not merely 
repressive. We can, therefore, harness his insights to build a theory of 
collective subjectivity. He broached a fundamental insight into this relational 
dynamic when he brought out what may become unintended consequences of 
this exercise of power: the influence a social system exercises on the 
constitution of another one implies a movement of self-constitution. His 
comment upon the unfolding of bourgeois civilisation is rather telling:
One could say that the strategy of moralization ...of the working 
class was that of the bourgeoisie. One could even say that it is 
this strategy which defined them as a class and enabled them to 
exercise their domination.30
29M. Foucault, L'Histoire de la Sexualite, v. I, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, pp. 
124ff; "The Subject and Power", pp. 217ff. I would put one of his observations 
differently, saying that power is subjectivity, but only relatively intentional, 
rather than the other way round.
30Idem, "The Confession of the Flesh", in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/ 
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings by Michel Foucault, 1972- 
1977, New York, Pantheon Books, 1980, p. 203.
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It is clear that these two dimensions are closely interconnected, since the 
external relational character of power implies an interplay with its internal 
workings. As Michael Mann has put it, dialectics is central to the relation 
between the distributive (external) aspect of power and its collective (internal) 
workings.31 In this section we have been dealing with the first one; the other 
will soon be tackled.
Recent discussions of, on the one hand, organisations and communities, 
plus, on the other, social movements and the constitution of the "social’1, have 
focused on the interactive dimension of collectivities, suggesting some 
theoretical pointers, even though one cannot say that they achieve a thorough 
success. Whilst the discussion advanced above aimed at shedding light on the 
internal character of social systems, thereby on their inner decentring, the 
following analysis will tend to stress the relational features of this process, 
which is bound to throw up some more aspects of that first dimension.
"Network" analysis, ranging from organisations to community and peer 
groups has been greatly concerned with this sort of issue: the relation between 
its "actors", particularly with respect to the search for resources on the outside, 
has become more important than their own attributes, involving ties of 
dependency and power.32 Organisations, for instance, negotiate, struggle and
31 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power, v. I, p. 6.
32Peter V. Marsden and Nan Lins, "Introduction" and Barry Wellman, 
"Studying Personal Communities", in P. V. Marsden and N. Lins, eds., Social 
Structure and Network Analysis, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982, pp. 9 and 63-4; 
and Joseph Galaskiwewicz, "Interorganizational Relations", Annual Review of 
Sociology, v. 11, 1985 (281:304).
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cooperate, social change being brought about in part through their 
interaction.33
With great appreciation of the relations between collectivities, Alain 
Touraine has produced an original formulation - expressed in the concept of 
the historical subject. It may be referred to organisations, but he is at pains 
to emphasise social movements as its main incarnation - with the resulting 
formation of classes, in a loose sense. They are in the centre of the struggle 
for the particular definition of the overall historicity (the core values and 
orientations) of each historical period.34 His is a position that stems, very 
modified as it is, from Marx. He is keen, however, to sketch a more diffuse 
and decentred notion of the subject, which basically represents "...the principle 
of unity and signification of a historical system of action, which cannot ever 
be identified with a concrete actor...".35 Regardless of the validity of this 
general postulation, his broader notion of the subject is not precisely 
conceptualised.
With a similar concern and from a "Post-Marxist" perspective - i.e. under 
the influence of post-structuralism, but also of Marxism - Emesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe have advanced some interesting ideas (the more strictly 
political features of which I shall not dwell upon). A strong idealistic element
33Goran Ahme, Agency and Organization, London, Sage, 1990, pp. 40-1, 
55 and 91-2.
34A. Touraine, Sociologie de I’Action, Paris, Seuil, 1965, pp. 9, 56-61, 77,
121 and 148; Production de la Societe, Paris, Seuil, 1973, pp. 11, 16 and 39; 
Le Retour de VActeur, Paris, Fayard, 1984, pp. 15, 31-5, 60 and 102.
35Idem, Sociologie de VAction, p. 148.
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can be identified in their work, as it seems derived from an excessive stress on
the signifler at the expense of the signified, an inclination they borrow from 
Lacan. They do not realise that, if the projects social collectivities develop, and 
which they strive to make come true, play an essential and probably 
increasingly pivotal role in social life, they make sense only within certain 
limits of plausibility, beyond which they become pointless. There are limits 
to the fluidity of meaning a certain signifier may assume and the efficacy of 
ideologies depends on how much they are able to answer the problems posed 
in other dimensions of social life, irrespective of the extent to which power 
and other social relations may contribute to guarantee the at least partial 
acceptance of an ideological formation.36
Having pointed this out, it is important to recognise their very interesting 
insights into the interactive aspect of the constitution of collectivities, although 
even here some problems can be detected. They start with a reconstruction of
36For the idea of "plausibility", see Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, 
Paradoxos do Liberalismo, Sao Paulo, Venice/ Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ, 1988, 
pp. 1 Iff. The consequence of the no-longer sustainable character of an 
ideological formation which however remains in place may be the production 
of a "hyper-reality" - see A. Woodiwiss, Postmodernity USA, London, Sage, 
1993. See also, for a critique of Laclau and Mouffe, his Social Theory after 
Postmodernism, pp. 64ff. They try to ground their position more firmly in their 
quarrel with Geras, moving the battle field to an opposition between idealism - 
in whose tradition even Marx should be included - and realism. Discourse 
would be prior to the differentiation between linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements, whereas concrete discourses would constitute objects amongst others. 
In answering Geras’ misguided statement on the autonomy of an objective 
world, they do not manage to perceive the necessity of grounding a definition 
of the conditions of possibility (which should be coupled with the above 
mentioned category of plausibility) of those concrete discourses. See Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Post-Marxism without Apologies", in E. Laclau, 
New Reflections on the Revolution o f our Time, New York/ London, Verso, 
1990, pp. lOOff. For the critic’s position, check Norman Geras, "Post- 
Marxism?", New Left Review, n. 163, 1987 (40:82).
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the evolution of Marxism in terms of the increasing role the concept of 
hegemony came to play in this tradition so as to grapple with questions of 
contingency and multiple causation. They arrive at the conclusion that, in the 
modem world, differently from what was supposed to be the case until then, 
"unfixity has become the condition of every social identity"; social subjects, 
with no a priori projects and interests (such as a pretended essential inclination 
the working class would have towards socialism), "overdetermine" each other, 
mutually influencing the constitution of their identities.37
At this stage their conceptualisation becomes rather elusive. Advancing the 
key category of articulation, they suggest a relatively prior existence to the 
elements that are articulated, but at the same time postulate that they are not 
elements of an "underlying or sutured totality". It is discourse that creates the 
differential positions that elements occupy in a relational system and, 
consequently, in a totality.38 The overreliance upon the linguistic dimension 
is evident in this passage, let alone the tendency to impose the reality of the 
model on reality itself, to echo Bourdieu’s critique of structuralism. This 
should be extended even further, though, for they manage to reduce the whole 
of society to the structural effects of discursive formations, despite the 
complete freedom to shape reality their collective subjects seem, henceforth, 
to enjoy, and the authors’ stress on the interactive moment of collective 
identities. They are unyielding when they state (following Foucault) that the
37E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy, New York/ 
London, Verso, 1990 (1989), pp. 85-7.
38Idem, Ibid., pp. 93-107. Here the overloading influence of Saussure and 
Derrida can be seen.
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category of "subject" is entirely based on the notion of "subject positions 
within a discursive structure".39 Social relations entirely vanish with this sort 
of statement.
Notwithstanding the relevance of ideas such as "equivalence chains", that 
would articulate distinct collective subjects in a common discursive field, 
opposed to one another, the separation they produce between objective "real 
oppositions", conceptual "contradictions" and "antagonisms", sounds rather 
empty. The latter, which cannot be "said", only "shown", are necessarily 
external to society, never internal: "...they constitute the limits of society", its 
"impossibility of fully constituting itself'.40 Afterwards, Laclau expanded on 
this idea, asserting that with the concept of antagonism we are faced with a 
"constitutive outside", which blocks the full constitution of the identity of the 
"inside", rejecting once more Hegel’s attribution of contradictions to reality, 
for these would be internal to the concept, leaving no room for contingency.41
We can start by challenging the sharp distinction between inside and 
outside. Not only the boundaries of social systems are frequently blurred, 
which ought not to be forgotten when we build models to analyse social 
processes, but one should also ask how a perspective that pretends to rest upon 
the notion of social interaction between collective subjects is comfortable with
39Idem, Ibid., p. 115.
40Idem, Ibid., p. 125.
41E. Laclau, "New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time", in Idem, 
op. cit., pp. 17 and 26. The issue is even more problematic because of his 
strange statement that identities are relational, and that all relations are 
internal. See Idem, "Theory, Democracy and Socialism", in Ibid., p. 207.
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this sort of idea. What is a social system - wherein different subjectivities 
constitute their identities, by the same token constituting the identity of this 
inclusive totality - but an entity whose outside and inside can be defined only 
in terms of the referrential we are dealing with, insofar as these two 
dimensions are always present, often intertwined? Are Laclau and Mouffe 
speaking about the construction of subjectivities that oppose each other in the 
contemporary social setting defined in terms of the nation-state, therefore 
incorporating even the relative arbitrariness of this historical construction, or 
do they take it in substantial terms, embracing a perfectly traditional concept 
developed by metaphysics, that of an foreclosed identity? Are they delimiting 
all the possible definitions of meaning for a community in terms of its 
boundaries, with the constitution of societies as monads?
Contradictions, thus, providing they are not forced into the straightjacket 
of a triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, are to be considered as internal to 
social systems, as much as other sorts of relation. Especially if we detach the 
notion of social system from its passive overtones, this idea takes on a more 
relevant meaning, for we are talking about collectivities that develop a specific 
sort of joint movement - of conflict, collaboration or indifference - rather than 
the sheer effect of structural determinations, regardless of whether these are of 
material or linguistic type. This is why Laclau’s rejoinder to Mouzelis is so 
unconvincing as well, since the former’s theorisation is not comprehensive 
enough to come to terms with the whole of social life.42 Moreover, they
42Idem, Ibid., p. 222. For the critic, see N. Mouzelis, "Marxism or Post- 
Marxism", New Left Review, n. 167, 1988 (34:61).
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basically address the constitution of social movements. It is certainly not 
because these are unimportant that I advance this last remark; on the contrary, 
they should be included in a wider theoretical mould and find their specificity 
within this more general picture.
IV)STRUCTURES AND CAUSALITY
In the preliminary remarks to his studies on world religions, Weber 
proposed the question of the "universal historical problem" that besets a "son" 
of the European culture: which "chain of circumstances" (Verkettung von 
Umstdnden) has led to the appearance of cultural phenomena in the West with 
"universal significance and validity"?43 He was, of course, speaking of 
rationalisation processes, and furthermore he was especially concerned with the 
development of (rational) capitalism. It was therefore necessary to study 
economic conditions in order to explain this phenomenon. But this would not 
suffice on its own: another "causality complex" {Kausalzusammenhang) should 
be sought, inasmuch as the origins "economic rationalism" are dependent upon 
specific types of ways of life (Lebensfuhrung). His studies of world religions 
aspired to an understanding of which specific factors had furnished, through 
a peculiar "content of faith", the "conditions for the origin" of an ethos, an 
"economic disposition", which brought the Protestant ethic to the fore.44
43M. Weber, "Vorbemerkungen" (1904), in Gesalmmelte Aufstzae zur
Religionsoziologie, Tubingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1922, p. 1.
^Idem, Ibid., pp. 12-5.
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Comparison was the basic procedure he used to make out what particularities 
belong to Western evolution.
In his historical investigation, Weber abided by his more general comments 
on the role of meaning in the explanation of human conduct and even on 
rationality as a yardstick for that process of understanding,45 issues sharpened 
by the historical context upon which he fastened, in which the individuation 
and rationalisation of conduct assumed prominence. He also remained true to 
his belief in the unavoidable selection of angles and materials investigators 
carry out when projecting and doing research, in accordance with their own 
situation and values. And he lent enormous weight to his previous observations 
on the role of "mental experiments", "objective possibilities" in history, ideal- 
types construction and the isolation of possible causal elements.46 The 
Protestant ethic was held responsible for triggering off processes of 
rationalisation and economic development: its potential development could 
have occurred elsewhere, but did not, since these factors were absent. The 
secular developments of that ethic maintained those processes and enhanced 
them.
Putting forward the analysis of "concomitant variations", Durkheim went 
in fact further than Weber and presented this method as the main and almost 
exclusive one for sociology. Lacking possibilities to execute real experiments, 
sociologists need to employ an alternative, "indirect experimentation", that is,
45See Idem, "Soziologische Grundbegriffe", in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur 
Wissenschaftslehre.
46Idem, "Objektive Moglichkeit und adequate Verurachung in der 
historischen Kausalbetrachtung", in Ibid., pp. 266ff.
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the "comparative method".47 He quickly dismissed Comte’s recourse to 
historical reasoning, since he was not interested in the sort of problem - the 
direction of human progress in general - which that philosopher wanted to 
grasp. Convinced that to one effect only one cause corresponds, he imagined 
that it was possible to isolate variables that could explain "social facts", 
although he did not naively expect a perfect initial match between those two 
elements, for unknown causes and effects are bound to remain hidden in the 
course of research.48
In Weber, the efficacy of causation often took the form of intentional 
causation, directly related to the attribution of meaning, by individuals, to the 
world and to their action. He combined, thus, the identification of factors 
which, methodologically, seem to have a factual, external nexus only - e.g. 
capitalism and the Protestant ethic - but did not detach it from the actors’ 
intentional behaviour. Nevertheless, his position was not clear as to what 
constituted the internal causal relationships: his neo-Kantianism induced him 
to affirm the chaotic character of the world, simultaneously, however, with the 
underscoring of general causal relations imputed to reality by the researcher 
himself.49 His was, therefore, a dubious answer to Hume’s view of causality 
as a plain association realised by the observer between phenomena with
47E. Durkheim, R&gles de la Methode Sociologique, pp. 124-5.
48Idem, Ibid., pp. 128-31. As is well known, he also contrasted cause to 
function. For reasons repeatedly stressed above I do not accept the second 
element as more than methodologically useful.
49M. Weber, "Die ’Objektivitat* sozialwissenschaftlicher und 
sozialpolitischen Erkenntnis" (1904), in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur 
Wissenschaftslehre.
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absolute external connections (see chap. 1.1). Durkheim also brought the social 
facts that constrain individuals, identified via the method of "concomitant 
variations", to bear on their conscience and consciousness: as aspects of the 
"collective conscience" they determine the behaviour of actors.50 His 
proclamation of one cause corresponding to only one effect could hardly leave 
other doors open.
There is an array of important ideas in those recommendations. Yet I think 
that it is necessary to clarify some of their insights and then draw them close 
to the positions I have hitherto elaborated. We have discussed at a certain stage 
(in chap. 6.III) the role ideal-types, as structural models, play in the process 
of research. To an extent, i.e. ideally, they duplicate the processes of 
structuring of social life. They were deemed, following Weber and Schutz, 
fictitious structures, useful as models for investigation. The Protestant ethic, 
as the former precisely stated, was an ideal-type, a historical individuality; its 
factual existence could not be separated from individual consciousness and the 
relations between actors, which, pace his misguided methodological 
individualism, Weber did not altogether neglect. Durkheim’s case is different, 
since, affirming a "collective conscience" over and above individual actors, he 
committed the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness", imputing to reality what 
ought to be seen as simply a theoretical structure. On the other hand, his 
collectivist bias prevented him from ascribing that causation to individuals - 
and only then to groups, as did Weber. Instead, certain sections of the
50This is especially clear in E. Durkheim, Le Suicide, Paris, Alcan, 1930 
(1897), especially pp. 143ff.
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population were directly endowed with propensities to act, which constituted 
a reified "habitus".
We must, however, stress once more that collectivities cannot be reduced 
to individual actors, for they have properties of their own, which must not be 
reified. They exist only in and through interaction, although they become 
embodied in institutions, cultural works, machines, etc. - their reproduced 
patterns plus hermeneutic and organic aspects, which will be examined in the 
following chapter. When we focus on comparisons between social systems, in 
an attempt at grasping which distinctive factors are at work, producing 
processes within them and their interactive systems, what comes under 
inspection are, in fact, their properties. These properties exert sway, 
nevertheless, only through the impact of the collectivities they constitute. 
Otherwise we would just have inert properties. All in all collective causality 
is of crucial significance.
Therefore, Protestant sects should not be overlooked when the Protestant 
ethic is contemplated: that cultural formation was nothing but an element, a 
property of their constitution. Nor when we concentrate on the impact of 
socialist or ecological, domestic or scientific practices, must social movements, 
the family or scientific communities, be disregarded. The same holds true with 
regard to the influence of Western economies over the world: what is at stake 
is the impact those interactive networks exercise upon the other economic 
systems, not the influence of a thing, irrespective of how reified those systems 
are. We are speaking, thus, of the ascendancy which - for different reasons, 
counting on coercion or not - certain collectivities happen to enjoy, in the
cultural, economic, political or whatever aspect of social systems. This line of 
argument is at variance with Habermas’ sharp separation between the theory 
of evolution and history (see chap. 3.III). The structures of learning he fastens 
upon are just useful research models, but nothing else, and cannot be 
disconnected from collective subjectivities, despite even their solidification in 
institutions and the like. Structuralist influences are valuable up to a point 
only.
In all these cases the internal contingency and the external features of the 
constitution of collective subjectivities must be given due attention. They 
mediate between individual intentionality and encompassing social systems. I 
shall take up later the impact of Protestantism in the creation of modernity. 
The question of collective subjectivity and its relative (de)centring will be 
pursued after the efforts of sociologists and historians, and the problems thus 
far discussed will receive a concrete illustration.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY AND MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
I)PERSPECTIVES AND ORGANIC CONSTITUTION
I shall undertake now a discussion of collective subjectivities* 
hermeneutic dimension and of what will be called their organic constitution. 
Conceived overall, the whole comprising the hermeneutic dimension and the 
organic constitution, plus the space-time dimension to be introduced below, 
furnishes what could be declared the "formal" causality of social systems, that 
is the conditions whereby they are (re)produced and changed. The 
multidimensionality of social systems, recently underscored by Alexander1 - 
who handles it with reference to the "conditional" and the "normative" aspects 
of individual action as well as within a renewed version of Parsons’ AGIL 
scheme - will be thereby assessed.
Mead is better known for the concepts he forged to analyse the 
constitution of one’s identity in terms of the interactional aspect of social life, 
but his work contains some formulations that pertain to the hermeneutics of 
collective subjectivity. According to him, when the "self-conscious" human 
individual assumes the organised social attitudes of the social group or 
community to which he belongs, he enters into relations with other social 
groups, through participation in, and formation of, his own social group. In 
modem, complex societies, these groups are of two types:
’J. C. Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, v. 1, pp. 65-6, and The 
Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons, passim.
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Some of them arc concrete social classes or subgroups, such as 
political parties, clubs, corporations, which are actually 
functional social units, in terms of which their individual 
members are directly related to one another. The others are 
abstract social classes or subgroups, such as the class of debtors 
and the class of creditors, in terms of which their individual 
members are related to one another only more or less indirectly, 
and which only more or less indirectly function as social 
units....
This sort of insertion into social relations puts the individual in contact 
with several other individuals. This is how people attain their individuality, 
recognising the common perspective of the community, in a two way 
process.2
1 have criticised Mead above for his excessive emphasis on the role of 
society in the maturation of the individual self - even though he positively 
rejected the idea of group mind as pre-given vis-d-vis interactions; he lacked 
as well an articulate concept of collective subjectivity. Substantively, however, 
in the dimension of their hermeneutic constitution, the notion was present. The 
twofold differentiation he sketched should, furthermore, be considered almost 
in terms of ideal-types, for concrete social systems might be placed, even 
along their "life time" span, in more intermediate positions in relation to the
2 G. Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, pp. 158-9; and also "The Objective 
Reality of Perspectives" (1932), in On Social Psychology, Chicago and 
London, Chicago University Press, 1972, pp. 346-8.
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two kinds of unit he portrayed. It is not difficult to realise that his distinction 
refers, at least partially, to two sharply defined levels of centring of 
collectivities, which, in general theoretical terms, should be avoided. The idea 
he advanced, despite these drawbacks, is essential for the characterisation of 
the hermeneutic dimension of social systems. It sustains the collective identity 
of a social system, to whatever degree it happens to emerge, informs its 
objectives and goals, and mediates its interactions with other collectivities.
We must concurrently bear in mind the very common circumstance, 
asserted by Habermas (who harks back to the tradition of the critique of 
ideologies), that it may be imperative to go behind openly stated perspectives, 
in search for a "deep" hermeneutic that makes clear the meaning behind the 
meaning. Understanding and explaining must travel together, for other factors 
such as power and domination must be reckoned with. In fact, those processes 
may be completely overlooked by individuals and groups, insofar as the 
internalisation of norms very often entails psychological "mechanisms of 
defense", with repression and rationalisations resulting for individuals, which 
block for them any possibility of considering their own hidden motivations.3 
These motivations, norms and mechanisms receive expression in collective 
"habituses" and ideologies.
We should be wary of positing a general and overarching perspective in 
the constitution of a social system. We would be better off were we to take 
into account a relatively more heterogeneous constitutional formation. It may
3J. Habermas, Erkentnnis and Interest, p. 298, and "Die 
Universalitatsanspruch der Hermeneutik", in Zur Logic der 
Sozialwissenschaften, p. 345.
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in fact be the case that a social system is really homogeneous in terms of 
perspectives, which are evenly shared by its members. It may, on the other 
hand, be that heterogeneity and differentiation are writ large - with, 
nevertheless, a common overall pattern prevailing and establishing the general 
lines along which that heterogeneity develops, whereby the different local 
perspectives that constitute the internal or perpendicular social systems that 
comprise the units of the inclusive or semi-inclusive one should be seen as 
specifications of the more general perspective.4 Conversely, the partial 
perspectives may be actually sharply dissimilar, sharing very little common 
ground - other processes would, therefore, contribute to the permanence of the 
system. What is more likely to happen, though, is that the hermeneutic 
constitution of concrete social systems occurs somewhere in between those 
extremes of heterogeneity and homogeneity. And, of course, the movements 
of specification and generalisation work as much from the bottom to the top 
as the other way round, which was not taken into consideration by Parsons, 
who was keen on highlighting the first process. Once again the dialectics of 
the general, the particular and the singular must be brought to bear. We should 
especially recall to mind that the life-worlds we discussed in relation to Schutz 
and Habermas (in chap. 6.IV) are, in fact, another way of speaking of this
4See T. Parsons, "A Tentative Outline of American Values", in R. 
Robertson and B. S. Turner, eds., Talcott Parsons, Theorist of Modernity, pp. 
37ff; "An Outline of the Social System", in T. Parsons et al., Theories o f 
Society, p. 45; and Societies, p. 23. We find in Foucault the same sort of 
intuition, first more directly connected to structuralism and then when he drew 
upon his former ideas to deal with the constitutive and juridical aspects of 
power, arriving at the notion of dispositif. See, respectively, M. Foucault, V  
Archeologie du Savoir, passim, and UHistoire de la Sexualite, pp. 109, 117-8, 
185-6, 190 and 207.
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hermeneutic dimension. As we have seen previously, even if a general pattern 
is shared by a collectivity, a certain amount of internal differentiation is likely 
to be displayed.
In any case, intellectuals are of paramount relevance in the conformation 
of social systems’ hermeneutic dimension as well as in regard to other aspects 
of social life.5 Specialists in the domain of mental labour are extremely 
important; if we accept Gramsci’s radical formulation of intellectual activity 
as the domain of every individual, reflexivity - with its intended and 
unintended consequences - becomes an even more striking feature of social 
systems once these are conceived of as systems of action. Thereby we should 
be able to reject once again, from another angle, the reification of collective 
subjectivity, with respect now to the theme of reflexivity.
The interaction between collectivities - of collaboration, conflict, 
dominance or subordination - is an essential aspect of the process of formation 
of a social system’s perspective. I have earlier (in chap. 6.II) considered the 
interaction between collectivities with respect to the "labelling" of deviance; 
national, continental and civilisational identities should be regarded in the same 
connection. Not only may they directly influence another system - as in the 
case, for example, of direct military conquests and the ensuing possible 
reformulation of social life and cultural patterns; but a more diffuse contact is 
also common, as when cities or nation-states compare themselves with other 
cities or nation-states and draw upon and/or reject, either partially or
5See A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere (texts of 1930/2), v. I, pp. 474ff 
and v. 3, pp. 1513ff.
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thoroughly, the features that define their hermeneutic dimension, and in so 
doing constitute their own.
Countries like Russia, Japan or those that comprise "Latin" America are 
cases in point, but England, France and Germany, or the European Community, 
participate in the same interactive mutual constitution of societies. After its 
emergence as the dominant pole in the world, the position of Western culture 
has evidently become of particular significance in relation to this problem.6 
Once again intellectuals are key agents in the construction of these 
perspectives. We can in fact say that the social sciences as whole have been 
characterised by a Western slant. This is often implied in reflections which 
show their connections to the societies in which they emerged (as in the case 
of this study). But this should show as well how much they owe to their 
peculiar insertion in the process of globalisation developing in the moment of 
their emergence. The outcome of this process of formation makes once more 
manifest the extent to which "understanding" often means misunderstanding in 
the interaction between collectivities. This is conspicuous in the case, for 
instance, of so-called "archaic" societies, which have been depicted in quite 
idealised ways. This expressed, according to one commentator, the "nostalgia" 
that pervaded the West at the onset of its process of "modernization":
In other words, while Western imperialism of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved the political
6I have discussed this question, as for "Latin" America, in J. M. 
Domingues, "A America. Intelectuais, Interpreta9oes e Identidades", Dados, v. 
35, 1992.
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and symbolic incorporation of African and other territories into 
the national identities of the imperialist nations, it also involved 
the attribution to primal societies of cohesive functionality. That 
exercise actually combined a modernist notion of function with 
a nostalgic injection of a Western conception of Gemeinschaft?
In terms of material foundations, as a direct offspring of his AGIL scheme, 
Parsons produced a conceptualisation that aimed at achieving a more subtle 
understanding of concrete social systems. If all of them could be compressed 
into that single mould, different types of systems would concentrate, 
functionally, on different requirements defined by the general scheme. This 
means, as for the adaptation function, that, although some social systems 
"function" having material productive activity as their chief concern, all of 
them are to a certain extent entangled in this dimension - for "...every social 
system has an economic aspect".8 Despite other interesting remarks, Parsons 
sustained a biased Cartesian contention which stated that social systems have
7R. Robertson, Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture, London, 
Sage, 1992, p. 148.
8T. Parsons and N. Smelser, Economy and Society, p. 15. For reasons 
already stated, I disagree with the idea upheld in this very passage, when 
differentiating social systems in general from collectivities and inserting the 
economy in the first categorisation. In accordance with the main theses of this 
study an economy constitutes a collectivity, in spite of its typically low level 
of centring in the empirical realm. Herein I focus on the economy as an 
analytical element.
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no contact with the "organic world", which falls upon the "behavioural 
organism".9
What Giddens has characterised, attempting to rework Marx’s major 
insights, as the human "existential contradiction", has, however, direct 
implications for the theoretical definition of social systems. In Gidden’s 
original formulation of that contradiction, it refers to humans’ bodily 
constitution and the processes of interchange they unavoidably carry out with 
nature.10 As for social systems, this is what was above named organic 
constitution, a universal feature inherent to the concept of collective 
subjectivity. And it is on this irreducible basis, which is never thoroughly 
mastered by the humanisation of nature (including our inner and bodily one), 
that I want to place the "material" causality of social systems: this rescues the 
Aristotelian vision of "...life as a self-organizing, self-maintaining form, which 
can only operate in and therefore is inseparable from its material 
embodiment".11 It is endowed with an efficacy that, notwithstanding its being 
mediated by social relations, has always an external character. Multicausality 
must be granted centre stage. Whether the social dynamic rests more upon the 
weight of this material dimension or upon the hermeneutic one is something 
that cannot be decided in principle, but only empirically.
^  Parsons, Societies, pp. 8 and 15-6.
10A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 161.
nC. Taylor, Hegel, p. 81. "Form" and material "content" are intertwined, 
since one does not precede the other.
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Marx’s analyses of the labour process were above (chap. 4.II) criticised for 
their underlying individualism; it is better to place stronger emphasis on the 
interactive moment of the human interchange with nature. This should 
underscore the fact that individuals relate to nature through the mediation of 
the interactive system in which they belong. This is so in the case of material 
production as well as in the situation wherein the material core of a social 
system is merely a component harnessed in the endeavour of achieving goals 
that pertain to another sphere. Marx was aware of the role of the products of 
work as means of consumption: dead labour should be set in movement by 
living labour in the process of production.12 We can say that in social systems 
directly geared towards processes of material production, dead labour is 
consumed "productively", whereas in social systems that are geared towards 
other social spheres this consumption simply furnishes the bases whereupon 
the collectivity is constituted. The organic constitution of a social system is, 
therefore, necessarily part of nature, one which is, nevertheless, already 
transformed by erstwhile processes, and creates conditions that allow for the 
development of other interactions, in terms of multifarious and 
multidimensional collective practices. There remains, in any event, an 
unsurpassable natural element in all these social processes, as even an anti- 
essentialist thinker such as Foucault had to reckon, in relation to the biological
12K. Marx, D as Kapital, B. I, pp. 194-7.
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bodily features that supply the basis whereupon power dispositives perform, 
turning the body "docile" or forming human social sexuality.13
II)THE SPACE-TIME DIMENSION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
The space-time dimension must be added to our depiction of social 
systems as collective subjectivities. Traditionally, it has been taken for granted 
in sociological analyses, being more of a concern to philosophers and 
historians than to sociologists. Recently, this has being changing, but the social 
system perspective on this problem has not, however, been extensively nor 
successfully treated. A rejection of the Cartesian-Hobbesian view of social 
actor connects to a problematisation of the Newtonian-Kantian view of natural 
and social time and space in which individuals and collectivities are seen as 
moving through uniform time and undiferentiated space. Therefore, once 
collective subjectivities are introduced and placed at the core of the analysis, 
a new view of space and time becomes imperative.
Influenced by the definition of time and space by Newton as the 
coordinates wherein physical phenomena occur, Kant stated their existence as 
a priori elements of human faculties, which allow for synthetical knowledge: 
the structure of the human mind corresponds to that of nature, which was 
thereby understood as though internalised as an objective condition of 
knowledge. Parsons patently incorporated this point of view, giving short shrift
13M. Foucault, Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prision, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1975, pp. 147ff; and Histoire de la Sexualite, v. 1, pp. 182ff.
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to contemporary developments in the physical sciences. In the means-end 
analytic scheme of his theory of action, time had great importance as the 
coordinate wherein individuals carry their actions out Space, conversely, was 
granted no role at the analytical level, although both were, of course, deemed 
relevant at the concrete level. If time clearly conformed to the Kantian view 
in the analytical dimension, together with space this obtained even more 
distinctly in the concrete level, since therein the focus was on the movement 
of beings within the Newtonian framework.14 Parsons stuck to these ideas in 
his subsequent work, introducing the "action-space" analytic dimension when 
he first formulated the AGIL scheme.15 Finally he arrived at the definition of 
time as a situational "parametric variable", wherein action takes place16; even 
though space was not brought up then, the formulation clearly rested upon the 
same initial foundations.
Giddens has tried a reassessment of the issue, whilst bearing in mind, at 
least in principle, some powerful influences - contemporary physics, Schutz’s 
and Heidegger’s phenomenologies, human geography and the Annales School’s 
discussions of the duree of social life. As usual, he is very critical of 
functionalism, which is attacked for having mistakingly identified time and
14T. Parsons, The Structure o f Social Action, pp. 45 and 762-3.
15T. Parsons and R. F. Bales, "The Dimensions of Action-Space", in 
Working Papers in the Theory of Action, pp. 71-88.
16T. Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological Theories in Terms of the 
Theory of Action", in Sigmund Koch, ed., Psychology: a Study of a Science, 
v. 3, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959, p. 638.
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change.17 Against Parsons’ version of the ’’problem of order", he proposes a 
novel question: he asks how "form" comes about in social life, that is how 
social systems "bind" time and space, answering his query by pointing to the 
exercise of power.18 In a general statement on temporality, he enumerates 
three durations: Schutz’s temporality of immediate experience, of daily life; 
Heidegger’s temporality of the Dasein, the individual life-cycle; and Braudel’s 
longue duree - "the long term sedimentation of social institutions".19 Drawing 
upon Hagerstrand’s notion of individuals’ "life-paths" and Goffman’s "locales" 
- which are coupled with a peculiar reading of Heidegger - he offers still one 
more appraisal of the problem, according to which its solution must be 
discovered by "grasping the inteipenetration of presence and absence, the 
movements of individuals through time-space seen as processes of ’presencing/ 
absencing”’.20
It is undeniable that Giddens* proposes new openings for the theme. But 
not only contemporary physics and Braudel’s durees do not receive adequate 
attention; his position is far too individualistic to come to grips with the 
broader space-time dimension of social systems. In what follows I shall 
concentrate on this axis.
,7A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 198.
18Idem, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, pp. 30 and 84, 
and The Constitution o f Society, pp. 35 and 258ff.
19Idem, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, pp. 19-20.
20Idem, Ibid., p. 37. See also his "Time and Social Organization", in Social 
Theory and Modern Sociology.
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Norbert Elias advanced what may constitute a fresh start to our discussion 
when he wrote that the universe has added to the four dimensions of space and 
time a fifth one, "of consciousness, experience, or however one expresses it", 
with the appearance of human beings.21 Beyond the space-time dimension of 
nature we must, thus, consider, at a specific stage in biological evolution, a 
space-time social dimension, which possesses a conscious, phenomenological 
aspect. He suggested an interesting thesis on the "civilisational" outcome that 
the concept of time represents, not an a priori, contrary to what Descartes and 
Kant thought: it unifies a whole ensemble of processes and perceptions. Yet 
his position needs to be reformulated so as to lend a wider meaning to the fifth 
- social - dimension he identified. This is the space-time dimension of social 
systems and, whereas consciousness is an unavoidable trait of social relations, 
the awareness of that dimension individuals and collectivities manifest (as, in 
fact, of any other) is variable in its level and content. Social systems exist as 
physical space-time, in terms of the four dimensional coupling of these notions 
proposed by contemporary physics; but they are space-time in terms of their 
own constitution as social dimensions too.
Braudel’s durees are particularly relevant to this discussion. He started by 
defining different "histories": the first, that of man with its environment, full 
of recurrences, almost without movement; the second, a slowly metred history, 
of "groups" and "groupings" - "social", he would say, if the term had not been, 
he argued, "deformed"; and a third one, traditional, which deals with
21N. Elias, Time: an Essay, Oxford, Basil Blackwell/ Cambridge, Three 
Cambridge Center, 1992 (1987), p. 81 (and also p. 35).
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individuals, rich in passions and quick rhythms, an histoire ivinementielle?2 
In subsequent publications he essayed to refine this ideas, giving them at times 
new twists. Without much specification he introduced the very slow time of 
"civilisations"23, which was at last merged with the time of geography to 
produce the longue dur&e. To assign a theoretical place to this duration, the 
concept of "structure", imported from L^vi-Strauss’s ethnology, was 
introduced. The two other temporalities remained as well, with the notion of 
conjuncture crafted to deal with the intermediate level24 It should be noted, 
though, that throughout these formulations every now and then he alluded to 
these durees as "rhythms" rather than things or types of history.
It is necessary to stress the heterogeneity of the categories he made use of. 
Why confine tenements and the short duration to individuals? 
Notwithstanding his general anti-individualistic standpoint,25 Braudel seems 
to have been definitely committed to an individualistic view of agency. On the 
contrary, we may say that organisations and social groups - i.e. collective 
subjectivities - are as important as individuals at the ivenementiel level. In a
22Femand Braudel, La Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen d 
VEpoque de Philippe II, v. I, Paris, Armand Colin, 1966 (1949), pp. 16-7.
23Idem, "Positions de l’Histoire en 1950", in Ecrits sur VHistoire, Paris, 
Flammarion, 1969, p. 24.
24Idem, "Histoire et Science Sociales. La Longue Dur6e" (1958), in Ecrits 
sur VHistoire, pp. 44-50. A steering force behind these shifts were the disputes 
within French academy. It is arguable whether the result of these disguised
skirmishes was healthy to his formulations. See Jacques le Goff, "Le 
Changement dans la Continuite", and Frangois Dosse, "Les Habits Neufs du 
President Braudel", both in Espace Temps, n. 34-35, 1986 (respectively 20:22 
and 83:93).
“F. Braudel, "Positions de l’Histoire en 1950", pp. 21 and 35.
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sense, the very idea of evenement should be refashioned in order to allow for 
other occurrences that go beyond sheer individual action and causality. 
Moreover, why oppose conjuncture to longue durie, in other words, social 
groups to civilisations? They are both social systems, whereas geographical 
conditions should be kept analytically apart, conceived of as part of their 
organic constitution. Paul Ricoeur, in a recent book, has arrived at conclusions 
very similar in spirit to the ones I advance, when analysing this strand of 
French historiography. Departing from Aristotle’s account of narrative 
procedures, he identifies the "^w&H-characters" that historiography brings under 
the limelights in its narrative. Collectivities, organisations, nations, 
civilisations, engender the plot through which contemporary historians portray 
the unfolding of their subject matter.26 We can profit from his discernment 
and assert that it is the whole space-time dimension of social systems that is 
depicted through that narration, although the first term of the pair comes out 
clearly, however partially, when structural analyses are undertaken.
It is true that individuals have a role to play in the space-time constitution 
of social systems. To do this, Hagelstrand’s space-time paths followed by 
individuals in daily life, forming bundles that give rise to social life,27 should 
be coupled with the notion of unintended consequences of action, recently 
discussed in relation to time by Patrik Baert - so as to incorporate and go
26Paul Ricoeur, Temps et Recit, t. I, Paris, Seuil, 1985, pp. 255 and 270ff.
27See Torsten Hagerstrand, "The Domain of Human Geography", in 
Richard J. Chorley, ed., Directions in Geography, London, Methuen & Co., 
1973; and "Space, Time and Human Condition", in A. Karlquist et al.t eds., 
Dynamic Allocation o f Urban Space, Wermeads, Saxon House/ Lexington, 
Lexington Books, 1975.
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further than Elias’ formulation of the fifth dimension as necessarily 
conscious.28 Carrying out their activities, individuals contribute - intendedly 
or unintendedly, knowledgeably or not - to the space-time constitution of social 
systems. In any case, Braudel’s utilisation of Levi-Strauss’s concept of 
structure should be revised, since he embraced, however in a transformed 
manner, the ontological character that lies at the core of the latter’s idea. 
Rather than a structure, the longue durie, like the others, refers to the rhythms 
of unfolding, reproduction and change, of social systems. Structures in 
Braudel’s case point in fact to "structurings1' (and "destructurings") that lead 
to the patterning of social systems, the constituting processes of which we shall 
once more dwell upon below. Although his durations do not furnish precise 
concepts - and it should be said that not all social systems, some of fairly brief 
existence, attain the long duration - they bring into the open the problem and 
hint at possible solutions.29
This constitutes the time aspect of the space-time dimension of social 
systems. As for the space aspect, Giddens’ contribution, above mentioned, may 
be assumed to be correct, providing we add some elements to his formulation. 
He understands that power is the main element in the bringing together of 
otherwise scattered elements of social systems. Alongside Mann’s 
differentiation between "intensive" and "extensive" power, this conception is 
of fundamental importance to thinking about the establishment of what have
28P. Baert, Time, Self, and Social Being, pp. 104-66.
29This is the case also with the discussion proposed by G. Gurvitch, The 
Spectrum o f Social Time, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1964, pp. 29ff.
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been called "boundaries" and the higher or lower internal density of social 
systems.30 But other elements must be taken into account: dispositions, 
interests, "value commitments" and the like (which will be discussed shortly) 
are important elements in this process and an assessment of a social system’s 
spacial configuration is incomplete if it does not pay attention to them. 
Therefore, their limits may be more or less clearly defined (in terms of "roles", 
membership, closeness or openness to "interchange" with other systems); and 
they are internally condensed to varying degrees.
We can now propose a definition of the space-time dimension of social 
systems, the two aspects of which have been, for exposition’s sake, analytically 
treated in separation. Space-time is the dimension of social systems that 
accounts for their rhythms of unfolding, reproduction and interaction as more 
or less demarcated and compact entities. In addition, they evolve within 
encompassing social systems, which contribute to their space-time constitution, 
whilst they exert, in turn, an influence on the same dimension of these broader 
systems. Even if only partially intertwined with each other, or when they 
simply share the same interactive setting, social systems yield a reciprocal 
influence on their respective space-time constitution.
Such a notion of configuration offers, moreover, an alternative to the 
notion of boundaries which - from Parsons’ use of biological and general 
systems theory on - has become so prominent in sociology, even in Habermas’
30M. Mann, The Sources o f  Social Power, v. I, p. 7.
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work.31 That formulation implies a rigidity, definition and clear-cut 
delimitation which is often inimical to the reality of those social interactive 
bundles. Not only do they intertwine, share blurred "frontiers" (as, for instance, 
most states before the modem era did) and have an identity which does not 
sharply separate them out from other systems, which, from another angle, 
Parsons’ "onion-like" scheme does suggest -at best the attribution of sharply 
demarcated boundaries is a formulation of the analyst, similar and perhaps 
linked to the concept of model or structure formerly debated, although some 
collectivities, such as nation-states originally (though no longer) near this 
distinct insularity.
This portrait of different social systems, in varied and uneven relations, 
with diverse rhythms and configurations, is directly related to the conception 
of social systems developed in this study, based, as it is, on social relations 
and the establishment of properties that cannot be reduced to the elementary 
elements that constitute these systems. This is one of the primary reasons for 
the refusal of a Newtonian-Hobbesian view of social life (expounded in chap. 
1 .III) - and why an alternative to it was pursued. The traditional conception of 
time and space forwarded by Newton and Kant does not suffice any longer 
either. Consequently, inspiration was looked for in contemporary notions of 
physics, with Minkowski’s four dimensional space-time held loosely as an 
alternative view of the problem, although it is not, of course, mandatory.
31T. Parsons, The Social System, pp. 36, 482-3 and 542-3; "On Building 
Social Systems Theory", in Social Systems and the Evolution o f Action Theory, 
pp. 27-8 and 48-9; and "An Outline of the Social System", in T. Parsons et al.t 
Theories o f Society, pp.34-5 and 38ff. For Habermas, see chap. 3.II.
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In any case, the conceptualisation above proposed is very much in 
agreement with the conviction that animates contemporary cosmology. In 
Michael Shallins’ words:
Our cosmology, therefore, is an abstract and mathematical one.
We no longer envisage the universe in terms of absolute space, 
a vast three dimensional matrix in which things happen at 
specific moments according to some absolute and universal 
clock, but as one in which time is relative, passes by at variable 
rates for different observers and yet, seemingly, can be thought 
of as ticking by uniformly for the universe as a whole.32
Added to this, it should be stressed that the "fifth", social dimension of 
space-time must not be oblivious to the impact of collective subjectivities: they 
are essential factors, not only via their internal unfolding and reproduction, but 
via interaction too, to the establishment of both the local and the global time 
that ticks nowadays for the human species as a whole as well as in terms of 
the rhythms which, for the simple fact that they have themselves an organic 
basis, social systems contradictorily share with nature.33 This is an element 
which they can by no means evade. In fact, the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics probably underpins, in social systems as well as in nature,
32Michael Shallins, "Time and Cosmology", in Raymond Flood and 
Michael Lockwood, eds., The Nature of Time, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986,
p. 66.
33See Barbara Adam, Time and Social Theory, Cambridge, Polity, 1990.
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the irreversibility of time, the pointing of its "arrow" in the direction of the 
future.
III)DISPOS ITION S, INTERESTS AND THE STRUCTURING OF 
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITIES
The notion of "structuring" processes of social systems (discussed in chap. 
6.III) - and more directly related to face-to-face interactions - can be now 
referred to collective subjectivities, bearing in mind also the theme of 
multicausality. We will be able thereby to contemplate the processes of 
constitution of large-scale social systems.
Reshaping Marx’s understanding of the relations between the classes by 
means of the concept of hegemony, Gramsci attempted to shed light on how 
coercion and consensus contribute concurrently to the reproduction and 
possible change of society. He was keen on grasping and stressing the means 
and forms whereby some rule, legitimately within certain limits, whilst others 
are oppressed, without, however, usually sliding into passive subordination.34 
Parsons’ notion of power as a medium wherewith commitments are enacted 
within social systems shares similar insights with Gramsci - notwithstanding 
his avoidance of issues linked to domination and class struggle plus, once 
again, an excessive stress on integration, via moral commitments. Consisting 
of a "media of interchange", power would insure the performance of the units
34This is present throughout his writings, but see especially A. Gramsci, 
Quaderni del Carceri, v. 2, pp. 1222 and 1245-50 (texts from 1932/5), and v. 
3, p. 2010 (text from 1934/5).
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of a system in terms of collective goals. The explicit or implicit threat of force 
would back up this capacity of enacting commitments and mobilising the 
collectivity internally.35 Parsons* idea supposes and demands, instead of being 
excluded by, a more traditional notion of power, which harks back to the 
realism of Hobbes and Weber. This notion is contemporarily sustained by 
Giddens, according to whom power is the capacity to make one’s will prevail 
despite or against the will or resistance of another, within relations based on 
divergent interests and unequal resources.36
In the middle period of Parsons’ development Lockwood pointed to the 
underestimation of the material dimension of social action in those 
functionalist theories. By this he meant interests, which could not be reduced 
to the normative dimension, either conceptually or in reality, since the 
conflictual nature of society originates from them.37 By the time Parsons had 
become an institutional monument in the American university, a renewed wave 
of utilitarianism was to gather momentum, with particular awareness of the 
theme characterised as "collective action".
Mancur Olson brought out the unlikely unification of large groups, should 
they organise a collective action oriented towards the realisation of the 
interests of the individuals that comprise them, whereas as for small groups the
35T. Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power" (1963) and "Some 
Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process" (1964), in Sociological 
Theory and Modern Society.
36A. Giddens, "The Concept of Power in the Writings of Talcott Parsons", 
in Studies in Social and Political Theory, p. 347.
37D. Lockwood, "Some Remarks on ’The Social System’", The British 
Journal o f Sociology, v. 7, 1956 (134:146).
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situation would be rather distinct. The inevitable dispersion of the large group, 
and the irrelevance of individual actions taken outside its organisation, would 
make collective action impossible, unless there were other "positive 
inducements" or plain coercion to join in, or else if it beget "by products", 
which constitute "selective incentives". Another difficulty would be yielded by 
what has been called "free rider" benefits, i.e. those that accrue to an 
individual without any cost, irrespective of whether s/he participates or not in 
the inclusive group’s collective action. Individuals, because of their interests, 
would, therefore, not come together in a joint movement. However, in small 
groups, notwithstanding distortions on the allotment of the burden of effort 
amongst actors, the scale of the relationship would entail a collective action 
oriented to the fulfilment of their interests.38 Przeworski, partially influenced 
by this utilitarianism and to counter a culturalistic understanding of Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony, highlighted the interests which, in the working class, 
lead to the reproduction of capitalism in the face of a lack of alternatives and 
problems that are entailed by the transition to socialism.39
I think that it is, nevertheless, necessary to proceed carefully with regard 
to the themes thrown up above. The connection between values, norms and
38Mancur Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1971 (1965), pp. 1-3, 33-4, 46 and 65. It would be fair 
enough to recognise that Marx had himself realised the relevance of the 
problems these writers raise when he discussed the difficult process of class 
constitution, in terms of the options open to individuals in relation to the 
definition of their interests and possible courses of action to fulfil them, as 
well as to the organisations which originate to meet their necessities. See chap. 
4.II.
39A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, chap. IV.
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interests has been mostly a difficult one to grasp and the meaning of the 
meaning of interest has consisted in an almost mute question, pace its 
widespread use in the social sciences. Interest is a notion that assumed 
distinctiveness and prominence only with the emergence of capitalism. Ever 
since the utilitarians defined it as something associated with the pleasure of 
egoistic individuals and took their material - pecuniary - expression as the one 
they could more easily identify and measure40, interests became a centre piece 
of ideologies and of social analyses, without further clarification. Marxists, but 
also authors who belong to other schools, often depict a distinction between 
collectively defined objective and subjective interests41 (which receive, 
however, no actual clarification); Weber stressed individual "materiar and 
"ideal" interests as opposed to "values"42; and Parsons, interestingly enough, 
rephrased that notion with recourse to Freudian insights, fusing organic drives 
and cultural conditionings, which work in terms of optimisation (see chap. 
5.n). In contrast, contemporary utilitarian writers fall back upon the sheer 
pecuniary and measurable interests Bentham conceptualised and bequeathed to 
posterity. At best, they adopt a position analogous to Weber’s. Of course, the
40See Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1977; and Elis Halevy, The Growth o f Philosophical Radicalism, 
London, Faber & Faber, 1934.
41See J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, pp. 511-3 and 941-6.
42M. Weber, "The Social Psychology of World Religions" (1919) in From 
Max Weber. Essays in Sociology (ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills), 
London, Routledge, 1991, p. 280.
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cultural foundations of the capitalist civilisation43 make rather plausible an 
interpretation of humans as self-interested, maximising individuals, which, 
moreover, to a large extent becomes true in social systems organised according 
to those patterns and as a consequence of the absorption of these ideas in 
society at large.
Whether there is an underlying maximising or optimising drive in humans, 
especially in material terms, beyond the level of basic organic subsistence, is 
something the truthfulness of which cannot be decided herein - and its 
arguable whether it could be at all, beyond the inductive knowledge we can 
gain from the study of human history and evolution. Nor is it necessary for 
this investigation. What is needed is the definition of a number of concepts so 
as to assess and explicate the behaviour of individuals in connection to the 
formation of collective subjectivities. I want to propose a threefold analytical 
conceptualisation: interests, dispositions and interactive inclinations comprise 
the set that will answer to that demand.
Interests will be conceived of as objectives which individuals and 
collective subjectivities set to themselves. With this definition, I am following 
Hindess, who, moreover, correctly asserts that interests are not given: on the 
contrary, it is in the interactive processes in which individuals and collectivities 
are enmeshed that their interests take shape - they are not given a priori.44
43See, for a discussion of these cultural elements, Marshall Sahlins, Culture 
and Practical Reason, Chicago/ London, The Chicago University Press, 1976.
^B. Hindess, Political Choice & Social Structure, pp. 36ff and 66ff. For 
a discussion that associates interests, interaction and social movements, see C. 
Tilly, "Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action", Social Research, 
v. 52, 1985 (717:747).
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Interests refer to social and non-social objects. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, 
whereby individuals’ dispositions are brought to bear on a spontaneously 
coordinated collective behaviour (see chap. l.IV), furnishes some further help. 
Dispositions are inclinations to act, i.e. motivations, which do not need to 
imply - although they may - normative anchors, contrary to what Parsons 
thought, insofar as routine may utterly or partially underpin human behaviour. 
These individual dispositions must be regarded, however, in their collective 
dimension, as properties of social systems, whether classes, groups or 
organisations. This train of reasoning by no means leads towards an idea of 
collective motivations thought out after individual psychological mechanisms, 
since social relations provide the means whereby those collective dispositions 
come about; besides, it makes no sense to speak about "gratification" in terms 
of collectivities, unless we refer to individuals. At most, individuals 
psychologically gratified can reinforce the solidarity of the collectivity, to the 
extent that this satisfaction relates to the goals and the functioning of the social 
system. Dispositions of individuals and collectivities are, on the other hand, 
both generated in the course of interactive processes. Dispositions underpin 
interests which, in turn, contribute to the moulding of dispositions. Similarly 
to interests, dispositions address social and non-social objects. The reference 
for both may be the format and direction of those processes as such, producing 
what I want to call the interactive inclinations of social systems. Interactive 
processes are conditional to the attainment of collective goals, which may 
consist of the unfolding and outcome of the interaction as such, per se or with 
regard to other goals. Normativity, material interests, fear, etc., are varied
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elements that constitute the habitus of collectivities and decisively contribute 
to the generation of their interests.
The more centred and compactly organised a social system happens to be 
the more directed and concentrated the final result of its intentional impact. 
Homogeneous groups in terms of individual motivations may, conversely, end 
up with a more loose and dispersive collective disposition, inasmuch as their 
level of centring and density is low. Take, for instance, a factory: traversed by 
conflicts of interest and heterogeneous collective dispositions - e.g. blue and 
white collar workers, managers and owners - it often works with great 
efficiency. The functionalist idea of role-differentiation tried in part to 
account for this.45 On the other hand, a football team may become very weak 
in the face of an adversary, just because it has lost the favour of the 
supporters, or because the coach has no longer the respect of the players, or 
still because internal strife is writ large; the common desire to win may be 
marred by the sheer lack of greater concatenation and mutual allegiance, which 
entails an irresolute collective inclination in relation to the adversary.
Individuals or groups may, therefore, follow their dispositions and thereby 
facilitate a well-centred subjectivity, with distinctive identity, decision-making 
centres, clear membership definition, strong intentionality. But something very 
different may come about. The first possibility is that they do not pull together, 
bringing the level of centring to something close to nought. The second 
possibility is that they in fact organise, but that this does not require a high
45See T. Parsons, The Social System , p. 114.
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level of centring. The concrete corollary hinges, of course, on the concrete 
social system.
All things considered, the idea that interests must be always explicit and 
distinctive, as sustained by Hindess,46 cannot be accepted. It is excessively 
dependent upon his centred notion of actor. Even Parsons, with the substitution 
of "units of action" for "unit acts" - since action, even in individual terms, does 
not always imply distinctive ends - went further in this respect (see chap. 5.II). 
To be sure, it is not that there are interests, which would stem from their 
structural position, that individual actors and collectivities are prevented from 
identifying - although it must be said that social stratification and hierarchy do 
permit that certain collectivities avoid the discussion of issues, prevent people 
from proposing ends and finding out means, as well as give them greater 
capacity of influence over the constitution of other collectivities, their interests 
included. As for the constitution of collective subjectivities, it is capital to 
stress that interests may be more distinctive and homogeneous or more fuzzy 
and heterogeneous, depending on, in some part, the level of (de)centring of the 
collectivity.
The notion of habitus, comprising dispositions, must be seen as an aspect 
of collective life-worids. In this regard, it must be also appraised in specific 
cases bearing in mind the syllogism of the general, the particular and the 
singular. How much individuals and internal (or perpendicular) groups share 
a habitus is a question that must be decided with reference to each concrete 
case. Generally, however, we may say that it has a decisive impact upon the
46B. Hindess, Political Choice & Social Structure, pp. 73-7.
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level of centring of a collective subjectivity, drawing closer or distancing the 
units of which the system is composed. The extent to which interests are, or 
are seen as if they were, complementary is also variable. Coercion, of course, 
plays an eminent role, since, being often a key component of the constitution 
of social systems, it greatly affects their level of centring; the concrete 
distribution of resources between individuals and groups is partially responsible 
for the concrete weight coercion, openly or latently, may assume in an 
interactional setting. Constraint, compromises and consensual regulations, 
based on general or sectional "interests” and dispositions, are forms of the 
structuring of social relations that come about in accordance with collectivities’ 
interactive inclinations.47 These are the processes that govern the 
(re)production of institutions - "the most deeply-layered practices constitutive 
of social systems", in terms of recursive organisation of practices and space­
time breadth, that is their presence across a range of interactions 48
IV)STRATIFICATION AND RESOURCES
We should certainly consider the possibility of social structurings that 
would erase or at least reduce inequalities in social life with regard to certain 
central institutional spheres; social life as we have known it, however, has 
been rife with disparities of power, resources and prestige. To tackle social 
stratification and hierarchies, it is important to take into account that
47J. Habermas, Legitimatiosprobleme im Spatkapitalismus, pp. 153-6.
48See A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 65.
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individuals and groups are defined not only for what they are, but for what 
they are reputed to be too. Their "perceived being" {etre pergu) is, as 
Bourdieu tells us, as important as what they actually are. If their symbolic 
dimension is dependent upon those more straightforward features, it cannot be 
reduced to them.49 As we have seen, Marx’s syllogism implies a hierarchised 
way of structuring social relations. Resources are crucial to this, both in their 
organic and hermeneutic dimensions, as well as in terms of social relations by 
means of which collectivities can mobilise resources in order to (re)produce 
their dominant position or challenge the powerful.
Parsons in fact evoked such distinctions regarding resources with respect 
to an analytical approach to stratification. He advanced a twofold 
conceptualisation, which classifies the units of a system in terms of their 
"ranking" according to the "standards of the common value system", but also 
appraises them in terms of their actual "power", their capacity to attain their 
goals. Whereas evaluation rests upon their perceived "properties" (qualities, 
performances and possessions), in comparison with other units, real power 
should be measured against their actual possessions and the degree of 
indulgence with which their deviances from established norms are m et50 To 
draw these observations closer to the concept of collective subjectivity, certain 
issues must be clarified and some ideas recast.
49P. Bourdieu, Le Sens Pratique, p. 233. See, for further discussion of 
hierarchies in the sociological literature, N. Mouzelis, Back to Sociological 
Theory, chap. 7.
50T. Parsons, "A Revised Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification", 
in Essays in Sociological Theory, pp. 388-92. This ideas received shape before 
his reformulation of the concept of power.
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First I want to introduce a distinction between the organic constitution of 
a social system and the resources that it can bring into play when facing other 
units in a given social arena or field. In concrete terms, the distinction is 
blurred, consisting, however, in a necessary one on the analytical plane. 
Parsons concept of "possessions" will be analytically split in two: they are part 
of a social system, as a property, an intrinsic attribute; or they are elements 
which, lying outside the system, are of feasible manipulation. Properties are 
reproduced and thus endorsed in terms of structurings which, in terms of broad 
social relations, take on an institutional form. Conversely, resources may be 
either institutionalised or possess a more contingent character. Thereby we can 
distinguish between internal and external mobilisation. The first has received 
attention from writers such as Etzioni, who is basically concerned with how 
collectivities are able to achieve higher level of centring and, thereby, of 
"activity", marshalling assets which belong to their "sub-units".51 I want to 
emphasise precisely the other aspect of "mobilisation".
This is how the bourgeoisie, i.e. "capital", is the sum of its material 
possessions, guaranteed by economic, political and cultural institutions, but is 
able - and needs - to swallow the working classes, transforming them into part 
of its own reproduction in the production process. Cognitive capacities fall 
under the same rubric and analytical divisions: industrial espionage furnishes 
information on ways of doing things; once stolen from a company, they 
become part of the constitution of the other which managed to get hold of
51Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society, New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 
387ff.
them, whereas before that they were solely a potential external resource. 
Caught up in the process of the globalization of the planet in a situation of 
practical inferiority, "archaic” communities have reversed, to an extent, the 
asymmetry of the relationship they formerly developed with anthropologists. 
They are no longer solely their object of study. More prudent in the way they 
deal with social scientists, those communities have also been using them to 
further their causes and, moreover, have drawn upon the knowledge produced 
by that discipline so as to understand themselves. Anthropologists such as 
Levi-Strauss feel depressed by that, scared perhaps that these communities 
might in fact decide to study something such as the "L6vi-Strauss tribe".52 
They place that scientific instrument, however, alongside their own traditions, 
without moreover embracing the world-view associated with Western science, 
which is treated basically as a resource.
Network analysis has been very much attentive to this sort of issue. 
According to the theorem of someone working within this trend, "the success 
of instrumental action is associated positively with the social resources 
provided by the contact".53 This contribution stresses the fact that the position 
of the "actor" in the upper layers of the social hierarchy facilitates in principle 
access to resources outside. Tilly underlines, to some extent, this point too,
52For Levi-Strauss’s opinion, see his interview to Fabio Altman, "Um 
Sabio na Tribo do Passado", Revista Veja, n. 1292 16/06/1993 (48:50). For a 
more general discussion, see George E. Marcus and Michael M. I. Fischer, 
Anthropology as Cultural Critique, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1986, pp. 37-8 and 44.
53N. Lin, "Social Resources and Instrumental Action", in P. V. Marsden 
and N. Lin, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis, p. 133.
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drawing in addition our attention to the question highlighted above in 
connection with Parsons’s argument: he observes that a "mobilization" group 
riveting on the "building of an arsenal" will be more likely to "get away" with 
running "afoul of the law" the more powerful it is.54 He is, actually, the 
original source of inspiration for social movements resource analysis, which 
has emphasised - often in regard to the media - how those collectivities can 
and do reach out to elements they do not in principle control in order to 
advance their causes.55 The relation between resources and hierarchy is, 
nonetheless, more complex, as shall be seen below.
As for the hermeneutic dimension, i.e. as for how collectivities are 
perceived by others in ranking terms, we can say that it influences the position 
of units in the system in two dimensions. On the one hand, this position may 
be conferred to them because they are perceived as occupying it for intrinsic 
reasons, although of course the latter are socially delineated. This is the 
obvious case for qualities such as beauty or performances like obtaining a Ph 
D degree (which then becomes a quality of their possessors). On the other 
hand, the hermeneutic dimension is defined in accordance with the legitimation 
for the differentiated ranking, symbolic and real, of diverse units in the 
hierarchical system. The lack of fit which Parsons noted is often, however, 
much larger than he assumed it to be, insofar as his solution to the problem of 
order clung to normative controls, with less than adequate attention given to
54C. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p.57.
55See Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, eds., The Dynamics o f Social 
Movements, Cambridge (MA), Winthrop, 1979.
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the role coercion plays in unequal social structurings. Besides, in accordance 
with previous similar statements (see chap. 6.III and above), I want to draw the 
distinction between the hermeneutic dimension in terms of the constitution of 
a collectivity and the possibility of norms and evaluations persisting as external 
to it - sometimes as a constraint, to be sure, but often as a resource as well. 
This means, of course, that authority, irrespective of the high level of its 
legitimacy, is never total, unless a real consensus, as devised by Habermas, 
underlies the establishment of the social hierarchy - and even in this case one 
might wonder about the role envy and other human feelings might play. 
Provision made for that possibility, legitimate authority is usually coupled with 
domination, which stands on its own sometimes, with no legitimation processes 
to secure it.
The possibility that images and norms are treated in instrumental terms 
must be reckoned with. Collectivities may maintain a very much pragmatic 
attitude towards the "legitimate order" in which they are subordinate - this 
would be the case of the working classes in the West today, as mentioned 
above - or may deal with it, whatever their position in the hierarchy, as 
something not really to be respected, but only used, deceptively if necessary, 
to guarantee the prevalence of their goals. Thereby these hermeneutic features 
should be seen, analytically, as either properties of a collectivity or as 
resources that lie outside it. The corruption so often associated with 
governmental groups all over the world, even when they rise to power calling 
for morality in public life, is an extremely obvious and conspicuous example 
of sheer instrumental collective attitude towards "rules". Weber has, with
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regard to Protestantism, drawn attention to this instrumental use of world­
views:
As is well known, not a few (one may say the majority of the 
older generation) of American ’promoters’, ’captains of 
industry’, of the multi-millionaires and trust magnates belonged 
formally to sects, especially to the Baptists. However, in the 
nature of the case, these persons were often affiliated for merely 
conventional reasons...their religiosity was, of course, often of 
a more than dubious character.56
Therewith they achieved social legitimation and business contacts; other 
groups, more deeply connected to these life styles were, according to him, 
responsible for the changes in patterns of orientation that led up to the modem 
world’s distinctive outlook.
We should, in any case, be aware of what Giddens has called the 
"dialectics of control". In fact, he proposes this concept with reference to 
individual actors, who, under domination, always find ways to influence their 
situation, to an at least minimal degree.57 I want to transpose this idea to the 
level of interaction between collective subjectivities. No situation brought 
about by the interaction of two or more collectivities would, thus, be entirely
56M. Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1906), in
From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, p. 308.
57A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 145ff.
309
defined by the dominant pole in the relation. Regardless of how restricted the 
capacity a collective subjectivity has to, more or less consciously, or 
intentionally, make its imprint on the outcome of the interaction in which it 
takes part, it is always an active element. It is true, on the other hand, that the 
degree to which it has its room to manoeuvre varies. This variation ranges 
from almost complete incapacity, constitutionally or situationally given, in the 
case of a subordinate system, to an almost balanced situation, or even 
overwhelming command, if it is the dominant pole in a given interaction. Any 
social system, in whatever situation, has a minimal strength to define the core 
values and orientations of broader social system, as well as the institutional 
and material elements which give shape to the situations that result from its 
interactive processes - and, of course, itself as a collectivity. Habermas’ 
rejection of the old Frankfurt School pessimistic account of contemporary 
Western societies and Foucault’s detection of countervailing powers in the face 
of a dominant dispositif8 should be both referred to this pervasive "dialectics 
of control". Again in these reflections we can discern the role played by 
irreducible particularities, which resist the assimilation of more powerful 
systems.
Finally, it is necessary to emphasise that the very position a ruling 
collectivity occupies in the social hierarchy may prevent it from making use 
of resources that are available to other groups, such as ideologies, cultural 
patterns and practices, and so forth. When young Brazilian black people started
58See, for Habermas, chap. 3.1 and III; plus, M. Foucault, "Two Lectures" 
(1976), in Power and Knowledge (ed. by Colin Gordon), Brighton, Harvester, 
1980, p. 83.
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making use of James Brown’s and other North-American soul music some 
decades ago, it was clear that, whereas the white Brazilian population could 
borrow from European and North-American white culture, it would be harder 
for them to do the same with black cultural expressions. Their identity as a 
relatively distinct, though subordinate group, was thereby in part secured, 
although no articulate project had been devised in that direction. At least to a 
considerable extent, this was a totally unintended outcome of choices and 
inclinations of young black people who shared similar life-histories and 
happened to enjoy that sort of music.59
59See Renato Ortiz, Cultura Brasileira e Identidade National, Sao Paulo, 
Brasiliense, 1985, p. 8. For the production and consumption of music as a 
process that involves collective subjectivities (although the author has in mind 
in fact the outcome of the process in its totality), see H. Becker, "Art as 
Collective Action", American Sociological Review, v. 39, 1974 (767:776).
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CONCLUSION
I)COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVITY: A TYPOLOGY
Endeavouring to form a classification of social systems, a number of 
typologies have been proposed in sociology. In the course of our discussion we 
met, and I often criticised, other attempts at differentiating types of social 
system. Especially significant for our discussion is the distinction some authors 
have drawn between groups and "quasi-groups". Whereas the former would 
imply definite relations between individuals, each of them being conscious of 
the group and its symbols, with the collectivity possessing basic organisation 
and structure as well as a psychological foothold in the mind of its members, 
the latter would lack these characteristics. Social classes, age, status and sex 
groups would belong in this second type.1
Gurvitch attempted to further develop a taxonomy related to the subject of 
this study. Discussing the several relations of we’s with alter-egos, he 
identifies four types of social collectivities: micro collectivities, which would 
be very flexible; groups, more structured and more strongly held together by 
centripetal forces; social classes, partial multi-functional macrocosms of 
groupings that oppose other classes; and global societies, "macrocosms of 
macrocosms". Particularly relevant to our discussion is his conceptualisation 
of two types of "sociability": the first would be "passive", founded on affective 
ties, but not on goals; the second, "active", would, on the contrary, be based 
upon the accomplishment of "oeuvres". Groups would always be of the second
JThe distinction between groups and quasi-groups is pivotal to the 
discussion in R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, pp. 173-89.
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sort - denoting a "unity of attitudes, of oeuvres and of conducts", not all of 
them however consisting of organisations; the "mass", communities and pure 
forms of communion would be characteristic of the first one. Moreover, social 
classes, societies and even larger groups, even when they are passive, would 
count on active groups, which guarantee their existence, although they 
sometimes provoke internal turmoil or stalemates.2 Gurvitch’s ideas are, to an 
extent, in agreement with the theses on collective subjectivity herein 
developed, especially when he suggested something similar to a view of social 
systems as intertwined and mutually conditioning each other.
But his separation of groups from other types of collectives is not 
dissimilar to the aforementioned one between groups and quasi-groups. And 
both need to be handled carefully, since, even though the fluidity of this kind 
of differentiation is often acknowledged in regard to concrete social systems, 
it still owes its raison-d’ etre to that traditional opposition between conditioning 
and active causality. Instead of accepting this split, therefore, I shall propose 
a typology grounded on a continuum of levels of centring and intentionality. 
The level of centring should be, in fact, regarded as the primary one, whereas 
the level of intentionality of the movement of a collectivity is directly related 
to the extent to which the social system is centred. As we will see in the next 
section, this level of centring, if high, is not capable, per se, of assuring great 
impact of the collectivity upon its interactive setting. It should be added to this 
that the levels of centring and intentionality of collectivities vary according to
2G. Gurvitch, "Probleme de Sociologie Generale", in G. Gurvitch, ed., 
Traite de Sociologie, t. I, pp. 172ff.
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internal and external circumstances, within the limits of the specific features 
of different types of social system.
Typologies are, to a certain degree, inescapably arbitrary, always 
provisional and only useful tools when we undertake to approach reality, 
building a worthwhile bridge between general theoretical constructions and 
more empirically oriented concepts. The typology presented herein does not 
pretend to evade these characteristics. Let us examine it:
l)The first type to be considered is what I want to call network. It may be 
more or less diffuse or more or less structured, but its level of centring is 
usually low. Its members, individuals and collectivities, come together without 
the intention and organisation to effect a direct and focused impact upon 
reality. Broad friendship webs and broad intellectual circles, consumers of 
certain products, extensive families in societies wherein nuclear families are 
the basic unit of kinship and so forth, are some of the instances we can 
encompass under the classification of network. A very significant example of 
this type is the economy as a social system (not, I repeat, the economy as the 
mediation of society and nature in analytical terms) - especially when 
organised as an ideal competitive market. This is not true in societies in which 
it is firmly entangled with other systems, whether of kinship or politics. In 
social formations wherein it has achieved a considerable amount of 
autonomisation from other spheres, it must be regarded as a network, which 
possesses a low level of centring and intentionality.
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2)Classes, genders, races, and ethnic formations constitute another important 
type. I shall call them categories. Their level of centring and intentionality is 
already higher than that of networks. They may, though they may not, develop 
common identities, become organised, and exert a rather intentional action in 
social life. In any event, it is unlikely that these collectivities can surmount 
their internal heterogeneous features and fractures, for - criss-crossed 
themselves by the whole range of social phenomena - centrifugal forces are 
almost necessarily at work within them, except in specific conjunctures, during 
which the sort of identity upon which they are built becomes endowed with a 
powerful force.
3)Groups consist our third type of social system. Their level of centring is 
potentially very high, for their identity is virtually already given and it is 
possible for them to become organised and effective without much effort. Peer 
groups, close friendships, community neighbourhoods and, at the extreme 
potential level, the family - in accordance with the dominant kind of kinship 
structure of society, whether extended or nuclear - provide some of the main 
examples of this category.
4)Encounters, haphazard or not, may achieve high level of centring. For 
example, coming to constitute quickly formed and dissolved mobs, as it has 
been of the tradition of the English popular classes. A myriad of other 
circumstantial groups are formed and dissolved in daily life, with a low or high 
level of centring.
5)Social movements are a peculiar category, almost a network, but usually 
possess more awareness, that is self-identity, and capacity of joint mobilisation.
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They stand out because of their historical relevance too. They tend to be 
relatively loosely organised, notwithstanding the existence at times within them 
of tighter groupings - of intellectuals, for example - or organisations - such as 
political parties, associations, newspapers or unions - which promote higher 
level of centring, or strive to do so, often unintentionally achieving the 
opposite, though.
6)Organisations are the sort of social system capable of attaining the highest 
level of centring and intentionality, despite the fact that this is not given either. 
Formal organisations have received pride of place for a number of years, as we 
have seen, as the paradigm of the collective actor in much of sociological 
theory. Superseded by the broader notion of collective subjectivity, they are by 
no means the cornerstone for theory building in this study. They retain, 
however, an important position, not only because of their growing prominence 
in contemporary society, but also for their extremely high potential level of 
demarcation, centring and intentionality. Political parties, business corporations, 
the state and its diverse bureaucratic branches, the army, etc., have all been 
interpreted as formal organisations. Speaking of organisations in a more 
general way, I want to make clear that other collectivities, such as football 
teams or criminal gangs, may be considered under this typological heading. 
Churches and sects usually consist in organisations as well.
7)Societies are a peculiar case of social system. Not because they would be 
self-subsistent, as envisaged by Parsons, a hypothesis progressively less tenable 
today. Nor do they necessarily coincide with nation-states: cities, civilisations 
and world-systems should also be understood under this classification. They
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are total social systems, encompassing diverse networks, social groups and 
categories, criss-crossed by conflicts and contradictions. Although their 
effectiveness hinges on processes of cohesion and intentional impact that are 
not automatically and directly to be identified with them, their identity and 
thereby potential relative level of centring are thus quite frequently extremely 
high, depending on an array of other circumstances, for example state 
legitimacy, urban pride, the outbreak of war, etc.
I have refused for excessively closely associated with traditional notions 
Gurvitch’s sharp distinction between active and passive collectivities. 
Nonetheless, the idea, as suggested in his work, that some collectivities largely 
depend on other collectivities to become centred or heighten this level and that 
of intentionality is rather interesting. Utilitarian thinkers concerned with 
’’collective action” and the emergence of organisations from interest groups 
have lent outstanding importance to this issue. Olson is greatly concerned with 
this question, directly identifying group size with the degree of possibility of 
joint action. For him, as we have seen (in chap. 8.III), large groups tend not 
to organise, since they have no incentives to come together, according to a 
strict utilitarian logic, and therefore enjoy a very low capacity of impact upon 
social processes. Small groups would not incur these difficulties. What is at the 
core of his argument, however, is the capacity a certain group has to attain 
intentional action, which, in turn, depends on its possible level of centring. 
Placing his stress on size, he does not perceive this issue. Russell Hardin 
recently added his thoughts on this utilitarian reasoning, showing that, provided
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some individuals profit enough from supplying the goods themselves, they will 
do so, regardless of whether they have to support the burden of the task alone 
or not.3
It is necessary to take this discussion further, even though the idea I want 
to introduce is not at total variance with the points raised by those writers. In 
dealing with interest groups, their ideas touch upon important issues. The real 
factors for discussion should nonetheless be the level of centring and 
intentionality a group can achieve - underpinned either by collective 
dispositions (utilitarian motivations, normative impulses, etc.) or coercion. Size 
is not a key variable per se, although it may imply that other subgroups need 
to emerge from larger ones so as to confer a collectivity with higher levels of 
centring and intentionality and then greater immediate impact.
II)A CONTROLLING FRAME OF REFERENCE
The dimensions we have been focusing on can all grasped by means of the 
concept of structure I considered in previous chapters. Thus, we can render the 
organic constitution of social systems, their perspectives, their space-time 
configuration, their power relations, their dispositions and interests, their 
interactive inclinations, in terms of models or structures. The same is true as 
for their levels of centring and intentionality. To what degree do these 
elements influence the capacity of impact social systems exert in social life -
3Russell Hardin, Collective Action, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1982, pp. 4Iff.
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that is how much do they contribute to what will be called hereafter their 
potency?4 We will go over and detail the content of the elements listed above 
so as to meet this question.
Possibly implying identity, existence and strength of decision-making 
centres, demarcation and internal compactness - though not all of them 
necessarily together - the level of centring directly determines what was named 
level of intentionality - the clear-cut and focused joint movement of a 
collectivity. As for their perspectives, we may say that they indirectly influence 
what I have called their interactive inclinations, by means of which I mean the 
direction towards which a collective subjectivity, in a more or less intentional 
form, interacts with other social systems. The form and content of their 
perspectives increase or decrease their impact upon their interactive settings. 
The mediation between these perspectives and inclinations is carried out by the 
collectivity’s dispositions. On the other hand, the organic constitution of a 
social system is significant in social processes, as a function of its internal 
material capacities, again taken or utilised in a more or less intentional manner.
The problem is that if we refer to collectivities as the units that exercise 
might - i.e. the extent to which they are able to make use of resources that lie 
outside themselves - the level of centring of these social systems must be
4Parsons defined the term in relation to a unit’s "...relative capacity to 
influence the outcome of a process", as compared to other units in an 
interactive system. He related it directly to the stratification of the system, 
which is too simple. We need to take into account, together with the hierarchy 
of such inclusive settings, other elements, as seen above. For his point of view, 
consult T. Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the 
Theory of Action", in S. Koch, ed., Psychology: a Study o f a Science, v. 3, p. 
638.
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examined beforehand: as much as any other element, it depends also on the 
level of centring and intentionality of the system that exercises it. Therefore, 
it varies according to the other elements that contribute to the level of centring. 
Two groups within a collectivity, making use of similar resources, can even 
produce total paralysis or neutralisation of the impact of the encompassing 
system. The potential exercise of power varies, in addition, with the position 
of a social system in the general hierarchy of its inclusive interactive settings, 
but this is not a necessary correlation.
I want to dissociate what was called above the potency of collective 
subjectivities from any direct association with their level of centring and 
intentionality. The causal impact a social system has in social life, although it 
hinges on these factors, is linked to these other elements too. The impact that 
certain loosely organised social movements, classes, intellectual trends and 
similarly faintly centred subjectivities exercise can be of paramount 
importance. One might say that only a deep-seated presupposition in Western 
culture is responsible for this stress on activism, which of course requires a 
high level of centring and intentionality. This is the background, for instance, 
to Etzioni’s high praise for the "active society", "in charge" of itself - "aware, 
committed and potent".5 But, as Weber’s studies, to take just one case, 
demonstrated, this is not a universally held belief.6 A lesser level of both 
those factors does not, thus, mean diminished impact in social life, for it can
5A. Etzioni, The Active Society, pp. 4-5.
6See, for instance, M. Weber, Economy and Society, v. I, Berkeley/ Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1978 (1921/2), pp. 55Iff.
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be conceived of in a much looser manner as spanning over the long-term. 
Moreover, the historical context wherein this impact is to be felt must receive 
due attention.
To be sure, the rhythm of unfolding and the configuration of social 
systems, as much as that of other social systems that stand in direct or indirect 
relation with one another, is always affected by their level of centring. In the 
short term, the higher this level, the greater the capacity a social system has 
to shape its rhythms and configurations, and the greater the impact a social 
system has upon other systems. In the long run, however, this is not 
necessarily the case. Not only may this impact not last in subsequent 
developments, but it is also quite possible for loosely organised movements 
and other diverse social systems to exert a less immediate, though far-reaching 
impact upon the unfolding of social processes. Not even the direct association 
between centring and activism inexorably obtains, as shall be seen with 
reference to the Protestant sects below.
We need at last to bring these elements together and specify the impact 
collective subjectivities exercise in social life. It should be borne in mind in 
the course of the following that social systems contribute to the establishment 
of their interactive settings and to their mutual constitution through precisely 
those interactive processes.
The ideas herein proposed are not meant to contribute to a rigid deductive 
model, although they might help built instrumental ones with restricted reach. 
They are rather envisaged as advancing a controlling frame of reference, 
against which empirical research should be gauged. It sums up knowledge,
322
furnishes concepts, insights, queries and clues to empirical inquiries.7 The 
historical and specific settings onto which the proposals I want to put forward 
are to be applied demand, therefore, attention and proper investigation: social 
sciences work with open systems; their variables often escape control, 
definition and measure, and even identification.8 The more rigidly structured 
a social system the more it is likely that deductive schemes can be clearly 
devised and mathematically formalised, since the number of surprises that are 
likely to come up in the course of the investigation tend to be lower, exactly 
as a consequence of that rigidity. Not by accident, it is in economics that such 
schemes are often developed.
With these caveat and provisions, I shall treat those factors as variables 
that have a differentiated impact upon the constitution of social systems. Three 
different types of variables need to be defined at the outset.9 The first is what 
will be called independent variables, since they may be specified without 
reference to other variables in the theoretical scheme, notwithstanding the 
possibility of breaking them down into other internal variables if one wishes 
to do so. The second will be named dependent: they are directly derived from 
an independent variable alone. Finally, the third ones will be christened
7T. Parsons, E. A. Shils et al., "Some Fundamental Categories of the 
Theory of Action", in Towards a General Theory o f Action, p. 3.
8R. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 21, and A Realist Theory of 
Science, chap. 2. This seems, however, to be also increasingly the case in the 
natural sciences.
^ o r  a discussion of this sort of problem, in ways I shall not follow, see 
T. Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of 
Action", pp. 63Iff.
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resultant variables, insofar as they obtain when those variables (independent 
or dependent) are crossed. These are analytical devices which are thought out 
so as to provide means of assessing the interactive processes of collective 
subjectivities, therein regarded as units. Whether or not the values of these 
variables could find mathematical expression is an issue that will not occupy 
us, although I believe it might be the case, as we can see in other areas of the 
social sciences.
Level of centring (LC) - or, conversely, decentring, perspectives (P) and 
organic constitution (OC) are, thus, independent variables: they can be 
analytically defined on their own, providing we do not attach any privileged 
causation to them, in particular the two latter. Position in the social hierarchy 
(PSH), although concretely dependent upon a range of factors, will be isolated 
and treated also as an independent variable and so will be might (M), i.e. the 
capacity a unit possesses to make use of resources outside itself - a possible 
link between them notwithstanding in concrete terms. Space-time (ST) is a 
dimension which, although concretely influenced by the others, is analytically 
independent. Level of intentionality (LI), dispositions (D) and direction of 
interactive inclinations (II) are dependent variables. Whilst the first derives 
from the level of centring of the collectivity, the second and the third can be 
deduced from the system’s perspective, in connection, moreover, with its 
organic constitution. Potency (PO) will be called a resultant, for it is ultimately 
consequent upon the interaction of a number of other independent and 
dependent variables: level of centring, thus the level of intentionality; the 
perspectives and the organic constitution, thus the collective dispositions,
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leading to the conformation of the interactive inclinations; the social system’s 
position in the social hierarchy; and finally its might. Potency needs, however, 
to be regarded as a broad variable too, which, alongside the space-time 
dimension - and other variables (OV) that possibly remain unknown or are at 
least specific to the historical, interactive, situation - finally yields the ultimate 
impact (I) of a given collective subjectivity upon a social process, in the short 
or the long run.
A graphic representation of these relations acquires the following aspect:
LC
OC
PSH
M
ST
OV
LI
II PO
FIGURE I
This detailed enumeration of variables does not imply that all of them 
must concur in the construction of the explananda at every stage in the course 
of whatever investigation. This may certainly be the case, but it seems more
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likely that some factors will be more important than others in specific 
instances. What should not be lost from sight is the general reference provided 
by the frame, which may help sustain a general awareness of 
multidimensional questions with reference to collective causality.
A last caveat: the frame of reference proposed above refers to one single 
social system. Its concrete application must, however, be carried out with a 
concern with the interactive relations between two or more collectivities. They 
not only shape their encompassing system jointly - even if in radical 
opposition: they shape each other as well, in accordance with their own 
capacity of impact. But there is no reason why one should imagine that the 
capacity of impact of collectivities necessarily entails a zero-sum game. It may 
well be the opposite that obtains.
III)DECENTRING, THE PROTESTANT SECTS AND MODERNITY
I want now to explore a specific and concrete example in order not only 
to illustrate the main ideas and concepts hitherto developed, but also to 
exemplify the general applicability and possibilities for this frame of reference. 
I hope to be able to draw attention to a neglected aspect of a much commented 
on issue and, in so doing, I shall endeavour to bring together two schools of 
thought which have developed separately, giving origin to what Klaus Eder has 
called the ’’European/ American divide in the study of social movements".10 
The cultural-developmental orientation of that strand - central to Weber’s and
10K. Eder, The New Politics o f  Class, pp. 5 and 48ff.
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Habermas’ discussions, for instance - will be coupled with the "resource 
mobilization approach", which pays great heed to issues of practical 
organisation, which have been dear to activists, but not so much to social 
scientists.
As noted above, the idea that the most effective causal impact upon the 
world is necessarily produced by a very centred, cohesive and delimited entity 
has been central to the Western tradition over the last few centuries: its 
conception of the subject rests, as we have seen, upon this presupposition. The 
subjectivism of the Reformation and the rationalisation of daily conduct 
introduced by Calvinism are at the roots of such a vision. Those individuals 
chosen by God should show their qualities as the Lord’s elect through an 
increasing pattern of control over themselves, entailing asceticism as a 
consequence of a strongly delimited and purposive ego, which ought to 
dedicate itself, in its loneliness, to the transformation of the environment. "In­
world asceticism" was Weber’s famous characterisation of this cultural pattern, 
a popular type of Calvinism which crept in out of the terrifying uncertainty 
about the designs of an inscrutable God and His verdict on those predestined 
either to enter the Kingdom of Heaven or doomed to Hell, as originally 
proposed in Calvin’s theology. Activity in the world was, therefore, introduced 
to counteract "feelings of religious anxiety".11 Parsons took up these ideas
nM. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, London, 
Unwin, 1930 (1904/5), especially p. 112.
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when he defined the American cultural tradition as basically an inheritor of 
that view, speaking of "in-world activism".12
As has already been remarked, other religions did not bank on the same 
sort of belief, preferring other forms of dealing with the world. In terms of the 
potential to transform the environment, however, there appears to be little 
contemporary disagreement regarding the instrumentality of this sort of pattern 
of conduct for the realisation of mundane deeds. This was the gist of Weber’s 
thesis on the role of the Protestant ethic and its release of the economic forces 
of a new sort of - rationalised - capitalism. This is however unambiguous at 
the individual level only. When we bring the notion of collective subjectivity 
into the plot a certain change in the argument must take place. Centred 
organisations have become crucial in the workings of capitalism; in contrast, 
if we focus on the part played by Protestant sects in the making of the 
contemporary world, the whole scene is altered.
Most of the discussions on the impact of Protestantism and its offsprings 
in the modem world have concentrated on the debate about the magnitude of 
the influence of ideas, versus material forces, which Weber supposedly played 
off against Marx. Much light has been thrown on the cultural innovation 
represented by the (instrumental) rationalisation of daily conduct, or even, as 
more recently, in Habermas’ case, on another side of the rationalisation 
process, i.e. that of morals and the law.13 Weber realised that the ascetic
12T. Parsons, "A Tentative Outline of American Values", in R. Robertson 
and B. S. Turner, eds., Talcott Parsons, Theorist of Modernity, pp. 47-58.
13J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, B. I, pp. 254, 305-6, 
38 Iff.
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rationalism of the Puritans affected the organisation and daily life of social 
groups, "from the congregational level all the way up to the national state"; but 
he did not pursue this line of inquiry.14 Culture, world-views, were, in his 
case, subsequently, at the heart of the controversy. Short shrift has been given 
to organisational factors in the development of the Protestant sects by 
sociologists, as Zaret recently noted and tried to remedy with respect to 
England.15
When this aspect is granted weight, the problem of collective subjectivity 
necessarily stands out. What is at stake, thus, is the reach of what I shall call 
the dialectics of activism and decentring, which accorded those sects their 
prodigious impact upon the making of the contemporary West. In a previous 
chapter (7.IV), I observed that collective causality is absent in Weber’s 
assessment of intentional conduct. This will now be made clear in relation to 
a concrete example, for we will have occasion to see that "organizational 
features of Puritanism" - as well as of other sects - "mediate actively between 
economic and ideological realities".16 The faith on a direct association 
between centring and impact will be challenged and the interactive inclinations 
of collective subjectivities will have their importance underscored. The 
hermeneutic and organic constitution of social systems will be touched upon,
14R. Bendix, Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait, London, Heinemann, 
1966 (1960), p. 87.
15David Zaret, The Heavenly Contract, Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1985, p. 6.
16Idem, Ibid., p. 11.
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as well as their space-time dimension and the structuring aspects of social life 
in the period.
Protestantism was bom with Luther and his reformist, which created a 
schism with the Roman hierarchy. It extended its doctrinaire divergencies and 
influence through Calvin’s preaching and governance in Geneva. It was in 
England, nonetheless, and with its eventual expansion in America, that it 
pushed through a deeper rupture with the Catholic Church. Puritanical 
separatism within the Church of England progressively grew in strength up 
to the stage at which, frustrated in its hopes of receiving support from the 
Royalty, it chose to concentrate all its energies on the colonisation of the New 
World, alongside the multiplicity of other sects that emerged in the period.
Within the Church in general a double-edged phenomenon has already, 
according to Weber, to be reckoned with. On the one hand, clergypersons 
sustain a relation of domination over the other members of the religious 
community; on the other, the Church as a whole represents a "constellation" 
of material and ideal interests.17 Legitimate authority plus feelings of 
solidarity and commonality of interest, dispositions and interactive inclinations 
provide for the structuring of the institution. The influence of a laity 
progressively more autonomous economically from the feudal and Monarchical 
encompassing environment enormously grew substantially in England during 
the seventeenth century. Clergymen were caught up in the uncomfortable 
situation of having to answer both to the institutionalised hierarchy of the
17R. Bendix, op. cit.y p. 292.
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church and to a, by and large, gradually more radicalised laity.18 At first these 
groups were located in the cities; the development of capitalism in the 
countryside lent greater power to this strata, which was, considerably at least, 
related to the new "price-making" (that is self-regulated) markets. Under this 
practical leverage these rising social groups transferred the ideas of possessive 
individualism and contract, which prevailed in those markets, to religious 
matters. A new concept of covenant was thus bom, implying specific 
procedures of internal structuring. The Puritanical but non-separatist movement 
within the English Church affirmed a one-sided contract of God with men, 
after the model of the Old Testament; the separatist movements insisted on a 
mutually binding and negotiated contract between men and God.19 The path 
to the fragmentation of the Church was open: its mediating role between divine 
and human spheres could now be questioned.
The eschatological, apocalyptic view that received its first formulation in 
Luther’s writings, and was later on embraced with a major role attributed to 
this country, by English reformers, was ultimately forced in the direction of a 
New World because of the resistance of the Anglican Church to deeper 
reformation. For Luther and those other writers, the split from the Roman 
Church was legitimated by the fact that it was taking place on the eve of the 
Final Judgement. It inaugurated, therefore, a new sacred time in the sacred 
space of Europe and, finally, specifically in England - the community chosen
18D. Zaret, op. dr., p. 14. Technically, the printing revolution fostered a
laicisation of culture, furnishing further impulse to this process.
19Idem, Ibid., pp. 17 and 135ff.
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by God to play a paramount role in human Redemption. America, in its 
"wilderness", became the new sacred space of that new sacred time.20 
Immersed in that symbolism, they launched themselves upon the adventure of 
colonisation, with its expanding frontier and accelerated transformation of the 
environment, impelled by the asceticism and "in-world" activism of dissidents. 
Thereby they shaped the actual space-time dimension of what eventually 
formed the United States - Virginia’s royal colonies apart - as well as their 
economy, culture and first institutions.
These sects depended financially on their members much more closely 
than they ever did in Europe.21 The resources for their (organic) constitution 
basically came from this source. This is the element behind Weber’s stress on 
voluntarism in his characterisation of these sects. They therefore reflected 
more immediately, the desires and perspectives of the local communities from 
which they drew their congregation hence, as had already occurred in England 
although only in part. However, success in individual terms was valued not 
only because it confirmed the state of grace of the sects’ members, but because 
it was regarded as a sign of collective election by God. Activism was as 
pivotal to the success of the individual as to the expansion of the sect.22 This 
last aspect was reinforced by active proselytism, whereby new converts were
20Avihu Zakai, Exile and Kingdom, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1992.
21M. Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism", in From
Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, p. 302.
22Idem, Ibid., p. 322.
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gained, although all these sects, according to Simmons, tended eventually to 
become more concerned with their own consolidation.23
A chief aspect of this process was what McLoughlin, echoing Troeltsch, 
characterises as a dialectics between, on the one hand, a desire for 
respectability plus order and, on the other, a search for religious freedom.24 
Initially fighting for toleration, new, minority sects became stifled and tended 
to become Churches, just to be challenged once again by new sects. First 
Puritans, then Antinomians, Baptists and Quakers, followed by Freewill 
Baptists, Shakers, Universalists, Methodists, and, a stage later, Adventists, 
Perfectionists, Mormons, and finally Pentecostal and Holiners - all those 
groups strived towards toleration and, once they had overcome initial 
resistances, looked forward to more general, spiritual and political, control and 
influence.
23R. C. Simmons, The American Colonies, London, Longman, 1976, pp. 
209ff.
24William G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent 1630-1833, v. I, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. xviii-xix. For Troeltsch, who 
conceptualised the dialectics of centring and decentring in religious life, the 
differences between Church and sect were "quite clear": "The Church is that 
type of organization which is overwhelmingly conservative, which to a certain 
extent accepts the secular order, and dominates the masses; in principle, 
therefore, it is universal, i.e. it desires to cover the whole life of humanity. The 
sects...are comparatively small groups; they aspire after personal inward 
perfection, and they aim at a direct personal fellowship between the members 
of each group". Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching o f the Christian 
Churches, v. I, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960 (1911), p. 331. It should 
be noted that, although much more centralised, throughout its history the 
Catholic Church has also undergone internal movements of decentring, which 
are usually expressed in new orders, from the Franciscans to the Jesuits. Their 
role in the colonisation of America can hardly be overestimated.
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We can see that, on the basis of the idea of a radical covenant, the 
dynamic of decentring was fundamental to the accomplishments of 
Protestantism. Rather than a centred and unified movement, it was a 
fragmented one which guaranteed the widespread development of capitalism 
in the American colonies. The close relationship between community and 
Protestant sects was essential to this outcome. The so-called "elective affinity", 
however, cannot be examined in cultural terms alone, as the consonance 
between bourgeois strata and certain, in-world activistic and ascetic patterns 
of behaviour. Two phenomena stand out, allowing for the connection of the 
movement as a whole with the broader social system, especially to the 
emergent bourgeois classes. The relational perspective of the movement, 
founded on a specific, contractually inspired, manner of recruiting followers - 
which, furthermore, provided for its ties with the emergent ruling classes of 
North-America and, consequently, for good positioning within the social 
hierarchy25 - matched other social developments unfolding at that moment. 
The low level of centring of the movement - despite the high level of centring 
of its individual followers and their activism and that of the individual sects, 
which on their own may be classified as organisations - in turn afforded the 
concretisation of those relational perspectives and the style of structuring. 
Social relations and collective subjectivity must be borne in mind when the
“ The importance of belonging to a sect and thus being recognised as a 
trustable person was highlighted by Weber; otherwise not only social exclusion 
tended to follow but business opportunities would diminish. This helped bring 
about the instrumental utilisation of Protestantism by a number of captains of 
industry and commerce, as previously observed (in chap. 8.IV). See M. 
Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism", pp. 304ff.
334
impact of the Protestant sects is dwelled upon in association with the 
emergence of capitalist modernity, in particular when we refer to its 
consummation in the United States of America.26
To be sure, the dynamic of the Protestant sects was not solely responsible 
for the development of capitalism either in England, Germany or Holland, but 
only in part, since they were not completely victorious in these areas. In 
France this is even less the case. It is true, too, that Weber later introduced 
other factors, much closer to Marx’s view, so as to explain the rise of 
capitalism and modernity.27 But, to the extent that the Protestant sects retain 
their relevance in this connection, especially in America, their collective 
causality and the relations they maintained with other collective subjectivities 
must be given due attention. It may help in going beyond individual causality 
and the introduction of world-views in society at large, bringing in the 
dialectical relations between movement and other systems, social classes and 
the encompassing "environment".
260 f  course, this does not detract from the possibility that, at another level, 
a broader collective identity was necessary, and that the very idea of an 
American nation was bom out of the strain brought about by the fragmentation 
of sects which, having rejected the organicism of Anglicanism, needed some 
other form of (partial) "universalism". This is suggested by Louis Hartz, The 
Founding o f New Societies, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964, p. 11.
27See R. Collins, Weberian Sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1986, pp. 19ff.
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IV)A REITERATION OF BASIC CONCEPTS
Finally it will be useful to state, in a concise form, the main conclusions 
reached in the development of this discussion on contemporary syntheses in 
sociological theory and the theory of collective subjectivity. They are the 
following:
1)Social systems are systems of action, made up of individual actors and, as 
soon as we depart from elementary units, other social systems. Their internal 
constitution comes about interactively. They comprise a communicative aspect, 
although the interaction of their units includes not only argumentative and 
symbolic operations, but also power relations as well as the transformation of 
the organic natural world. Social systems are, therefore, sets of ongoing 
interactions, which unfold as time and are shaped as social space.
2)The interactive processes that constitute social systems possess properties 
that cannot be reduced to their individual units or to other social systems. The 
extent to which these properties, in the hermeneutical dimension, are 
internalised by individual actors is, moreover, contingent and vary in each 
concrete case. The construction of structures is a worthwhile tool in the 
analysis of social systems. We should be careful, though, not to attribute 
ontological existence to them. The relative level of homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of a social system must be accounted for when such a 
construction of structures is undertaken.
3)The constitution of social systems is multidimensional. On the one hand, it 
contains a hermeneutic dimension, which I call their perspectives, whereby
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their internal dynamic and the external interactive setting are perceived and 
judged. On the other hand, it contains a material dimension, which I call their 
organic constitution, whereby they carry out their interchange with the organic 
material world. Both dimensions are always present in any social system, and 
they are some of the cardinal properties of the interactive processes that shape 
them, in the course of which a space-time social dimension is also produced. 
Other properties consist of power relations, collective dispositions and 
interests, interactive inclinations, and so forth.
4)Individuals are able to exert efficient causality, since they act, more or less 
reflexively, by impulse or routine - in any case, intentionally, notwithstanding 
the permanent possibility of unintended consequences of their action coming 
about. Social systems possess a sort of efficient causality over themselves, 
which may be understood in terms of influence. They signify the two sorts of 
causality, conditioning and active, to which I have referred throughout these 
pages. The first one is a property of social systems, which cannot be reduced 
to their individual members. It is, in fact, the impact collectivities exert on 
their units - other collectivities and individuals. Another causal property of 
social systems must be, however, introduced, for it has not received proper 
heed from sociological theory. Whereas conditioning causality has - almost 
without exception, if sometimes ad hoc - been accepted, a more active 
causality has too often been denied to social systems. This causal property is 
what I have called collective causality: thence the notion of collective 
subjectivity ensues, for the cognizance of this property entails the attribution
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of a precise characterisation to social systems, which implies causality, but also 
interaction, dialectics and reflexibility.
5)Individual actors, or even social systems that constitute units of other, 
inclusive social systems, may or may not be aware of the role they play in the 
constitution of a collective causality. They may behave intentionally to foster 
or thwart it, or else they may be completely oblivious to it. Their contribution 
to the constitution of a collective causality may be intentional or just an 
unintended consequence of their action. Similar to individual action, which is 
as a rule only relatively reflexive, the interplay of the action of individuals in 
interactive processes brings about a collective subjectivity, whose level is also 
relative. It cannot be taken for granted, requiring examination in each concrete 
case.
6)The extent to which a collective subjectivity has a compact constitution - 
that is the extent to which it has a distinct identity, strong decision-making 
centres, clear-cut boundaries, explicit internal roles and cohesion - is also 
relative. Its level should not be regarded as high a priori. For the same reason, 
collectivities that do not fit into this tight model should not be excluded from 
the category of collective subjectivities.
l)Qua collectivities, social systems are constituted not in isolation, but in 
interaction with other social systems. Thereby their constitution is directly, or 
indirectly, influenced by the causality of other social systems. These 
interactions are of many kinds, from close collaboration to overt hostility, and 
hinge on the perspectives and dispositions of the social system regarding its 
environment, which produce its interactive inclinations.
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8)The potency of a collective subjectivity, i.e. its capacity of impact upon other 
collectivities, depends, thus, on a range of factors. The levels of centring and 
intentionality are exceedingly important, but potency cannot be directly derived 
from them. The perspectives and the organic constitution of the social system 
are also important in this regard. We must be attentive to the relation between 
the space-time dimension and potency, for, apparently ineffective in the short 
run, the impact of a social system upon the unfolding of another system may 
turn out to be paramount in the long run.
9)Social hierarchies must always be reckoned with: they express the 
advantaged or disadvantaged position a system occupies in relation to other 
systems. It may also determine the access social systems have to resources that 
might furnish instruments for the exercise of power and, therefore, participate 
in the increase of their potency, although this is not necessarily the case.
10)In short, social life must be considered in terms of a multiplicity of 
interactions between individual actors and collective subjectivities, which are 
intertwined in uneven and shifting ways. Social change and relative 
permanence are to be understood in this light. Neither individualistic nor most 
of the other more complete frameworks have, however, been entirely able to 
take stock of this reality, insofar as collective subjectivity has too often been 
a neglected concern. The cross-fertilisation of contemporary syntheses in 
sociological theory with the few theories of collective subjectivity available, 
in their remaking, is intended to overcome this shortcoming. This was the 
purpose of this study.
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